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PREFACE
A history of the Pacific cable involves considerable 
problems in approach and sources. These difficulties begin 
with the range of political communities and actors involved; no 
less than six separate imperial and colonial administrations 
spanning twenty-five years of intense politics. I have 
concentrated on the more neglected aspect of this history; the 
perspective to be gained from the Australian sources. A 
definitive history of the cable would ultimately involve a 
rigorous treatment, similar to this examination, of all the 
regional and metropolitan forces involved in this fascinating 
if deeply-tangled narrative of technological and imperial 
development in the late Victorian era.
Within the Australian context, a considerable problem of 
sources and their whereabouts had to be surmounted before I 
could begin my initial assessment. The crucial documentary 
resources, which record the making of the cable connection in 
the years prior to Australia's Commonwealth of 1901, I found to 
have scattered among a range of state and federal archival 
deposits. After 1975, the Department of the postmaster-general 
was further divided between 'Australia Post' and 'Telecom 
Australia', yet again affecting archival collections. I
further found that key sources used by the major doctoral
dissertation of Dr K.J. Melhuish, within her 1965 study of
"Australia and British Imperial Policy 1885-1902" (Sydney) were 
no longer available at the Sydney General Post Office. These 
were at last found through Australia Post, in a disused 
warehouse in Chippendale. I have been able to draw heavily
i
from these neglected papers. Since my discovery they have 
fortunately been moved to be housed in the 'historical section' 
of Telecom, safely located at the City South Exchange, Sydney.
Personal papers proved less useful than I had hoped. The 
Larke papers and the Rowan letterbooks, held at the National 
Library, Canberra, were valuable, essentially for the period 
1885-99. But private collections of several of the significant 
figures in the narrative could not be traced despite my 
assiduous efforts: I would have particularly appreciated the 
private papers of the more important colonial 
postmasters-general. A larger-scale study, from a wider 
perspective of research, would also wish to peruse the sources 
in Canada and London. However, given the richness of the 
documentation available in Australia, and the large general 
literature on British imperial and telegraphic history, this 
thesis has still faced a task of comprehension and
'reconstruction' that at times seemed as difficult to achieve 
as the Pacific cable itself.
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"This act, the signing of the Pacific Cable contract, simple and 
unpretending as it may seem, was really a greater step towards the 
unity of the Empire than the most splendid conquest. As an act of 
partnership between six Governments, it is far reaching in its 
effects, and may be regarded as the forging of the key to the 
solution of the great Imperial problem."
Sir Sandford Fleming,
to the Royal Society of Canada,
22 May, 1901.
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Introduction
Imperial and Commonwealth history has traditionally emphasised 
the interaction of the periphery states with the metropolitan centre 
of Empire. Few scholars have seriously addressed the connections 
between the various colonial societies of settlement. In 1902, the 
physical barrier separating the Dominion of Canada and the 
Commonwealth of Australia was bridged by way of a submarine cable, 
bringing the two largest settlement colonies in the British Empire 
into direct telegraphic contact. The history of the Pacific cable 
offers an excellent case-study in examining one aspect of the 
relationship between the two major self-governing colonies of 
settlement within the context of the British Empire. In the idiom 
of the late Professor W.L. Morton, it provides a fascinating aspect 
of the 'connectional history' of the settlement Empire. The Pacific 
cable was not only the first public work undertaken jointly by Great 
Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the Australian colonies. It was 
also the first technological project conceived in the colonies to 
promote the unity of the Empire, and which actually was achieved.
British Imperialism after 1870 can be very generally divided 
into two schools of thought. One was loosely associated with 
Gladstonian liberalism and the other with conservatism and 
unionism. The first tended to view the Empire as a collection of 
independent states tied to Britain by only sentiment and interest, 
an historic legacy of earlier expansion and overseas enterprise. To 
Gladstone, for example, the best means of promoting the British 
Empire was to grant the maximum of self-government, or 
self-responsibility to the major societies of settlement. This 
tradition of "voluntaryism", bordering on
"anti-imperialism" in the eyes of its critics, was an orthodoxy of 
approach even firmly subscribed to by many officials in the British 
public service.
This aspect of the "official mind", in the public service, made 
it difficult for the exponents of the second interpretation of 
Empire, the "consolidation and reconstruction" school. They 
advocated an assertive foreign and colonial policy, to expand and 
develop the power of the British in world politics. This view was 
pressed on policy by Joseph Chamberlain, a liberal minister of the 
Unionist government after 1895. However, the Pacific cable 
demonstrates that the emphasis of the "new Imperialism" focused on 
'reconstruction', rather than consolidation. The thrust of 
late-19th century British imperialism often found its form in 
attempts to exploit tropical possessions, and it did not always give 
first priority to development of the older Empire of settlement.
The idea of crossing the Pacific with a submarine cable as a 
partial or 'all-British' project originated in Sydney. The local 
1876 Post and Telegraph Conference passed a resolution requesting 
the postmaster-general of New Zealand to inquire into the prospects 
of a telegraph cable which would begin in Australia and terminate in 
California. The Canadian plan for a Pacific cable found its origins 
in the final report of Canadian Pacific Railway engineer-in-chief, 
Sir Sandford Fleming, to the Dominion Parliament. This proposed a 
north Pacific route from the west coast of Canada, via the Aleutian 
Islands, to Yesso, Japan. It was not until 1886 that Canadians and 
Australians jointly began to consider a direct telegraphic 
communication link.
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Initial contact led to further discussion. In 1887 the proposal 
was advanced significantly when the Imperial government convened the 
first Colonial Conference, to discuss topics of mutual concern. It 
was this meeting which brought the Pacific cable to the attention of 
a wider public. Sir John Pender, chairman of the "Eastern 
Extension, Australasia and China Telegraph Company", was
particularly interested in the possibilities of the proposition. 
The Eastern Extension Company had a vested interest in the progress 
of the Pacific cable movement. This resulted from ownership of the 
only existing overseas cable which connected Australia and New 
Zealand with the Old World. In years ahead, the supporters of a 
Pacific cable would change, as would the proposed routes and the 
means of financing the project. The only constant would be the 
persistent opposition of the Eastern Extension Company, with its 
alternate plans and proposals.
From the Post and Telegraph Conference of 1876, to the actual 
laying of the Pacific cable in 1902, the various colonial 
governments of Australia were largely motivated by the excessive 
tariffs charged by the Eastern Extension Company. Despite the 
desire of some Australian colonies to break the monopoly,
co-ordinated action often proved elusive, frustrating and 
time-consuming. For example, in 1891 the Eastern Extension Company 
succeeded in mollifying the restless colonial critics by reducing 
the tariff, and thus lessening the need to force competition. Given 
that the mere discussion of an alternative telegraph line moved the 
monopoly to cut their ordinary charge for telegrams by half, it is 
hardly surprising that discontented rumblings continued throughout 
the decade.
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The rise of a new Imperialist sentiment in Britain, at the
metropolitan heart of Empire, as well as the colonies during the
1890's, kept the Pacific cable idea in the foreground. A number of
reasons were involved. Paramount was the growing desire to assure
secure communications for commercial and defence reasons. The
submarine cable system of the Eastern and the Eastern Extension
companies suffered from the 'fatal flaw' of landing on, or near,
foreign territories. As British trading power declined relatively,
in relation to the European powers and the United States, the
commercial community in Britain feared any disruption to
communications, and by extension commerce, which would follow any
aggression toward an over expanded 'Greater Britain'. Indeed, noted
Imperial defence expert Sir Charles Dilke commented that,
It is imperatively required, for the safety of the Empire, 
in order to insure, in time of war, the communication 
between its various portions, that they should be connected 
by a series of purely British cables, having no shore ends 
upon foreign territory. ■*■
However, these fears did not move the "official mind" until 
Chamberlain's appointment to the colonial office in 1895. Once the 
Imperial government agreed to assist the interested colonies in 
propagating a Pacific cable, events moved quickly. The problem was 
then that of keeping the project alive while the British authorities 
often prevaricated.
It was Sandford Fleming who was, of all concerned, the most able 
in facing that task of promoting the Pacific cable in the face of 
both opposition and indifference. As an associate of Canada's
1. Sir Charles Dilke and Spenser Wilkinson, Imperial Defence. 
1897, cited in George Johnson ed. The All-Red Line: The
Annals and Aims of the Pacific Cable. Ottawa, 1903, pp.262-63.
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senior conservative statesmen, Fleming was able to keep the proposed 
cable in the political arena just when it appeared that interest was 
waning in the antipodes. G.N. Savory, in his 1972 thesis on 
"Colonial business initiatives and the Pacific cable: A study in 
the role of private enterprise in the development of Imperial 
communication", has argued that Fleming's resolve was paramount to 
the success of the project. This assertion is well made.
However, what needs to be added to that view is the crucial role 
which I will show was played by successive Australian colonial 
ministries in the completion of the cable. The annual "Post and 
Telegraph Conferences" in Australia repeatedly expressed a desire 
for a Pacific cable; and Australian delegates to the Ottawa 
Conference of 1894, and the Pacific Cable Committee of 1896, 
strongly approved resolutions favouring the Pacific scheme.
Yet, even with the support of all colonial parties, the Pacific 
cable was not easily achieved. Finalising details involved 
continuous correspondence, discussion and hard negotiation between 
Canada and the Australian colonies. In a move to expedite those 
lengthy negotiations, Canada dispatched its first trade commissioner 
to Australia in 1895. The presence of a Canadian intimate with the 
Pacific cable movement kept the Imperial and intra-colonial 
objective in sight. But, it still did not alleviate colonial 
rivalry. This process in particular involved a good deal of 'one 
upmanship' on the part of New South Wales. Disregarding the spirit 
of the Australian federal movement, the colonies haggled over almost 
every aspect of this history: financial contributions; delegates to 
the Pacific Cable Board; the veto power of the Imperial government; 
and generally attempting to secure the best terms for their own
5
colony. This tortured process offers an insight into the workings 
of British Imperialism at the turn of the century. Should promoting 
the Empire prove beneficial to the colonies, then all were in 
favour. If closer ties with Britain interfered with colonial 
autonomy, then 'Empire' was placed in second order of priorities.
While these negotiations continued over the years, the 
'monopoly' was not undefended. The Company responded to each set of 
circumstances by challenging the practicality of a second service 
and, when absolutely necessary, offering liberal concessions. Once 
the Pacific cable was on the verge of being realised, in a last 
attempt to limit the impact of competition on profits, the Eastern 
Extension Company offered a further reduction in rates and also an 
alternative cable, connecting Western Australia with South Africa, 
and then Britain - providing the Australian colonies allowed the 
Company to open offices in the capital cities, to collect and 
deliver telegrams. At the time of this last offer, all telegraphic 
business was handled by the general post offices. It was on this 
basis that the Imperial partnership of the Pacific cable was 
formed. The Eastern Extension Company was unable to convince the 
colonies of Queensland, Victoria and New Zealand of their good 
intentions; but, at the last moment, even after the Pacific Cable 
Bill had received Royal assent, New South Wales ignored protests 
from other partner states, and granted the concessions as 
requested. By so doing, New South Wales received lower rates during 
the 18 months when the Pacific cable was being constructed, while 
the other colonies involved with the Pacific cable paid a higher 
tariff.
The decision by the administration of New South Wales actively 
to support the Pacific cable, to the detriment of the Eastern
6
Company on the one hand, while delivering a financial death blow 
with the other, is a curious and paradoxical development. This is 
particularly true as the so called 'Adelaide agreement' was signed 
after the formation of the Commonwealth, and only months before 
postal matters were handed over to the central government. • By 
entering into an agreement with the Company, the caretaker 
government of New South Wales soured the unity of the Pacific cable 
compact, and strained the developing relationship between Canada and 
the new Commonwealth of Australia.
It is my intention to follow the development of the Pacific 
cable 'movement', focusing on the actions of New South Wales up to 
and including the signing of the Adelaide agreement. I will argue 
that the Eastern Extension Company was so determined on preserving a 
monopoly over the Australian telegraph traffic, that it actively 
prolonged the debate over the viability of the Pacific route; and, 
in the end, moved to restrict the success of the new line by 
establishing a direct service to the public. Through private 
negotiations with the colonies interested in the Pacific cable, the 
Company was able to divide and conquer a significant Imperial 
undertaking.
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CHAPTER ONE
SUBMARINE 
MONOPOLY',
TELEGRAPHY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN 'INFAMOUS 
(1837-1887)
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Prior to the advent of electricity communications were
painfully slow. The transmission of written or spoken messages 
depended on the speed and availability of transportation. In the 
case of overseas communications, many months separated the sending 
and receiving of information; making replies often outdated and 
useless. The electric communications revolution began in 1837 when 
the Electric Telegraph Company of London opened its lines for 
business.'*' From that point, investors and entrepreneurs began 
to consider the possibility of crossing under the high seas with 
cables. The application of electricity to communications broadened 
the possibilities and potential for commercial growth. Rapid 
communications meant more precise information on market fluctuations 
than ever before. Should the "magic" electric wire be adapted to 
transmissions across the oceans, the significance of telegraphy 
would take on a whole new meaning. The achievement would not only 
further British commercial development, but it would add a new 
dimension to the administration and expansion of Empire.
The story of the early years of submarine telegraphy is one of 
repeated failure. Theorists had no doubt of its practicability.
However, many years passed before a means of insulating the wire was
2perfected. The first attempt to institute overseas
communications was undertaken by the English Channel Submarine
1. Hugh Barty-King, Girdle Round the Earth: The Story of Cable 
and Wireless. 1851-1979. London, 1979, p. xiv.
2. The perfection came with the institution of 'gutta percha'. 
Mayalayan for gum cloth, gutta percha was first used in 
experiments as an insulating material in 1848. See Charles 
Bright, Submarine Telegraphs; Their History, Construction and 
Workings. London, 1898, p.248.
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Telegraph Company in 1850. The Company had received concessions
from the French government to establish a line from Dover to
Calais. The cable was successfully laid, but the signal went dead
3after only a few hours of operation. The fact that
communications had been established allowed the company to maintain
its concession, and the next year the line was a success, bringing
4London and P a n s  into direct contact.
This intitial success set off a flurry of speculation about the 
future prospects of the new technology. Accompanying the excitement 
over the submarine telegraph was a proliferation in the field of
land telegraphy. In 1855, there was already 8,000 miles of electric 
wire, pulsating its currents on almost every continent. Of that, 
two British firms, the Electric Telegraph Company and the English
and Irish Magnetic Telegraph Company, controlled 6,700 miles.5 
Overall, in the United Kingdom, a total of over one and a half
million pounds sterling had already been invested in telegraphs. 
The idea of expanding to other continents lured even more funds into 
submarine cables over the next decade. The most ambitious scheme 
was to cross the North Atlantic and join Europe to North America.
In 1856 the American Cyprus Field travelled to London to find 
investors for the Atlantic Telegraph Company. On 6 November, after 
finding three hundred and forty-five Britons willing to invest one
3. Ibid, p. 9.
4. Ibid, p. 12.
5. Barty--King, op p. 10.
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One of thethousand pounds each, the company was floated.
investors was John Pender, already a director of the English and
Irish Company. The Company had been granted a subsidy of £14,000
per annum from Doth the British and American governments, an
unprecedented move in the brief history of submarine cables. Since
the English channel cable had been laid, four attempts were made to
connect England and Ireland, the last being successful. In 1853 a
second cable had been laid across the channel, and by 1857
7Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-German cables were in operation. All had
been financed solely by private enterprise, without government
assistance. The subsidy to the Atlantic Telegraph Company was a
precedent with varied implications for the future.
That same year the subsidised Company made an unsuccessful
attempt at laying a cable across the Atlantic. The cable broke in
mid-ocean, casting doubt upon the feasibility of laying a long and
heavy apparatus in the depths experienced in the Atlantic. Pender
and Field were not deterred and, rather than sell it off to ease the
loss, they convinced the other members of the board to use the
8reserve cable, and try again. By 17 July of the next year, the 
venture had succeeded, and the Old world was a tap away from the 
new. The possibilities created by this wire under the sea were 
'nobly' recorded:
It has been the result of the great discoveries of the past 
century to effect a revolution in political and social life 
by establishing a more intimate connexion between nation
6. Ibid, p.ll.
7. Bright, op. cit., p.15.
8. Barty-King, op .cit., p.13.
11
and nation, with race and race. It has been found that the 
old system of exclusion and insulation are stagnation and 
death. National health can only be maintained by the free 
and unobstructed interchange of each with all. How potent 
a power then is the telegraphic destined to become in the 
civilization of the world.9
The wonder and awe of the greatness of modern science was brief. 
The transmission was weak from the start, and the line went silent 
after only one month of operation. Still, the exercise had proven 
that it was possible to lay a cable at a great depth and over a long 
distance. The fault was electrical. Improvements in design and 
construction would come as trial-and-error were continued.
The futile efforts to link Europe and America deadened the 
initial financial excitement about submarine cables. However, the 
subsidy granted by the British government maintained investors' 
enthusiasm. Conscious of the importance of communications to India, 
the Red Sea and India Telegraph Company was formed to bring Britain 
into contact with her most valued possession. In 1858 a "guarantee 
of dividends" was granted by the British government, which amounted
to a subsidy of £36,000 per annum for the establishment of
communications to T 10India. The guarantee, 4 1/2 per cent on
capital for fifty years, was to be effected providing the line 
worked. The proposed route was divided into sections, the first 
from Suez to Aden and the second from Aden to Karachi. The
line was completed in 1860, but faults occurred immediately and the 
cables were abandoned. Under the terms of the guarantee, the
9. Charles Briggs 
Telegraph. (New
and Augustus Maverick, The Story of the 
York, 1858), cited in Barty-King, p.13.
10. Briqht, op. cit., p. 57.
11. Idem.
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British government was obliged to continue the payments until 1908,
, , 12 even though a complete message was never received.
The string of failures prompted the British government to
appoint a committee of inquiry into the construction and working of
13
submarine telegraph cables. The committee consisted of eight
members, four nominated by the board of trade and four from the
Atlantic Telegraph Company. It sat from 1 December 1859 to 4
September 1860, examining promoters, engineers, scientists and
anyone "whose knowledge or experience might throw light on the 
14
subject". After exhaustive deliberations, the committee
concluded that knowledge of the intricacies of cable construction
had advanced and would continue to do so. The cables that had
failed to operate effectively might have worked "had the conditions
15
been sufficiently understood beforehand." The favourable
report was gratefully received by cable promoters. But, even with 
expert evidence that the future of ocean telegraphy was bright, the 
British government was thereafter reluctant to enter into subsidy 
agreements for private cable ventures.
The report did encourage further attempts. By 1861 the 
European land lines had been extended to Baghdad in the east. The 
following year the government of Bombay formed the Indo-European 
Telegraph department with the aim of connecting Karachi, India's
12. Barty-King, op. cit., p.15, Estimates of the total cost of the 
failed project were in excess of £1,800,00. See Bright, p.59.
13. Idem.
14. Idem.
15. Ibid, p. 6 0.
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westernmost town, with the Turkish telegraph lines.16 Rather
than risk constant interruption of the service by "the vandalism of
the barbarous and unconquered natives" who lived between the two
terminal points, it was decided to lay a cable through the Persian 
17Gulf. Regardless of the findings of the special committee,
submarine cable telegraphy was still suspect and expensive. To
minimise the amount of cable required, a land line was erected
across Baluchistan to Gwadur at the north of the Gulf of Oman. From
there the line took to the sea, landing at Foa near the mouth of the
18river Shat-el Arab. On 27 January, 1865, the first
telegraphic link between India and England was secured, marking the
"first instance of any great length of cable being a complete and
, „19lasting success.
The fruition of communications with India breathed new life
into the scheme to cross the Atlantic by submarine cable. Despite
losing all but £150 of its £460,000 paid capital, the Atlantic
20Telegraph Company was still in existence. The Company found
it difficult to attract investors and approached the British
16. Barty-King, op. cit., p.17. The head of it was immediately
responsible to the secretary of state, and it was not part of
the Public Works department.
17. Bright, op. cit., p.73.
18. Barty-King, op. cit., p.18.
19. Bright, op. cit., p.77. By the time of the construction of
the cable to India, Bright states that, "the science of 
constructing and laying submarine telegraphs was pretty 
definitely worked out, and no very striking departure in
general principles has since been introduced; indeed, the 
pioneer stage may be said at this juncture to have reached its 
termination."
20. Barty-King, op. cit., p.15.
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government requesting a guarantee similar to that which was granted
to the Red Sea promoters. Initially, the government baulked at the
idea, but, after sustained pressure, eventually agreed to a
guarantee of 8 per cent on a capital of £600,000 "conditional of the
cable being successfully laid and a trans-Atlantic telegraph 
21
working." In December 1862, having obtained a similar
concession from the United States government, the Company issued a
prospectus to raise £600,000, in 8 per cent shares, and appointed a
22
consulting committee to fully review all facets of the project.
By the following May the company had only raised £300,000.
Undaunted, the directors called for tenders, and eventually accepted
that of Glass, Elliot and Company. However, after the consulting
committee recommended improvements in the design and manufacture of
the cable, the cost rose to £700,000. The Company was faced with
the problem of paying for £700,000 worth of apparatus with only
£300,000 capital. To overcome the problem of insufficient funds,
John Pender orchestrated a merger between the Gutta Percha Company
and Glass, Elliot and Company. On 7 April, 1864, the Telegraph
Construction and Maintenance Company Limited was registered in
23London with a capital of £1,000,000 and Pender as chairman.
The Atlantic Company, of which Pender was still a director, in 
the next month (5 May) offered Telcon a contract to lay a cable
21. Ibid, p.16..
22. Bright, op. cit., p.180.
23. Barty-King, o p . cit., p.21. For further commentaries on the 
formation and history of the new company see G.L. Lawford and 
L.R. Nicholson, The Telcon Story, 1850-1950. London, 1950. 
The new entity will hereafter be referred to as Telcon.
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across the Atlantic for £837,140. The Atlantic Company would pay
24£30 0,000 in cash and make up the rest in shares to Telcon.
The proposition was risky but the potential profits were enormous.
The fundamental defect in the earlier attempts to lay long, heavy
cables resulted from the need to use two ships and to splice the
cable in raid-ocean. To overcome this, Telcon secured the Great
Eastern, a then unused passenger vessel, formerly on the far eastern 
25run. The Great Eastern was a giant for its day, "an enormous
26vessel of 22,500 tons burden." After being refitted, it was
more than adequate to carry the full length of cable.
With much fanfare and high expectations, the Great Eastern
began on 22 July, 1865, paying out cable from Valentia Island in the
United Kingdom, at a speed of six knots. Two days later, after
laying eighty-four miles of cable, the first of many defects
27emerged. Repairs were effected and the Great Eastern
continued on its way to North America. Five days later another
defect was found and repaired. The final calamity occurred
two-thirds of the way across the Atlantic; the cable broke and lay
silent in 2,300 fathoms. Immediate steps were taken to recover the
cable. After eleven days, the last of the grappling rope gave way
28and the project was abandoned.
24. Bright, op. cit., p.82.
25. For a detailed account of the Great Eastern and other cable 
ships, see K. R. Haigh, Cableships and Submarine Cables. 
London, 1968.
26. Bright, op. cit., p.85.
27. Ibid, p.89.
28. Ibid, p.90.
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Although a serious failure from a financial point of view, the
excursion did give some cause for enthusiasm. The insulating
capability of gutta percha had proved adequate under the pressure of
great depths and the conductivity of the copper core was
29"substantially increased" by the low temperatures. The Great
Eastern had performed beyond expectations and the undertaking would 
have succeeded had the recovery equipment been sufficient. Like the 
previous attempts at submarine telegraphy, the engineers learned 
much from the failure. The next venture would see the connection 
realised.
Capitalising on the excitement within the scientific community,
Pender offered immediately to lay a new cable, as well as retrieve
the latest line, and continue it to North America, for only
£500,000. Because of its three successive failures, the Atlantic
Telegraph Company was barred by the British attorney-general from
floating further capital at 12 per cent. Consequently, a new
company, the Anglo-American Telegraph Company, was formed- to raise 
. 30the capital Pender required. The shareholders were ostensibly 
directors of Telcon and the most perseverant of the former company.
On 13 July, 1866, equipped with reinforced grappling rope, the 
Great Eastern once again departed from Valentia. Fourteen days 
later the cable was landed at Hearts Content, Newfoundland. Telcon 
fulfilled its agreement on 2 September when the Great Eastern 
surfaced the 1865 cable and, finding it in perfect order, continued 
the line to Newfoundland, establishing a second means of
29. Ibid, p.91.
30. Barty-King, op. cit., p.22.
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communications with North America. Not only had submarine
telegraphy advanced to laying a cable of unprecedented length 
without incident, but a fractured cable had been raised and repaired 
in mid-ocean. Both events augured well for the future of the 
technology, and also for John Pender.
The triumphs of 1866 led to a proliferation of underwater 
cables. Although the telegraph was fast becoming indispensable to 
commerce, the business community and the press were not satisfied 
with the service provided by the private telegraph companies. High 
tariffs were acceptable for overseas telegraphy, considering the 
cost of materials and the preliminary failures. However, the high 
cost for inland messages was less easily explained away. The debate 
in England over whether to nationalise the telegraph lines, active
since the 1850's, reached its apex in 1868 in the form of the
32Telegraph Bill. The Act authorised the British Post Office to 
buy up the existing telegraph companies and the telegraph business 
of the railway companies.
This move by the Disraeli administration had the full support
33of Gladstone's liberals. The principle at issue was whether
the interests of the public could be met by companies primarily 
functioning in the interests of shareholders. "The internal 
communications of a great state were not matters for private
31. Bright, op. cit., p.102.
32. Jeffrey Kieve, The Electric Telegraph: A Social and Economic 
History. Plymouth, 1973, p.138. For details of the opposing 
views on the subject of nationalisation, see pp. 119-137.
33. Kieve speculates that partial démocratisation brought about by 
the Reform Bill of 1867 changed the view of state ownership in 
the mind of both the public and politicians. Ibid, p.152.
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enterprise at all; they were of national importance and involved a
national 34obligation." The post office had control of
telegraphy in the Australian colonies and elsewhere, to great
advantage. Public support for the Bill was evidenced in the 77
private petitions and 177 press petitions in favour of 
nationalisation. Of the 319 petitions against the plan, only one
was from an individual not associated with the telegraph
35companies. On 23 June 1868, in deference to the power and
influence of those opposed to the proposed take over, a select House
committee was formed to examine the matter in its entirety.
However, before the committee could begin its work, details of the
financial package to be offered to the companies became known, and
36the opposition was largely withdrawn.
The nationalisation of inland telegraphs proved to be a boon 
for capitalists and submarine telegraphy. Charles Bright noted that 
the Bill,
afforded an opportunity of securing for new telegraphic 
ventures a good deal of the capital now let loose by the 
"winding up" of the ... telegraph companies which had, up 
to that time, shared amongst them the control of the land 
lines of Great Britain and Ireland. For this result of the 
aquisition of our land telegraphs by the State had the 
necessary further consequence of liberating something like 
£8,000,000 sterling for re-investment by those who looked 
favourably on electric telegraphs as a subject of safe and
sure remuneration.37
The quickest off the mark in the race to invest in submarine cables 
was John Pender, at that time the chairman of the Anglo-American
34. Ibid, p.146.
35. Ibid, p.147.
36. Ibid, p.148. The Bill was passed in August 1869 by the 
liberal administration.
37. Bright, op. cit., p.110.
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Telegraph Company and Telcon. His assets in the English and Irish
Magnetic Company freed, he quickly became the "Cable King" through
boldness and considerable business acumen. Within four years he
became directly responsible for extending the electric girdle
38three-quarters of the way around the world.
With the credibility of ocean telegraphy established by the
Atlantic cable, the commercial community began to bemoan the poor
existing connection to India. Delays were customary and messages
were frequently mutilated by non-English operators along the line
through the Middle East and Europe. On 29 January 1869, Pender
formed the British Indian Submarine Telegraph Company to connect
Suez and Bombay via the Red Sea. The contract for the cable was
39given to Telcon. Pender then signed an agreement with the
Anglo-Mediterranean Company for "twenty-one years of cooperative 
40working." The agreement meant that the connection of India
was two-thirds complete with Malta and Alexandria being joined by 
the Anglo-Mediterranean cable, and Suez was linked to Bombay by 
Pender. In June, Pender formed the Falmouth, Gilbraltar and Malta 
Telegraph Company to complete the all-ocean route to India.
Events continued to move quickly, and after securing
concessions the previous June, Pender formed his third company in 
December 1869, the China Submarine Telegraph Company, to lay a cable
38. Ibid, p.32. Pender entered the House of Commons as a Liberal 
in 1862-1966. He was returned in 1872-1885 having 
consolidated a considerable cable empire. See Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, VdI.XXII.
39. Barty-King, op. cit., p.27.
40. Ibid, p.28.
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 ^ . 41from Singapore to Hong Kong. To bring the new line in contact
with India and England, Pender then formed the British India
Extension Telegraph Company. The company contracted Telcon for
1,800 miles of cable, to be laid from Madras on the east coast of
India to Penang on the Malayan Peninsula, and then on to 
42Singapore. The contract was fulfilled on 5 January, 1871,
bringing London into contact with Hong Kong and all ports between. 
Pender's dominance began to assert itself.
I
The steam engine has been heralded as the premier technological
advance in the history of imperialism by shortening the time
43expended transporting people, goods and information. The
electric telegraph was its perfect complement in further eradicating 
time and distance. Indeed, Dr. Ronald Hyam has suggested of the 
cable that,
...it could be argued, was more important than the 
steamship or the railway because it carried information 
overseas. It thus facilitated the centralisation of facts 
and figures and the concentration of economic and military 
power. It laid the mechanical basis for a world market by 
providing fast transmission of political news, and 
intelligence about the trading situation and market 
prices.44
41. Ibid, p.38.
42. Idem, All Pender's cables were manufactured and layed by
Telcon. See Bright, p.109.
43. Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and
European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century. Oxford 1981, 
p.17. Headrick argues of the cable that, "Few inventions of 
the nineteenth century were as important in the history of 
imperialism."
44. Ronald Hyam, Britain's Imperial Century, 1815-1914, A Study of 
Empire Expansion. London, 1976, p.108.
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Nowhere in the world was this more appreciated than Australia. With
submarine cables extending out from England, as close to Australia
as Singapore, the prospect of instantaneous international
communications was seriously entertained.
By the 1860's steamships and fast clippers had drastically
reduced the travelling time from London to Sydney. The opening of
the Suez canal in 1869 further raised expectations of faster
service. However, few vessels on the Australian run took advantage
of the shorter distance afforded by the canal. Sailing vessels were
slow through the canal and in the tropics, and the great distance
45meant that steamships used too much cargo space for coal. The
completion of the New York to San Francisco railway system offered
still another avenue for commerce and communications. By 1879 the
average transit time of mail from London to Melbourne took
forty-four days via Suez, and forty-six days by the American
route.^ These improvements were warmly received by politicians
and businessmen. But, with the 'world shrinking' as the telegraph
inched its way around the globe by land and sea, the call for direct
and comparatively instant communications grew louder. The
connection of Australia to the expanding international telegraph
network would increase the commercial value of the colonies, and
repudiate Disraeli's contention that they were "a millstone around 
«47our neck.
45. Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance, South Melbourne, 
1966, p . 218.
46. Ibid, p.221.
47. Barty-King, op. cit., p.37.
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The first proposal to lay a submarine cable to Australia was
broached in 1854 by promoters of the Red Sea cable. The plan was to
continue the above project from Madras to Ceylon, then across the
Indian Ocean to Perth. When the Red Sea line failed, the proposal 
48was discarded. In 1858, after the brief success of the
Atlantic cable, the project resurfaced and, although discussions
49continued for some years, it was again abandoned. In 1862 a
prospectus was issued in the name of the Anglo-Australian and China
Telegraph Company, to connect Rangoon, Singapore, Java and Moreton
Bay, at a cost of £2,080,000. The colonies were asked to guarantee
50a subsidy of £50,000 per annum for thirty years. In view of
the substandard achievements in ocean telegraphy, the colonies
declined, and the proposal was left to drift.
Pender's advances changed this, and by 1869 negotiations were
near completion. Pender had successfully connected London with the
major cotton centres of the east. His next transaction was to bring
England into communications with the wool producers of Australia.
The managing director of Telcon wrote to the Governor of South
Australia in early 1870 (22 January) informing him of the formation
51by Pender of the British-Australian Telegraph Company. Hie
48. F.R. Bradley, "History of the Electrical Telegraph in 
Australia" in Royal Australian Historical Society. Vbl. 20, 
1934, p.14.
49. Idem.
50. Ibid, p.15.
51. Idem. At the time, discussion of overseas communications had 
narrowed to two routes: "1st Western - A land line from Port 
Augusta, South Australia to King George's (Albany) and Perth,
(Footnote continued to page 24)
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Company proposed to lay a cable from Singapore to Burketown,
Queensland, landing the cable first at Port Darwin in South
Australia's Northern Territory. Telcon then despatched an agent to
Adelaide to secure landing concessions at Port Darwin before
finalising details with the Queensland government.
Upon arrival in Adelaide, the agent was confronted by Charles
Todd, the superintendent of electric telegraphs, and a plan to
construct an overland telegraph from Port Augusta to Port 
52Darwin. Todd's proposal to cross the continent by telegraph
was a bold undertaking. The arid interior had only been traversed 
once - by John McDouall Stuart in 1862. Although the Company had 
made a tentative agreement with Queensland, the agent conceded to 
Todd's request, and wrote to London outlining the new proposal.
While awaiting Pender's response, Todd busied himself preparing 
estimates of the cost of the plan for parliament. In a report dated
18 April, 187 0, Todd calculated the cost of the venture to be
53£120,000. Realising that time was against them, the South
Australian government moved quickly on Todd's recommendations. On 4
(Footnote continued from page 23)
thence via submarine cable to Ceylon. 2nd Northern - An 
extension of the Queensland line from Cardwell to the Gulf of 
Carpentaria, Burketown or Normanton, and thence -(a) By the 
continuation of the land line through the Northern Territory 
of South Australia to Port Darwin, thence by cable to East 
Java, or (b) by cable from Normanton or Burketown to East 
Java, connecting at Port Darwin as an intermediate station."
52. Ibid, p.16.
53. Peter Taylor, An End to Silence: The Building of the Overland 
Telegraph from Adelaide to Darwin. Sydney, 1980, p.39. With 
only two short telegraph lines to his credit, and no knowledge 
of the terrain, it is little wonder Todd underestimated the 
total cost by £400,000.
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June the agent had received instructions from London, and informed
the ministry that
I am now in a position to state that the cable will be 
landed at Port Darwin, if the South Australian government 
will pledge themselves to have a land-line open for traffic 
by 1 January, 1872, connecting the port with the present 
system of colonial telegraphs.54
The arrangement suited Pender and his associates. South Australia 
had relieved them of their commitment to construct a land line from 
Port Darwin to Burketown, and then join the Queensland telegraph 
system. To South Australia would go the prestige of being 
responsible for connecting Australia to the rest of the world.
Writing some years later, Todd reflected on the formidable task 
which faced the small colony:
We were thus committed to the completion of a telegraph 
line, nearly 2,000 miles long, through a difficult and dry 
country, of which we knew nothing except what we could 
glean from Stuart's journal, and which was wholly 
unoccupied by white men for a distance of 1,400 miles. 
Stuart was dead and could not help us, but we knew that 
there were broad stony deserts to cross, long stretches of 
heavy high sandhills, at right angles to the course of the 
line, which could not be turned or avoided; long stages 
without water, and that for the greater part of the way the 
country was so sparsely timbered that wooden in some cases, 
iron poles would have to be carted immense distances.55
The arduous work was begun in June 1870, and was completed after 
much hardship on 22 August 1872.^ Although not in working 
order by the stipulated date, the undertaking was monumental. When 
the deadline passed, there were grumblings from the
54. Ibid, p .40.
55. Charles Todd, "Telegraph Enterprise in Australasia", Royal 
Colonial Institute. \fc>l. XVII, 1886, p.153.
56. Peter Taylor's account of the two years of toil is recommended 
reading for a detailed record of the overland expedition.
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British-Australian Company for compensation. However, on 24 June
1872, the new cable connecting Java with Port Darwin failed, and the
57grumblings ceased.
Before the landline was completed, the proprietors of the
submarine cable it was racing to meet, held an "extra-general
58meeting". On 2 May 1872, Pender addressed the shareholders of
the British Indian Submarine Telegraph Company on the subject of
amalgamating with the Anglo-Mediterranean Company; Falmouth,
Gilbraltar and Malta; and the Marseilles, Algiers and Malta
Companies. The recommendation was approved, and on 1 June the
59Eastern Telegraph Company (hereafter Eastern) was registered.
The following year, Pender sealed his position as the world's
telegraph magnate by combining his British Australian, China
Submarine, and British Indian Extension Companies, into the great
"Eastern Extension Australasia and China Telegraph Company"
(hereafter Eastern Extension). The company had a capital of
60£3,000,000, and Pender was its Chairman.
Direct telegraphic communications between England and Australia
was at last initiated on 15 November. Celebrations were held in the
colonial capitals, and London, "rejoicing at this fresh bond of
61union between different members of the Empire." Cable
57. Ann Moyal, Clear Across Australia. Melbourne, 1984, p.53.
58. Barty-King, op. cit., p.39.
59. Bright, op. cit., p.119.
60. Barty-King, op. cit., p.53.
61. K.S. Inglis, "The Imperial Connection; Telegraphic
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communications had changed the face of imperialism now that the 
British government was in intimate contact with Canada, India, the 
far east and Australia. With the component parts of the British 
Empire united by the bond of telegraphy, the traditional liberal 
concept of voluntaryism became dated, and various schemes of 
imperial unity, and even federalism, became the vogue. This rising 
tide of sentiment, between 'kith and kin', grew stronger, due in no 
small measure to submarine cables. The "magical business", as Sir
Henry Parkes quipped, "uniting us hand in hand as it were with the
. , „62 parent land.
The political and imperial significance of submarine telegraphy
was not immediately apparent. Professor K.S. Inglis argues strongly
that it was within the commercial community that the transformation
in colonial life was most obvious.
After 1872 Australian producers knew what buyers in London 
had been offering twenty-four hours earlier for wool, 
wheat, tallow, preserved meat, copper, leather, tin and 
whatever else they were growing or making or mining for 
export.63
Merchants also benefitted from the magic wire, for they could now 
reduce stock and order replacement items by telegraph when 
required. Foreign investment also increased, as up-to-date 
information on colonial opportunities became available overseas.
(Footnote continued from page 26)
Communication between England and Australia, 1872-1902", in 
A.F. Madden and W.H. Morris-Jones (Ed.) Australia and 
Britain: Studies in a Changing Relationship. Sydney, 1980,
p.22.
62. Ibid, p.24.
63. Idem. For an account of the long term developments resulting 
from the first telegraphic connection with Australia, see 
Moyal, op. cit., pp. 61-73.
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As Australian dependence on the new technology developed, so
did dissatisfaction with the frequent interruptions and high
tariffs. Between 1872 and 1883 the overseas service was disrupted
more than 30 times - totalling 540 days, or eighteen months of 
64
silence. The overland line proved equally unreliable,
breaking down for 101 days over the same period. For this service
the telegraphing public was required to pay 10s. 8d. per word. As
early as 1872 colonial businessmen protested that, as electricity
65cost little, it should also be sold inexpensively. However,
the proprietor of the lone wire to Australia refused to reduce the 
tariff.
The monopoly of Australian traffic enjoyed by the Eastern
Extension Company was strengthened in 1875 when Sir Julius Vogel
entered into an agreement with the Company to connect New Zealand
with the Australian continent. Vogel travelled to London to confer
with the agent-general for New South Wales, and the various cable
companies. After discussions with Siemens Brothers and Company had
broken down, Vogel entertained proposals from Pender's company. In
his report to the New Zealand government Vogel stated that
I found that the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company 
(Limited) much desired to enter into an agreement for the 
work; and that their desire proceeded not so much from 
anticipations of the pecuniary results of laying a cable to 
New Zealand as from anxiety to forestall opposition to 
their Indo-Australian system.^
It was the opinion of the Eastern Extension Company that, should 
another firm secure the New Zealand contract, they "would eventually
64. "The Australasian Cable Question", Reprinted from the 
Electrical Review. 4 March 1887, Telecom Archives, Sydney.
65. Inglis, op. cit., p.23.
66. New Zealand Pari. Paps., 1875, F.-6A, p.l.
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start an opposition line to India and Great Britain. 67
Consequently, New Zealand was able to negotiate from a position of
strength and in their best interests, despite the objectionable
monopoly that would result; and on 1 February 1876, the cable was
laid between Botany Bay, New South Wales and Nelson, New Zealand,
68two months ahead of schedule.
It was not until 1876, when the successive faults in the cable
network caused disruptions for over six months, that the colonial
ministries began to question the "fool's paradise" inherent in
relying on a single means of communication. In May, the New South
Wales colonial secretary expressed his administration's view, on the
undesirable state of the existing telegraph system, in a circular
letter to the other colonies. He suggested that the time had
arrived to consider a second cable, possibly "by the use of the line
from Sydney to New Zealand, and thence by the Sandwich Islands to 
69San Francisco." A Pacific cable would be expensive, and out 
of the question, without some assistance from America. To that end, 
E.C. Cracknell, the superintendent of telegraphs for New South 
Wales, was to seek concessions in America on his way to London.
His mission in the United States a failure, Cracknell arrived 
in London in July to negotiate with the Eastern Extension Company. 
The object of the discussions was to ascertain what terms the 
Company required to duplicate its lines and reduce the tariff to
67. Idem.
68. Barty-King, op. cit., p.23.
69. Colonial Secretary, N.S.W. 
April 1876, New South Wales
to Chief Secretary, 
Pari. Paps., 1877-78,
Victoria, 18 
52- p.2.
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Australia. After examining the information available in
London, on the condition of the Company's cables, Cracknell 
recommended the duplication of the line from Singapore to 
Banjoewangie, leaving the line from there to Port Darwin as it was. 
The Eastern Extension Company was in the process of duplicating the
Red Sea to Bombay section of the line as well as the portion from
71Rangoon to Penang. They were willing to duplicate the
Singapore to Banjoewangie cable for a total subsidy of £45,000, a 
tariff reduction being left to further negotiations. As the Company 
had exclusive concessions throughout the East, and a Pacific route 
would be very expensive "without the slightest prospect of the
Government of the United States subsidizing any portion", the
72options were limited.
The various colonial governments addressed the matter of
improving cable communications at the conference of January 1877 in
Sydney. The two main points considered by the conference were
duplication of overseas communications and reduction of the tariff.
After discussion, the gathering resolved "that it is desirable to
extend and improve the means of telegraphic communication between
Australia and Europe, by the duplication, where necessary, of the
73cable or lines connecting the same." Three routes were
determined as practicable. The government of Queensland was asked
. 70
70. Ibid, p.3.
71. Idem.
72. "Minute of the Superintendent of Electric Telegraphs" ibid, 
p. 5.
73. New South Wales Pari. Paps., 1876-77, 157-, p.2.
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to open negotiations for the construction of a cable from that
colony to Singapore. South and Western Australia were to do the
same to Ceylon. Lastly, New Zealand was to inquire into the
establishment of communications with the United States, and to
attempt to procure a subsidy from America with the view of reducing
the tariff to 6s. per word. While the other colonies were engaged
in encouraging competition to the existing cable system, New South
Wales and South Australia were empowered to make arrangements to
reduce the Eastern Extension Company's tariff to 6s. per word for a
74subsidy not to exceed £20,000 per annum.
Anxious that the initial governmental steps to address the
unsatisfactory telegraphic situation would not lapse, the Sydney
Chamber of Commerce requested that the postmaster-general receive a
deputation. On 21 June Saul Samuel met with prominent businessmen
. . 75to discuss his ministry's inaction. Samuel explained that New 
South Wales could not accept the current offer from the Eastern 
Extension Company, as it would amount to only a partial duplication 
and would not go far in securing communications. Conceding that the 
present cable operators, and the colony of South Australia, should 
be considered in any scheme, because of their pioneering labours in 
creating the existing system, Samuel intimated that his ministry 
favoured a second independent cable. To this the deputation 
intimated that an acceptable alternative would be a Pacific line,
74. Idem.
75. Sydney Morning Herald, 22 June 1877. Samuel would continue to 
play a prominent role in the Pacific cable debate as 
agent-general for New South Wales throughout the 1890's.
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either to San Francisco or to Vancouver. In response, Samuel
pointed out that the primary obstacle which confronted a quick 
solution to the problem was the multiplicity of interests involved. 
Without concerted action, the colonies would continue to labour 
under the yoke of high tariffs and insecure cables.
In pursuit of the conference resolution relating to a Pacific
cable, the New Zealand government despatched a Memorandum to the
United States government. It outlined the state of affairs in
Australia concerning overseas communication, and highlighted the
advantages to be won by establishing direct communications across
the Pacific. The Memorandum stated that,
Monopoly should be guarded against as far as possible... by 
the choice of the Pacific Ocean course, from the United 
States southward, not only would this advantage be most 
effectually gained, but a line would be secured which might 
reasonably be expected not to fail at the same time as one 
from England eastward.77
This reasoning weighed heavily in favour of an alternative via the 
Pacific. However, the sea bed of the Pacific was virtually 'terra 
incognita' and depths were anticipated to exceed five thousand 
fathoms. Estimates of the cost of a Pacific cable were speculative 
and varied. The only constant was that no commercial group had as
yet entertained the idea, and the United States would not provide a
. . - 78subsidy.
Pender renewed his efforts to induce the Australian and New 
Zealand governments early in 1878 to grant his company a subsidy to
76. Idem.
77. New South Wales Pari. Paps., 1877-78, op. cit., p.13.
78. Sydney Morning Herald, 12 January, 1878.
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duplicate its far eastern cables. In a telegram to the colonial
ministries, Pender proposed that
The recent break to the Port Darwin cable brings forcibly 
before me the necessity of duplication. I would be 
disposed to advise my Board to make considerable sacrifice 
to meet the wishes of the Colonies. I would propose a 
subsidy to be given to cover interest on cost of 
duplication, with increase for any reduction of tariff the 
Colonies may desire.79
To that end, Pender sent another agent to Australia to negotiate an 
agreement. The duplication offered would satisfactorily meet the 
desires of the colonies, in as much as the exorbitant tariff would 
be lowered. However, the question of reliability would not be 
answered by laying a second line in the same seas that had proved 
adverse to submarine cables. The marine life prevalent in the warm 
shallow waters between Java and Port Darwin would be equally 
inclined to bore through two cables as one. Any further concessions 
to the Eastern Extension Company would, also, more firmly entrench 
the Company's monopoly.
Despite the arguments against an agreement, Pender was
8 0determined to succeed in his quest. The situation needed a
rapid resolution, and no other Company was better-placed to fulfill 
the needs of the colonies. An agreement with the Company would
provide the colonies with the lower rates which they required in the 
most inexpensive and efficient manner. Consequently, in December, 
after months of bargaining, the Company and the colonies found
79. Agent, Eastern Extension Telegraph Company to Colonial 
Secretary, N.S.W. 3 January 1878, New South Wales Pari. Paps., 
1877-78, op. cit., p.15.
80. The Eastern Extension Company commanded 60 per cent of the 
total traffic to India and 80 per cent to China, Java, and 
Australia. Barty-King, op. cit., p.62.
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common ground. The Company contracted to lay and maintain alternate
cables between Port Darwin and the India land lines, provided that
81 _the colonies granted an annual subsidy of £32,400. 'me
Company also agreed to reduce the charge for press messages to 5s. 
Id. and government messages to 6s. 4d. The contract also stipulated
that the Australian colonies reserved the right to purchase the new
cables, provided the Company had paid dividends of over 10 per cent
82for five years.
A Pacific cable offered many advantages over the existing
system, both commercially and strategically. At their beginning,
submarine cables were seen merely as tools to promote trade and
further strengthen British economic power. However, as the world
cable network expanded, the significance of rapid communication for
8 3defence purposes became more obvious. Imperial security
depended on safe and efficient communication. This position gained 
prominence during the Sudan crisis and the rumours of a European 
conflict in 1885. At the height of these concerns of Empire, the 
cable to Australia went silent. The Eastern Extension line was down 
for only three days, but, had war broken out, the colonies would not 
have been alerted. The Pacific route, via Vancouver, promised an 
alternative far removed from Europe and the east, touching only 
British-controlled soil, which was perceived as an incalculable 
advantage in times of war. However, with the duplication of the
81. New South Wales Pari. Paps., 1878, 376-A, p.2.
82. Ibid, p.38. New Zealand and Queensland refused to enter the 
agreement.
83. P.M. Kennedy, "Imperial Cable Communication and Strategy, 
1870-1914", English Historical Review. VdI. 86, 1971, p.729.
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Eastern Extension line to Port Darwin, the clamour to secure an
independent route declined and the Pacific cable idea went into 
remission.
Ill
In the latter part of 1885 the proposal to join Australia and
America by submarine cable assumed a distinct and practical shape.
In December a group met in Sydney to lay the foundations of a plan
to undertake a Pacific cable. The leader of the group was Randolph
C. Want, the solicitor for the New South Wales government in 
84London. With him were Melbourne engineer F.C. Rowan, and
Audley Coote, then a member of the Tasmanian legislative
. 85council. Want convinced them that he represented an
"association of wealthy and influential" men in London, which was
anxious to establish telegraphic communications with Australia by
86way of the Pacific Ocean. Want was due to leave for London,
and en route, meet with American politicians and businessmen to
discuss the possibility of securing a subsidy from Washington.
Rowan and Coote were to advance the project in Australia, and Sir
87Julius Vogel had agreed to do the same in New Zealand.
84. The son of noted New South Wales solicitor Randolph J. Want
and brother of John Henry (attorney-general 1885,1886-87, and 
1894-99) , he was well placed in the free trade circles of
power. Australian Dictionary of Biography. Vol.6, p.350.
85. Rowan to Want, 18 January 1886. F.C. Rowan Letterbooks, M.S.
931, National Library of Australia.
86. "Memorandum to the Federal Council of Australasia, January 
1886, ibid.
87. Rowan to Want, 25 February 1886, ibid. Coote had been
actively promoting alternative cable schemes since 1873.
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Want's departure was sudden, and he left his colonial agents in
a lurch. With no information about the composition of the London
syndicate, or a specific proposal to lay before the colonial
parliaments, the two were left with little to do but await further
instructions. In January, 1886, Coote urged that they take
advantage of the sitting in Hobart of the Federal Council of
Australasia. He argued that a proposal to all the colonies
represented would at once carry more weight than individual
appeals. Rowan was hesitant about the idea and felt that they
should wait until news of Want's activities in America became 
88known. Coote's haste was attributed to a second equally
mysterious syndicate in London.
The emergence of two groups of potential investors was a boon 
to the prospect of an alternative means of communication, but it 
created confusion in Australia. Coote's brother, George, was 
resident in London, and he contacted him representing John Hennicker 
Heaton, the great postal reformer, and others who were willing to 
undertake a Pacific cable - should the interested governments offer 
a guarantee. Audley Coote was of the opinion that the Australian 
colonies would not grant subsidies, as Want had envisaged, and he 
was inclined to side with his brother's associates and the
(Footnote continued from page 35)
Involved with financing controversial projects ranging from 
railways and streetcars to telegraph cables, his most notable 
association was with Siemens Brothers. As the professed agent 
of that company and Want's consortium, Coote was only 
interested in his own aggrandisement. Australian Dictionary 
of Biography. Vol.3, p.455.
88. Idem.
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guarantee. After being assured of the bona fides of Heaton's
syndicate, and that Want and Vogel were to be considered, Rowan 
agreed to Coote's plan of approaching the Federal Council.
On 21 January, 1886, Rowan wrote to the postmasters-general of 
New South Wales and New Zealand (not members of the Federal Council) 
to advise them of the proposal about to be laid before the Hobart
„ goconference. What Rowan and Coote did not consider was that
the constitution of the Federal Council prohibited it from hearing
matters which had not first been considered by the colonial
parliaments. Further, propositions concerning finance could not 
. . 91originate from the council. Consequently, the first step by
the two agents led to nothing but embarrassment and letting their
plans be known publicly. Frustrated, Rowan wrote to Coote:
I agreed to co-operate and we wrote jointly to New South 
Wales and New Zealand and to the press, assuring them that 
we intended doing what it now seems we could not in any 
case have done and what would have been useless if we had 
been able to do it... Our assertions to the colonies and 
to the press that we represented a powerful sydnicate at 
home were only justified in my mind by your assurance that 
if Want and his friends objected, your friends were to the 
fore and ready.
Coupled with Coote's miscalculation was a continued silence from 
Want in America. Without details of the syndicate they represented,
or the extent of negotiations in America and Great Britain, they
. 93were in no position to promote a Pacific cable.
89. Rowan to Coote, 23 February 1886, ibid.
90. Rowan to Postmaster-General, N.S.W. 21 January 1886, Telecom 
Archives, Sydney.
91. Rowan to Postmaster-General, N.S.W., 18 February 1886, ibid.
92. Rowan to Coote, 23 February 1886. op. cit.
93. Rowan to Want, 25 February 1886, ibid. Rowan wrote "Your 
silence leaves me rather awkwardly placed here but I will 
continue to watch your interests as well as my own."
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With the revelation of a renewed bid to cross the Pacific by
electric telegraph, numerous other options surfaced to compete for
colonial favour. After learning of Coote and Rowan's request for a
government guarantee over a subsidy, Vogel abandoned his support for
a Pacific line, and, instead, advocated a cable from Queensland to 
. . 94Great Britain through the east. Another proposal was to
connect Perth with Ceylon or Mauritius, Natal and then the Cape.
All of these routes would ultimately join with the Eastern Company
lines to London. If the object was to free the colonies from the
monopoly, it could not be achieved except by the Pacific 
95route. In an effort to satisfy the colonial desire for lower
telegraph rates, and also protect its position, the Eastern
Extension Company offered to reduce the tariff for private messages
to 8s. per word on messages between London and Adelaide, provided
that the colonies extended the term of the subsidy agreement by six
96and a quarter years. The uncertainty of the Pacific proposals 
left this as the most practical solution.
The Cape route was the more desirable of the other options, as 
it could be laid touching only British territory. Heaton had 
previously advocated such a route in 1883 at the Intercolonial
94. Idem.
95. Cracknell to Rowan, 19 March 1886, ibid. Cracknell stated 
that, "The Eastern Company have the joint purse system with 
the Great Northern, the Indo-European and the Extension 
Company so that an independent service cannot be got by going 
North or Northwest."
96. New South Wales Pari. Paps., 1885-86, *395-, p.2.
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Conference in Melbourne. When the Silvertown Company
displayed a preference toward the Cape over the Pacific route,
Heaton temporarily abandoned the Pacific proposal and joined with
98them. Coote cabled to his brother: "Warn Heaton Cape route
99opposed Pacific liked strive to obtain contractor." The
statement was not entirely correct, as none of the colonial
ministries had publicly declared an opinion on either.
Coote's aim was to keep his friends in London united, by
offering some hope of success in negotiations for a Pacific cable.
Continuing the exaggerated optimism, he wrote that
if we dropped the Pacific route other parties are ready and 
waiting to take it up, and the feeling in favour of an
alternative route to England which would at the same time 
connect us with America is so strong that if the two
schemes viz that via the Cape and that via the Pacific were
placed on even terms before the Governments concerned the 
decision would be for the Pacific route without 
hesitation. -^O
His confidence was unfounded, and he and Rowan were still not in a 
position to advance the scheme.
Before Rowan and Coote could officially place the Pacific idea 
before the local legislatures, a detailed critique of the plan 
emerged in Sydney. In a Memorandum which recommended acceptance of 
the Eastern Extension offer, Cracknell claimed that a Pacific cable
97. J. Hennicker-Heaton to the President and Members of the 
Australasian Intercolonial Conference, Sydney, 29 November 
1883, Mitchell Library.
98. Silvertown was the common name given to the India Rubber, 
Gutta-Percha, and Telegraph Works Company. Bright, op. cit., 
p.157.
99. A. Coote to G. Coote, 8 March 1886, F.C. Rowan, op, cit.
100. Idem.
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would be "very expensive and very risky. 101 Cracknell argued
that the Pacific had not been adequately surveyed and was riddled
with destructive coral reefs. He estimated the cost of a Pacific
cable to be £2,000,000, with annual working expenses of £210,000.
Assuming an annual traffic of 300,000 words (more than 50% of the
total traffic in 1885) and a tariff of 7s. per word, the total
revenue would only be £75,000. Cracknell concluded,
I am sure the public will be better served by accepting the 
proposal for an extension of the subsidy, than by paying a 
syndicate a large sum annually for procurring nothing more 
that the Colonial Governments interested can secure by 
negotiating direct with the Cable Companies... the Colonies 
are very well served; and, without very considerable 
additional subsidies... no sweeping reduction of rates can 
be secured.^ 2
Cracknell's report left Rowan and Coote in an awkward situation.
Want had intimated that they could expect assistance from Cracknell,
103it now appeared that this was not the case. This led the two
helpless agents to conclude that Want was not at all clear on his 
plans.
101. New South Wales Pari. Paps., 1885-86, op, cit., p.3.
Cracknell arrived in South Australia from Britain with Todd in 
1855 as his assistant. In 1858 he was appointed assistant 
superintendent of telegraphs for New South Wales on Todd's 
recommendation. Three years later he became superintendent. 
This close association with the "father" of the overland
telegraph impaired Cracknells independence in relation to the 
Pacific scheme. Australian Dictionary of Biography. Vd1.3, 
p .488.
102. Idem.
103. Rowan to Judge Casey, Melbourne, 15 May 1886, F.C. Rowan
Letterbooks, op. cit. "..when telling me of his interview
with Cracknell, he said: 'Cracknell must of course get 
something - I have as good as told him so - and if there is no 
other way you and I must each give him something out of our 
shares." On 21 May 1887, Rowan wrote to Want of Cracknell, 
"Cracknell has, in the opinion of most people, weakened his 
position as Government adviser very much by his open and
vigorous advocacy of Pender's cause." Ibid.
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Despite his misunderstanding of colonial opinion, Want was
making progress in America. In February 1886 he was joined in San
Francisco by Sir Alexander Stuart, the former New South Wales
premier, who was on his way to London for the Colonial and Indian
Exhibition. Stuart had long felt that the colonies "lay under a very
heavy grievance in the high rates charged for telegrams" and his
104position added greatly to the cause of a Pacific cable. Once
allied, the two travelled together to Washington for discussions
with the secretary of state. Upon learning of their activities, the
Canadian premier, John A. Macdonald, invited them to Ottawa to
discuss "a matter of great importance to the two groups of
Colonies."
The subject of a trans-Pacific cable was first raised in Canada
by Sandford Fleming. In 1879, as Chief Engineer of the Canadian
Government's Railways, he wrote to the Canadian superintendent of
telegraphs outlining the significance of the pending completion of a
Canadian land line from the Atlantic to the Pacific:
It appears to me to follow that, as a question of Imperial 
importance, the British possessions to the west of the 
Pacific Ocean should be connected by submarine cable with 
the Canadian line. Great Britain will thus be brought into 
direct communication with all the great colonies and 
dependencies without passing through foreign
countries.
The following year, in his Report on the Canadian Pacific Railway, 
Fleming elaborated on his earlier proposal. With the rapid advance
104. Stuart to Jennings, 23 April 1886, Telecom Archives, Sydney.
105. Idem.
106. George Johnson (Ed) The All-Red Line; The Annals and Aims of 
the Pacific Cable. Ottawa, 1902, p.8.
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of the international telegraph network, Fleming questioned why the
Pacific was the only ocean without a submarine cable. As the South
Pacific was reported to be marked by unusual depths and coral reefs,
he suggested that a Pacific cable could be laid from Vancouver
Island through the north Pacific via the Aleutian Islands to Japan,
107then on to Hong Kong. Such a cable would provide North
America with a cheaper direct line to Asia without having to involve 
non-English speaking operators.
Upon being relieved of his duties as engineer-in-chief of the
Canadian Pacific Railway in 1880, Fleming pursued his idea with full
vigour. On 17 June of that year, the Privy Council of Canada
endorsed a Minute which granted Fleming the exclusive privilege of
landing a submarine cable on the Pacific coast of Canada; and the
right to place a wire for cable business on the line of the Canadian 
108Pacific Railway. The Canadian land-line was not completed
until 1885, so Fleming was unable to generate further interest in 
the plan.
However, as the 1880's progressed, Fleming's imperial
proclivities became increasingly fashionable. Indeed, with the
completion of the Canadian land line, he renewed his efforts to have 
his scheme realised. In a Memorandum to Macdonald, of 20 October 
1885, Fleming asserted that the obstacles to a south Pacific cable 
were no longer considered sufficient to prevent a direct line from
107. Sandford Fleming, "Memorandum: In Reference to a Scheme for 
Completing a Great Intercolonial and Intercontinental 
Telegraph System, by Establishing an Electric Cable across the 
Pacific Ocean." London, 1882, p.3. Telecom Archives, Sydney.
108. Ibid, p.12. These concessions had lapsed before the cable was 
completed.
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He argued that the security of theCanada to 'Australasia'.
Empire demanded an alternate means of communications with Australia
and the East. Canada's position, as the "halfway house of the
Empire", offered the alternative desired:
The projected line...would supply an independent line of 
communication so much desired and in so doing would 
indirectly, but it is held very materially, strengthen the 
military and naval power of Great Britain while it would 
directly promote the highest interests of every one of the 
great colonial possessions.
After learning of the mission of Want and Stuart in America, Fleming 
suggested as a corollary to the Canadian line from Atlantic to
Pacific, that the Canadian government undertake the task of
persuading the Australians to consider Vancouver as the more
practical terminus of the proposed Pacific . . Ill cable.
Macdonald convinced Stuart and Want that the Canadian
government was interested in promoting the idea. On 8 June 1886 the 
Macdonald administration authorised the High Commissioner in London, 
Sir Charles Tupper, to confer with the various colonial 
agents-general, and attempt to "secure the co-operation of her
109. Letter to the Premier of Canada, by Sandford Fleming, 20
October 1885, in "Documents in Reference to the Establishment 
of Direct Telegraphic Connection Between Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada and Great Britain", London, 1886, p.23.
Telecom Archives, Sydney.
110. Idem.
111. Memorandum, Canadian and Australian Cable, Sandford Fleming, 6 
April 1886, ibid, p.18. See also Queensland Pari. Paps., 
1886, Colonial Office to Agent-General, 30 March 1886. "In 
view of the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway, it 
would seem to deserve consideration whether such a cable, if 
constructed, might not advantageously have its terminus in 
British Columbia."
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Majesty's government on the subject." The Indian and
Colonial Exhibition, then being held in London, afforded Tupper an
opportunity to comply with his government's request. On 12 July a
meeting was held at Tupper's residence consisting of the
113agents-general for 'Australasia', Want and Fleming. The
subject of a Pacific cable dominated discussion, particularly the
question of what form of assistance the promoters would expect from
the interested colonies. With the exception of the South Australian
delegate, all were sympathetic to the proposal. But none could offer
any assistance unless authorised by their respective governments.
The progress of the Pacific cable project was interrupted in
July, partly by the death of Stuart, and partly by the "electoral
114crisis" in London. With the installation of the Salisbury
administration, Want renewed his efforts to secure a subsidy from 
England. The change in government was timely for the promoters of 
the Pacific cable scheme. Gladstone's Liberals were too involved in 
the issue of 'Home Rule' to give the Pacific plan more than passing 
attention. The coming to power of the party of unionism and
imperialism so encouraged Want that he declared in September a faith 
that the government "will subsidise the proposed Pacific
cable.
No confirmation of any agreement was forthcoming from the 
Salisbury government. However, upon the dissolution of Parliament
112
112. Committee of the Honourable Privy Council of Canada, 8 June, 
1886, in "Documents in Reference"...op. cit., p.4.
113. Sydney Morning Herald, 14 July 1886.
114. Ibid, 14 September 1886.
115. Ibid, 3 September 1886.
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in November, the Queen's speech from the throne stated,
I have observed with much satisfaction the interest which, 
in an increasing degree, is evinced by the people of this 
country in the welfare of their Colonial and Indian fellow 
subjects; and I am led to the conviction that there is on 
all sides a growing desire to draw closer in every 
practicable way the bonds which unite the various portions 
of the Empire. I have authorised communications to be 
entered into with the principal Colonial Governments with a 
view to the fuller consideration of matters of common 
interest.I16
Accordingly, on 25 November, the secretary of state for the colonies
despatched a circular to the colonies under self-government inviting
them to attend a conference in the new year to discuss matters of
Imperial defence and communications.
Encouraged by the tone and character of the government's
intimations to the colonies, a large public meeting was held in
London (on 7 December) to issue a prospectus for a Pacific cable.
Before then, on 23 November, the Pacific Telegraph Company, Limited
had been formed - to construct a "new line of telegraphic
communication between England and Australasia, a line under
117exclusively British control." Want and George Coote had
succeeded in uniting the two syndicates interested in the
establishment of a Pacific cable, bringing together a number of
118influential politicians and businessmen. Of particular
importance was the support of Sir Donald Smith, later Lord 
Strathcona, the chairman of the Canadian Pacific Railway and a
116. Pari. Paps., 1887, Vol. LVI, Cd. 5091, p.VII.
117. Owen Jones, Secretary (Pro Tern) of the Pacific Telegraph 
Company to Duncan Gillies, 8 December 1886, Australasian 
Federal Council, No. 87.320.
118. See APPENDIX A.
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director of the Hudson's Bay Company. To Strathcona a
Pacific cable meant an increase in the amount of traffic over his
company's land lines. As a result, he offered "favourable terms" to
120the supporters of the cable for use of the Canadian route.
The promoters of the Company confidently claimed several 
advantages in favour of their proposal. Firstly, from the Imperial 
and strategic point of view, the projected cable would place the 
Empire's Pacific fleet into direct contact with England, and would 
provide a secure means of communications in time of war. Secondly, 
a direct cable to North America would increase the commercial 
importance of the Pacific region. With the "favourable terms" 
offered by the Canadian Pacific Railway, a Pacific cable would also 
have the effect of drastically reducing the tariff between England 
and Australia. However, in view of the enormous costs of
constructing and maintaining a cable of the length required, the
interested governments were asked to pay £100,000 per annum for
^. 121 twenty-five years.
Concerned by how far the Pacific cable discussions had gone, 
Pender offered to reduce the tariff to whatever level the colonies 
requested, provided the Company's profit levels over the three
119
119. Noted as one of Canada's most successful capitalists, 
Strathcona began his rise by joining the wealthy syndicate 
which purchased the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway 
in 1879, opening up the Canadian Northwest for the first 
time. After being appointed High Commissioner in 1896, 
Strathcona headed negotiations for Canada in London during the 
final phase of the cable debate. MacMillan Dictionary of 
Canadian Biography, p.721.
120. Jones to Gillies, op. cit.
121. Pari. Paps., 1887, op. cit., p.104.
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previous years were maintained. In a letter to the colonial
postmasters-general of 23 December 1886, Pender attempted to
belittle the claims of the Pacific Telegraph Company. He argued
that, as "the pioneer of telegraphic communication with
Australiasia", his Company was entitled to due
122consideration. His cable system was equal to transmitting
many more times the traffic than the Australian market supplied.
The line was staffed by English operators, and was under British
control; and, the sea routes under which the cables passed were also
most likely to be protected in the event of hostilities involving
the Empire. Pender and his associates had undertaken all of these
actions without aid from either the British or colonial governments.
Pender continued his opposition to the Pacific cable movement
until the beginning of the first Colonial Conference in April 1887.
He argued further that, if the Pacific line was to be at all
reliable, it must be duplicated. The promoters had admitted that a
Pacific cable would cost approximately £2,000,000; for a duplicate
123line Pender predicted it would cost well over £4,000,000.
The cable would also lie under seas far removed from the frequent 
shipping lanes, or major coaling stations. Also, the depths to be 
expected in the Pacific, according to Pender, would make repairs 
difficult - if possible at all. This, coupled with the great 
lengths of cable required, terminating on coral reefs, made the 
proposition
122. Pender to Australasian Postmasters-General, 23 December 1886, 
ibid, p.113.
123. Memorandum relative to proposed Pacific cable, by John Pender, 
23 December 1886, in ibid, Appendix, p.114.
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extremely dubious. In concluding the Memorandum, Pender argued 
curiously that,
Instead of a Pacific cable benefitting the Colonies, I
believe that the laying of such a line would only benefit 
the promoters, and would be inimical to the interests of 
the telegraphing public, as it would inevitably lead to a 
war of tariffs which would eventually impoverish both the 
Pacific and the existing cables, and result in a starved 
and inefficient service.1^4
By condemning the Pacific cable before the Colonial Conference met 
in London, Pender succeeded in putting the Pacific promoters on the 
defensive. It was their responsibility to convince the various
governments represented at the Conference that they were, as the new 
Company, quite right; and that John Pender, the "Cable King" for
some fifteen years, was all wrong.
IV
When the Colonial Conference opened, on 4 April, the task of 
convincing the delegates had been facilitated by the appointment of 
Sandford Fleming as one of the Canadian representatives. After 
discussions on the primary topic of the conference, Imperial
defence, the delegates considered Imperial communications. In a 
paper read before the conference, Fleming pointed to the advantages 
of establishing a direct telegraphic link between Canada and 
Australia. Perhaps the most important aspect of the question, in 
Fleming's opinion, was the unity of Empire which the cable surely 
would encourage. Emotively, Fleming argued that:
124. Idem. Harold Finch-Hatton commented on Pender's proposition. 
"Here is a commercial theory which has, at all events, the 
merit of being entirely new. It is probably the first time 
that a man of any commercial standing has ventured seriously 
to assert that a 'war of tariffs', in other words, 
competition, is inimical to the interests of the public." See 
Memorandum by Harold Finch-Hatton, Secretary, Pacific 
Telegraph Company, January 1887, Federal Council, P.87.1018.
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...is it for a moment to be thought that Canada and 
Australasia are never to hold direct telegraphic 
inter-course because a commercial company stands in 
the way? Are commercial relations between two of the 
most important divisions of the British family forever 
to remain dormant in order that the profits of a 
company may be maintained? Are the vital interests of 
the British Empire to be neglected? Is the permanent 
policy of England to be thwarted? Is the peace of the 
world to be endangered at the bidding of a joint stock 
company? ^ 5
Fleming's oration was followed by the more practical Cecil Raikes, 
the postmaster-general of Britain. Raikes sympathised with Fleming 
and the idea of an 'all-red' cable. However, Raikes informed the 
delegates that,
...it would be contrary to the practice of the English 
Government to engage in competition; that is to say, to 
associate itself with any enterprise which is competing 
with another enterprise, in other words, to give advantage 
to one scheme as against another. ■LZ,D
The British government was still paying for a Red Sea cable which 
had never transmitted a complete message, as well as a subsidy to 
the Eastern Company for opening communications with South Africa. 
Regardless of this, in 1887 the policy of the post office was to 
conform to the wishes of the treasury and discourage unnecessary 
expenditure.
One after another, the representatives of New Zealand and the 
Australian colonies rose in favour of the projected cable. Should 
the British authorities offer financial assistance, the colonies 
would be prepared to add their share. However, none were willing to 
commit themselves, or their governments, to taking the initiative. 
It appeared that the opportunity would be lost. But on the final
125. Pari. Paps., 1887, op. cit., p.215.
126. Ibid, p.218.
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day of the conference, Sir Alexander Campbell of Canada brought the 
Pacific cable idea before the delegates for one last occasion.
Because of the various interests and opinions present, Campbell 
requested to move two very general resolutions, so that the view of 
the conference could be recorded.
i) That the connection recently formed through Canada from 
the Atlantic to the Pacific by railway telegraph opens a 
new and alternative line of Imperial communication over the 
high seas and through British possessions which promises to 
be of great value alike in naval, military, commercial and 
political aspects.
ii) That the connection of Canada with Australasia by 
direct submarine telegraph across the Pacific is a project 
of high importance to the Empire, and every doubt as to its 
practicability should without delay be set at rest by a 
thorough and exhaustive survey. ^ 7
The resolutions were accepted by Sir Henry Holland, the president of
the conference, and passed by the delegates.
The conference concluded on a positive note for Fleming and the
supporters of a Pacific cable. The body was purely consultative,
and no substantial concessions could be expected from any of the
interested delegates. However, the subject had received a full
hearing, and was now open to public view. The two resolutions
passed on the final day of the meeting meant that Fleming could
continue to pursue the Imperial government for more material support
in the years to follow. The conference also exposed the extent of
12 8the Eastern Extension Company's power. Pender's 'influence'
127. Ibid, p.514.
128. In opening his remarks to the conference Pender stated that, 
"Our system is very much in touch with Her Majesty's 
Government." Indeed, George Johnson reported that Pender was 
"in constant attendence, button-holing the delegates, and 
exerting his influence both inside and outside the 
conference." Johnson, op. cit., pp 297-98.
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on the conference delegates, particularly the Imperial 
representatives, gave notice of the formidable task faced by those 
anxious to bring Canada and Australia into direct telegraphic 
communication.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE INTER-CONFERENCE YEARS AND THE MOVE TO PUBLIC E N T E R P R ISE ,
(1887-1894)
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By ensuring the adoption of the two resolutions relating to the
Pacific cable, Alexander Campbell provided Sandford Fleming with the
means to pressure the Imperial government for more substantial
support. Opposition to the scheme had been based primarily on the
uncertain nature of the ocean floor. Despite the dubious quality of
the Eastern Extension Company's evidence, it was sufficient to move
the delegates to adopt a 'go slow' attitude, and to suspend further
action until a thorough nautical survey was undertaken.'*' Prior
to the conference, Fleming had offered to meet half the cost of the
2survey, but the proposal was rejected by Sir Henry Holland. As
an official gesture of support Campbell had, on behalf of the
Canadian government, submitted that his country would also meet half
the cost of the survey provided that England bore the remainder.
3But, again, Sir Henry declined to commit his government.
After the Colonial Conference rose, on 6 May 1887, Fleming went 
to work to ensure that the resolutions would be acted upon. As a 
first step, Fleming wrote to the secretary of state for the 
colonies, enclosing the signatures of the conference delegates, and 
requesting the Imperial government initiate a survey of the Pacific
1. The 1887 Colonial Conference resolved "that the connection of 
Canada with Australasia by direct submarine telegraph across 
the Pacific is a project of high importance to the Empire; and 
every doubt as to its practicability should, without delay, be 
set at rest by a thorough and exhaustive survey."
2. Johnson, George, (ed.) The All-Red Line: the Annals and Aims 
of the Pacific Cable. Ottawa, 1903, p. 73.
3. Sydney Morning Herald, 20 June 1887.
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to discover the practicability of a submarine cable from Canada to 
4Australia. Upon receiving Fleming's correspondence, the
colonial office had made enquiries at the admiralty. They were
informed that no vessel would be dispatched for the specific task of
surveying a Pacific cable route, but that sufficient data could be
5collected during the course of routine work. The dispatch 
continued: "Their Lordships do not propose to dispatch a survey
vessel for the sole purpose of obtaining soundings over the route, 
but they will endeavour to arrange that soundings shall be gradually 
obtained during the next few years in the normal course of
hydrographic surveys." The response of the admiralty was not in 
harmony with the conference resolution, and by no means in accord 
with Fleming's expectations.
Undaunted, Fleming continued to press the Imperial authorities 
throughout the British summer, but without satisfaction. The
colonial office and the admiralty were of the opinion that
accelerating the normal surveying of the Pacific was questionable 
without some assurance from the colonies that the funds for 
constructing a cable would become available.^ The Canadian
government responded by transmitting a Privy Council Minute to the 
Imperial government, advising that Ottawa was prepared to ask 
parliament for an annual subsidy of £7500, provided that the 
Australian colonies and New Zealand responded in kind, and Great
4. Fleming to Holland, 16 May 1887. Pari Paps., 1894, Vol. LVI, 
Cd.7553, p.287.
5. Admiralty to Colonial Office, 28 May 1887, ibid, p. 288.
6. Colonial Office to Marquis of Landsdowne, 12 July 1887, ibid, 
p. 291.
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Britian also supplied an additional £37,500.^ The initiative 
now lay with the Australians to convince the Imperial government 
that the colonies were indeed serious, and were willing to finance 
their share. Of all the interested parties, none were more 
interested than the Australians.
Upon returning to Canada, Fleming busied himself corresponding
with the various Australian colonies, outlining the attitude of the
Imperial government. He listed the steps taken to hasten Great
Britian to comply with the wishes of the conference, and also
expressed his personal disappointment:
These communications were subsequent to the discussions 
on the subject of the Colonial Conference, and the 
published proceedings of the Conference will show that 
during the discussions testimony was brought forward, by 
officers of the Government and the Eastern Telegraph 
Company, to raise doubts as to the practicability of 
establishing telegraphic connection across the Pacific.
In consequence of these doubts it was deemed expedient 
by the delegates that a proper survey should be made as 
soon as possible. With that objective in view, Her
Majesty's Government was especially appealed to, but the 
reply of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, by 
whose authority it was hoped the survey would be made, 
was unsatisfactory. The correspondence was transmitted 
to me, whereupon I ventured to submit reasons why the 
application of the delegates should be reconsidered, but 
up to this date I have not learned that anything further 
had been decided.®
Fleming also raised the possibility of ignoring the admiralty 
position entirely, and undertaking the survey as a joint 
Australian/Canadian project. The Canadian government was willing to 
make available a vessel for the purpose of surveying a cable route,
7. Marquis of Landsdowne to Colonial Office, 28 July 1887, ibid, 
p. 292.
8. Fleming to Colonial Secretary, New Zealand, 26 September 
1887,Laid before the Post and Telegraph Conference, (Sydney, 
1888), p. 38. Telecom Archives, Sydney.
55
provided the Australian Governments are willing to co-operate in
defraying the expenses to be incurred for coaling, victualling and
«9crew."
Fleming's Memorandum was placed before the Federal Council of
Australasia. The acting president of the council, Duncan Gillies,
premier of Victoria, replied with the following telegram to his
opposite numbers in the Australian colonies:
Pacific cable - Seems highly important that 
practicability be set at rest by a survey, as proposed 
by the Colonial Conference. I suggest the matter might 
be moved a step forward, if the several Colonies move 
Governor to wire the Secretary of State representing the 
desirability of giving effect to the two resolutions of 
the Conference adopted on 6 May. If this is concurred 
in, I will act accordingly as regards Victoria.
Gillies received negative responses from South Australia, Western
Australia and Tasmania, and no reply at all from New South Wales.
Of the remaining two colonies, only New Zealand responded
favourably.^ Sir Samuel Griffith, premier of Queensland, was
sympathetic, but could not commit himself to Gillies' plan. Rather,
12he favoured the independent approach suggested by Fleming.
9. Ibid, p. 38.
10. Gillies to Premiers of Queensland, South Australia, New 
Zealand, Tasmania, and the Colonial Secretary N.S.W., Western 
Australia, 23 December 1887. Federal Council of Australasia, 
Correspondence, Nos. 4818-23/87. New South Wales was not a 
member of the Council.
11. H.A. Atkinson to Gillies, 24 December 1887. The cable read:
"Suggestion approved. Have requested Governor to urge
Secretary of State. We have heard from Mr. Fleming that 
Canadian Government are willing to undertake survey if 
Australian Governments contribute to cost. Have wired 
Premier, Sydney, who has not replied." Federal Council, Nos. 
4818-23/87,
12. Griffith to Gillies, 28 December 1887, idem.
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In need of allies, Gillies cabled Griffith to clarify his
position:
Mr Fleming's proposals for a survey were, I understood, as 
an alternative in default of a survey by the Imperial 
Government. But as far as I know the Imperial Government 
has not yet refused to do the work, and it is premature to 
proceed with other proposals. My idea, therefore, was to 
press for a reply to the delegates' letter of 16 May, and 
if that is unfavourable, then it will be time enough to 
consider an alternative scheme. J
The Federal Council had no legislative power to act on the survey. 
However, Gillies was attempting to establish colonial opinion before 
the pending Post and Telegraph Conference, scheduled to begin on 19 
January 1888 in Sydney. A favourable report on the subject, from 
the Imperial authorities, would greatly assist the deliberations of 
the local conference.
With the limited information then available, Gillies was 
correct in discouraging Griffith from adopting a cavalier attitude 
towards the survey. With only Fleming's Memorandum as guidance, 
Gillies argued that the Imperial govenment was being judged too 
quickly. His reasoning was jolted by a telegram, from the Victorian 
agent-general on 12 January 1888. In reply to his request for 
further information, on the question of a survey, Gillies was 
informed: "Fleming's letter answered. Holland says if Colonial 
Governments concerned provide necessary funds Admiralty will be
13. Gillies to Griffith, 30 December 1887, ibid. The colonial 
office was of the opinion that the issue was concluded and 
that the 16 May letter was answered in correspondence to 
Canada of 12 July 1887. The Australians were not aware of 
this and assumed at this stage that the Imperial government 
would comply with the conference resolution.
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urged to accelerate survey." Assuming the fastest mails,
Gillies could not have known the full story until a month later.
This snippet of information altered the situation immeasurably.
Rather than give the Imperial government the benefit of the doubt,
Gillies was forced to alter his stance, and to accept Fleming's
statements as conclusive. Requesting the various governors to urge
Imperial compliance with the survey resolution was no longer
satisfactory. Instead, a show of financial support was the only,
but more difficult, appropriate course of action.^
When the Post and Telegraph Conference opened in Sydney much of
the delegates' time was occupied with discussion of a Pacific
cable. Captain F.C. Rowan travelled from Melbourne to lay a
Memorandum before the conference, for the Pacific Telegraph
Company. Rowan was not disposed to offer any new proposals for the
Company, only to "obtain, if possible, an expression from this
16Conference of sympathy in the proposed line." However, Rowan 
did reaffirm what his company believed to be the advantages of the 
Pacific route; and he attempted to deflect the criticism levied at
14. Berry to Gillies, 12 January 1888, Federal Council. P.88/137. 
A full letter of explanation, with enclosures from the 
colonial office was sent to the agent-general on 13 January 
1888. See No.88/490.
15. What had been apparent to the Canadian authorities in July
1887, did not become known in Australia until January 1888,
and then only partially. The information forwarded by the
Victorian agent-general on 13 January 1888 was a copy of the 
colonial office letter to Landsdowne. The last sentence read, 
"I request that Mr. Fleming be informed of the contents of 
this despatch." Judging by Fleming's Memorandum, he was not 
informed. Ibid, No,88/490.
16. Statement of Captain F.C. Rowan on behalf of the Pacific
Telegraph Company. Proceedings, Post and Telegraph 
Conference, (Sydney, 1888), p. 50.
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the proposal by the Eastern Extension Company. With regard to the
need for a nautical survey, Rowan stated plainly that,
Objections and statements have been made that the bottom 
of the sea, on the route along which it is proposed to 
take this cable, is of a dangerous and unsuitable 
nature. These statements are not borne out by any
evidence so far available to us. On the contrary, so 
far, the soundings of the 'Challenger' and 'Tuscarora' 
between Sydney and Hawaii, and to some extent north of 
Hawaii, all go to show that the bed of the ocean is 
comparatively even, and eminently suitable for a cable.
The methods of construction of cables have so much 
improved in late years that the dangers to be
apprehended from mere automatic or defective breaking of 
the cable are almost nil.^7
After being questioned, Rowan conceded that the soundings of the 
'Tuscorora' and the 'Challenger' were not comprehensive. But, he 
argued that they were sufficient to assume that no unusual depths 
could be expected.
Prior to the interview with Rowan, the conference heard a 
statement from, and conducted an interview with, representatives in 
Australia of the Eastern Extension Company. Again, no new proposals 
were presented. The agents explained that the subject of reduced 
telegraph rates was dealt with at the Colonial Conference, and that 
the Company would stand by its original offer to lower the tariff on 
the condition that its profits were maintained. The Sydney meeting 
was concerned that the Company was willing to reduce the tariff, 
provided the Australian colonies would guarantee three-quarters of 
the existing traffic; yet, no request was made of the British 
government for a subsidy or guarantee. According to the 1884 
International Telegraph Convention, if the tariff for messages 
between Australia and England was to be reduced, so too must the
17. Ibid, p. 50.
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rates between England and Australia. Ultimately, the delegates were
of the opinion that if Australia was to offset the reduced rate,
England should also be required to assist. The Eastern Extension
Company's representatives replied that no suggestions for reduced
rates had ever come from England. As the call for a lower tariff
originated in the Australian colonies, they should be asked to
18maintain Company profits. It was further explained that the 
British government had made clear its policy on subsidies at the 
Colonial Conference; and, as no subsidy was expected, none was 
requested.
After more than a week of discussion, the question of improving
telegraphic communication had not been resolved. The Pacific Cable
Company had nothing new to add, nor did the existing monopoly. As a
result, the conference resolved, with respect to the latter, "that
the proposals of the Eastern Extension Company for the reduction of
the tariff between Europe and Australia are worthy of careful 
19consideration." In a bid to promote a Pacific cable, the
conference moved, with New South Wales dissenting, that,
This Conference is of the opinion that it is desirable a
survey should be made of a suitable route for an Ocean
Telegraph cable by way of the Pacific, via Vancouver
Island, the cost of the survey to be defrayed by Great
Britain, Canada, and the Australasian Colonies
represented at this Conference. This, however, is not
to bind any of the countries named to accept the
proposals of the Pacific Cable Company, and that the
subject of the resolution be communicated to the various
90Australasian Governments.
18. Statement by Messrs. W.G. Taylor, W. Warren, and 
Representatives of the Eastern Extension Company.
J.E. Squier, 
ibid, p. 45.
19. Ibid, p. 45.
20. Ibid, p. 7.
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Should the Pacific cable remain in limbo, the colonies were still in
a position to accept the proposal offered by the Eastern Extension
Company. The dissent of New South Wales was a blow to Gillies, who
had hoped the colonies would be able to speak with a single voice.
Of equal significance was the abstention of South Australia and
Western Australia, leaving only Victoria, Queensland, New Zealand
and Tasmania wholly supporting the survey.
In early March, Gillies informed the Victorian Governor that
his government concurred with the resolution, and were willing to
21bear a share of the survey cost. The Governor then wired Lord
Knutsford (formerly Sir Henry Holland),
In accordance with the resolution passed by Postal 
Conference held in Sydney, the whole of the Australian 
Colonies being represented, my Government ask that the 
Admiralty may be moved to make an early survey of a 
suitable route for ocean telegraph cable by way of the 
Pacific Ocean via Vancouver Island, cost to be defrayed 
by Her Majesty's Government, the Government of Canada, 
and Australian Colonies.22
Consequently, a full year after the first sitting of the Colonial 
Conference, representations for a nautical survey of the Pacific had 
been made to the colonial office from the Colonial Conference 
delegates, Canada and Australia. The request for a survey had 
evolved to the point of becoming a joint financial venture, but it 
appeared that the conditions set by the colonial office and the 
admiralty had been met.
Knutsford transmitted the Victorian cable to the admiralty, 
requesting once again to investigate an accelerated survey of the
21. Gillies to Loch, 5 March 1888. Federal Council No.88/897.
22. Loch to Knutsford, 7 March 1888. Federal Council P.88/2264.
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Pacific. As the colonies themselves had resolved to contribute to
the cost of the venture, Knutsford also requested the admiralty to
furnish him "with an approximate estimate of the probable cost of a 
23survey." In their lengthy reply the admiralty pointed out
that H.M.S. Egeria was on the point of embarking from Sydney to
commence the important work of fixing the position of the islands
between New Zealand and Vancouver. The Egeria was to take deep
soundings "which will in two or three years" provide more
24information than was at that time available. The
unenthusiastic correspondence then continued;
To survey a route for a cable to any purpose would, 
however, entail long searching for the best line,
examination of contours of coral Islands, and continuous
close soundings; and three years' steady work at that and 
nothing else would probably not complete the survey ... My 
Lords do not therefore consider that it is advisable to 
make any alterations in the orders under which the 'Egeria' 
is about to act; and as no vessel can be spared from her 
hydrographic work in any other part of the world, the 
question of hastening the survey by providing another 
vessel must, in their Lordships' opinion, remain open until 
Lord Knutsford is able to inform this Department that there 
is a reasonable prospect that the funds for the 
construction of the submarine cable across the Pacific will 
be found, and that time is of importance in Imperial 
interests.^5
The fact of the matter, here expressed by the admiralty, seemed 
to conflict with the estimates contained in Fleming's Memorandum to 
the Australian colonies, of September 1887. Fleming had predicted 
that the time involved in a survey of the Pacific would be six to 
twelve months, and not two to three years as the admiralty
23. Colonial Office to Admiralty, 16 March 1888, in Colonial 
Office Circular, May 1, 1888. Telecom Archives, Sydney.
24. Admiralty to Colonial Office, 4 April 1888, ibid.
25. Idem.
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maintained. The contention that no other vessel could be spared for
hydrographic research was obviously made without consideration of 
the Canadian vessel 'Alert1, which had been offered as a survey ship 
to the Colonial Conference. If "time is of importance in Imperial 
interests", as the admiralty claimed, then why did the colonies not
learn of the Imperial government's stand toward a survey until 1 May
261888? Clearly, the Pacific cable scheme was not as high a 
priority with the Imperial government as the promoters of the 
Pacific Cable Company suggested. On the other hand, the proposal 
for a survey, embodied in the two Colonial Conference resolutions, 
was vague in the extreme, with no specific route ever being 
indicated.
I
By the Canadian summer of that year, Fleming had concluded that 
a fledgling Company, could not raise capital until anxieties 
concerning the ocean floor were put to rest, and that it was 
impotent in a head-to-head confrontation with the Eastern Extension 
Company. Fleming accordingly took a different tack - 'public
26. News of the H.M.S. Egeria first appeared in the Australian 
Colonies on 4 April, 1888 in the Sydney Morning Herald. The 
postmaster-general of Queensland, Mr. W.H. Wilson, cabled his 
counterpart in Tasmania, Mr. Stafford Bird, requesting that he 
solicit the intentions of the "Egeria", then lying in Hobart. 
The commander, Captain Pelham Aldrich, refused comment. The 
next day the Herald wrote: "It will be most gratifying to the 
public, both in the Colonies and in the Dominion, to know that 
the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have seen their way 
to have the survey made under their direction, without calling 
upon the Australian Governments to defray the expense of 
either coaling, victualling or crew." The "Egeria" departed 
Sydney for Auckland on 19 April, 1888, before the views of the 
Admiralty were known.
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ownership'. Fleming is largely credited with popularising the
scheme of an Imperial partnership, but the idea was first raised
, „ • 27publicly by Sir Julius Vogel, the former New Zealand premier.
As the veteran New Zealand parliamentarian, Vogel had an early
association with Audley Coote and Rowan, through his representation
28of the Pacific Telegraph Company in Wellington. His
behind-the-scenes interest in a private enterprise Pacific cable had
led Vogel to consider a number of options available to the
'Australasian' colonies. As postmaster-general, Vogel had
approached the New Zealand premier with three different schemes to
bring overseas telegraphy into the public sphere. The first was the
nationalisation of the Australian landline from Port Darwin to
Adelaide, and the purchase of the Eastern Extension Company cables
to the Straits settlements. Secondly, Vogel also advocated the
construction of a government-owned cable across the Pacific to
Vancouver. The third option was a scheme of public construction and
ownership: the establishment of a series of cables from Ceylon to
29Mauritius, Natal, Cape of Good Hope and St Vincent.
Having experienced at firsthand the benefits of state ownership 
through his years with the Intercolonial Railway, Fleming embraced
27. Memorandum by Sir J. Vogel, Postmaster General re Telegraph 
Cables, 5 February 1887, Proceedings,(Sydney, 1888), op. 
cit., p. 35.
28. Rowan to Randolph C. Want, 18 January 1886. Rowan 
Letterbooks, MS 931, National Library of Australia.
29. Memorandum by Sir J. Vogel, op. cit.
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Vogel's idea. In a Memorandum to Lord Stanley, the incoming 
Governor General of Canada, Fleming restated Vogel's argument with 
vigour:
While there should be the strongest desire to respect 
established rights and honourably recognize existing 
interests, on the other hand we must bear in mind the well 
known principle that no private Company, whatever its 
profitable operations can be allowed to impede the general 
advantage of the Empire. The principle is clearly 
established that private interests must yield to public 
good, such private interests being fairly indemnified ... 
it is contemplated to carry out the undertaking under a 
joint Commission, on which will be represented the Imperial 
Government, and the Governments of Canada, the Australian 
Colonies and New Zealand. ^
It is difficult to see why Fleming was so convinced that the
Imperial government would be a party to such a scheme when the
admiralty was not willing to undertake a nautical survey in
co-ordination with the settlement colonies. After all, the British
postmaster-general had publicly declared that "it would be a matter
of extreme difficulty, I think without precedent, for the English
Government to become interested in such a scheme in such a way as to
constitute itself a competitor with an existing commercial
32enterprise carried on by Citizens of the British Empire." In
30. G.N. Savory, "The Pacific Cable: A Study in the Role of
Private Enterprise.." argues that Fleming, as a director of 
the C.P.R., was interested in establishing further traffic for 
the Company's land lines. Savory's argument is sound as far 
as it goes, but he neglects Fleming's intimate friendship with 
Canadian Imperialists George Parkin and Principal George M. 
Grant. Undoubtably, Fleming was greatly influenced by these 
men and their ideas, and this would explain his call to have 
the Canadian government nationalise the CPR telegraph lines. 
See Johnson, Annals and Aims, p. 437.
31. Fleming to Stanley of Preston, 28 June 1888, Telecom Archives, 
Sydney.
32. Pari. Paps., 1887, Vol. LVI, Cd. 5091, p.217.
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Fleming's view, this policy could be invalidated by purchasing the 
existing enterprise, and thus not competing.
Sir John Pender was concerned by the sudden turn of events. 
The obstacle of the supposed need for a survey was wearing thin, and 
the monopoly of the Australian traffic was being threatened on two 
fronts. The Pacific Telegraph Company was collecting momentum in 
preparing for a major offensive, and Sandford Fleming had 
resurrected the spectre of government ownership. Pender responded 
by intensifying his campaign to lure the Australian colonies into 
accepting his offer of reducing telegraph charges. This attempt was 
side-tracked by the total disruption of services between Australia
and Britain for 21 out of 114 days between August and
33November. The breakdown of communication certainly did not
harm the Eastern Extension Company, as the receipts from the
34previous six months showed an increase of over £20,000.
Following the news of the financial success of the monopoly, the
Electrical Review heralded the "dissatisfaction felt with the
present service, both as regards the tariff, and the security of 
35communication". The journal criticised Pender's tariff
proposal, arguing that it would be absurd for the Australian 
colonies to guarantee the profits of an ineffective service.
In early November, at the Congress of Australasian Chambers of 
Commerce in Melbourne, Rowan once again attempted to advance the 
cause of a Pacific cable. Rowan's well-received speech focused on
33. Electrical Review, Vol XX111, no. 570. 26 October 1888, p. 449.
34. Ibid, p. 450.
35. Idem.
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the commercial advantages of an alternative line of communication.
According to Rowan, the Pacific Telegraph Company was willing to
lessen the liability of breakdowns by providing a duplicate cable
lying in deep water, miles away from the shallow seas where the
Eastern Extension Company wires lay. Commerce would no longer rise
and fall at the whim of the Timor Sea. By reducing the tariff to
four shillings a word, the Pacific cable would lower the cost of an
3 6average telegram to just £2. Preceeding Rowan's speech, the
president of the Sydney Chamber of Commerce submitted a letter
containing more than 100 corporate names and personal signatures of
Australians supporting his resolution:
That this Congress heartily endorses, both on commercial 
and strategic grounds, the laying of a submarine telegraph 
cable through the Pacific Ocean connecting Australia and 
the Dominion of Canada, and this with Great Britain and the 
continent of Europe, and trusts that every effort will be 
made to hasten the completion of a survey of the ocean 
floor. It also urges upon the various colonial Governments 
the advisability of endeavouring through their Agents 
General to induce the Imperial Government to co-operate 
and liberally in the furtherance of thispromptly
object.
The resolution was passed unanimously, sending a warning to Sir
Henry Parkes in Sydney. The New South Wales government had remained
aloof from the cable debate. But, after the strong stand of the
Sydney contingent at the Congress, Parkes was forced to agree with
the January resolution, and to inform Gillies that New South Wales
38would pay its share of a survey.
36. The Argus,(Melbourne) 2 November 1888. Proceedings of
Congress of Australasian Chambers of Commerce. Rowan
maintained that an average message cost £5 13s. 9d. The 
Pacific cable would thus save the sender £3 13s. 9d. per 
average message.
37. Idem.
38. Sydney Morning Herald, 19 November 1888.
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The significance of the Melbourne meeting was reinforced by an
assembly of supporters of the Pacific cable at the famed Cannon
Street Hotel, in London. The meeting, of 22 November, convened by
the promoters of the Pacific Telegraph Company, "was one of the most
influential meetings of the kind ever held in the city of 
39London". This Cannon Street gathering was the pinnacle of the
Pacific Telegraph Company campaign following the Colonial
Conference. The actual meeting, chaired by the Earl of Winchilsea,
was attended by individual financiers connected with leading banks,
commercial firms and mercantile companies throughout the Empire. In
opening the conference, the chairman stressed that despite claims by
the Eastern Extension Company and its allies experts were now of the
opinion that laying a Pacific cable was practicable. Deep water
cables were less liable to the ill effects of boring animals, coral
formations, and wear caused by currents than those in shallow 
40water.
Sir Donald Smith followed the chairman, and moved a resolution
supporting the Pacific Telegraph Company; and, again, requested the
Imperial government "do all in its power to facilitate the laying of
such a cable, especially by obtaining the necessary soundings with
41as little delay as possible." In rising to second the
resolution, a representative from one of the largest firms connected 
with Australia, Dalgety and Company, emphasised the commercial 
importance of secure communication:
39. Finch-Hatton to Gillies, 24 November 1888. Appendix to 
Pacific Cable Papers, Federal Council.
40. Enclosure, Report of the Pacific Telegraph Conference, 22 
November 1888, ibid.
41. Idem.
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Few people have any idea of the part which telegraphy 
plays in business transactions nowadays....It is 
impossible to adequately realize the effect of any 
fracture in a cable system upon businessmen. It means 
not only a dangerous check to business, but more, an 
utter dislocation of all one's commercial 
arrangements; so much so, that an order taken, or 
given, with the full expectation of realizing a profit 
may become, owing to the rupture in the cable, by the 
time the transaction is completed, a loss instead of a 
gain.
Indeed, cable communication had passed from a novel luxury to an 
indispensable tool of commerce. Evidence to this fact is found in 
reading the list of influential businessmen attending the Cannon 
Street meeting. The commercial community was more than willing to 
rally behind the idea of lower rates and security from 
interruption. However, without government assurance, - that a 
subsidy or guarantee would be forthcoming, and that the Pacific 
would be surveyed - the 'captains of industry' were not inclined to 
lend more than vocal support.
The Eastern Extension Company attempted to offset the publicity 
expected to follow from the Cannon Street meeting by issuing a 
circular to the London "Times". Pender and his associates wished to 
offer the telegraphing public the other side of the cable story. 
This attempt to block the Pacific cable movement did not achieve its 
aim. It appeared to the directors of the Eastern Company that, as 
they had pioneered submarine telegraphy in the Southern Hemisphere, 
without a shilling of government aid, the same should stand for the 
pioneers of the Pacific. The circular further explained that the 
Eastern Extension system to Australia was at the time duplicated,
42. Idem.
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43 Alland discussions were underway to have it triplicated.
this took place when one cable was more than capable of carrying
many times the existing traffic. Pender also raised the subject of
reduced tariffs, by belittling the Pacific Telegraph Company, and
restated his Company's offer to ease the tariff burden.
Trying to lessen the public damage of the recent interruptions
in the Australian service, it was now argued that:
On the first occasion, both the Java-Australian cables 
were suddenly and simultaneously interrupted in deep water 
through volcanic disturbances, and, the two subsequent
breakages were in connection with the renewals of portions 
of the cables where they were found to be on bad ground...
The total interruptions, however, since the communication 
was duplicated in 1880, including those above mentioned, 
have aggregated only 41 days, averaging less than five
days per annum - a result that will bear favourable 
comparison with the working of any other submarine system 
in the world.^
The about face was now complete. The Eastern Extension Company 
could no longer sit back and wait for the Pacific cable scheme to 
collapse. Even given colonial office apathy, the monopoly had 
publicly to defend itself against a Company that had not yet raised 
capital.
In his closing remarks to the Cannon Street conference, Harold 
Finch-Hatton criticised the Eastern Extension Company's circular as 
entirely misleading. Indeed, on the subject of reliability, Hatton 
declared that,
Even if the total breakages only amount in the aggregate to 
41 days, which I do not admit to be correct, it is 
certainly not the case that the average of five days per 
annum would compare favourably with any other existing 
system, considering the Pernambuco Cable, which is laid for
43. Daily Telegraph, 2 January 1889.
44. Idem.
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a considerable distance at a depth of 2,900 fathoms, has 
only broken once during the last 14 years. The worst 
point, however, about the breakages of the Eastern 
Extension system, is their ever-increasing frequency; and 
the fact that out of 41 days in the five years, 33 days 
breakages have occurred during the past five months.^
It was a difficult record to defend. Even more difficult for
Pender, was the problem of conclusively proving that the guarantee
sought by the Eastern system was more equitable than that which the
Pacific Telegraph Company required. The Australian colonies were
already harnessed, with a subsidy of £32,600 per annum, to Pender's 
46consortium. To reduce the tariff further, a burden of
guaranteeing three-quarters of any loss in revenue would be 
required. In itself, the guarantee of £75,000 government traffic 
requested by the Pacific Telegraph Company seemed to be the best 
course, particularly if the Eastern Extension Company proposal was 
examined in the light of the Pacific cable becoming a reality.
Assuming the lower tariff would increase the Australian traffic by
$
25%, the colonies would be required to pay £60,000. Should the
traffic increase an extra 50%, the colonies would be called upon to 
47pay £40,000. In the event of the Pacific cable being
realised, traffic over the Eastern Extension lines could be expected
45. Report of the Pacific Telegraph Conference, op. cit. Harold 
Finch-Hatton was the fourth son of the Earl of Winchilsea. 
His interest in the Pacific cable project stemmed from his 
involvement in the North Queensland cattle industry. In 1883, 
after eight years in Australia, he returned to England 
permanently. Ultra-conservative and Imperial Federationist, 
he failed to win a seat in the House of Commons three times 
before being returned unopposed for the Newark division of 
Nottinghamshire in 1895. Australian Dictionary of Biography. 
Vol.4, p.168.
46. Electrical Review, Vol. XXIII, No.570, 26 October 1888. p. 450.
47. Report of the Pacific Telegraph Conference, op. cit.
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to decrease. If the decline in revenue were 25%, the colonies would
48
be penalised £100,000.
The Electrical Review was also anxious to comment on "the other
side" of the cable debate. On 7 December the journal condemned the
Eastern Extension circular, remarking that, "Besides being a weak
defence, this letter has lent itself to certain statements not only
49
exaggerated and misleading, but actually contrary to fact."
If criticism from the admittedly partisan Finch-Hatton was not
enough to bury the Company's circular, the views of this reputable
engineering journal did the final damage. In reference to the
Eastern group's claim, of being 'all-British', and their argument of
coincidence regarding interrupted service, it further remarked that:
The statement that the existing telegraph system between 
England and Australia is under British control is simply 
not true? Egypt and Java intervene. The technical argument 
employed to explain one of the interruptions of the 
Java-Australia cable is simply ridiculous. It is said that 
the repairing ship interrupted one cable while employed in 
repairing the other, because of the "strong currents off 
Java drifted the cables together". From this it is evident 
that we are asked to believe that there were two currents, 
one for each cable, flowing in contrary directions, in the 
same place and at the same time, so that each cable was 
carried by its own current towards the other, which was 
coming to meet it. Is this a serious statement, or is it a 
joke at the readers' expense?50
By going on the offensive, to engage the Pacific Telegraph Company 
in a show of merits, the Eastern Extension Company succeeded only in 
exemplifying its foibles. After this dismal attempt at public 
relations, the monopoly remained in the board-room, preferring to
48. Idem.
49. Electrical Review, Vol. XXXIII, No. 576, 7 December 1888, p.
621.
50. Ibid, p. 621.
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watch the course of the Pacific cable scheme rather than trying to 
divert it.
II
Following the loud signal tapped out by the commercial
community in Melbourne and London, the electoral importance of a
Pacific cable came to the fore. Sensing a renewed political
interest in the subject, the Canadian government issued invitations
to the Australian colonies to meet in conference to discuss "the
best means of establishing intimate trade relations, and the closest
possible telegraphic connection".51 The Canadian invitation
reached Australia in early January 1889. George Dibbs, the
newly-elected protectionist premier of New South Wales, immediately
communicated with the other colonies in the hope of soliciting a
favourable reply. The ministries of Queensland and New Zealand,
although alive to the benefits of a conference, were not inclined to
send a delegation to Canada. New Zealand would, however, consider
such a proposal, should the location be Australia rather than 
52Canada. Similar replies followed from Tasmania and South
Australia; and it was finally decided that it would be difficult to
send delegates to Canada as the ministers responsible could not
53conveniently evade their parliamentary duties simultaneously.
Gillies was of a similar opinion, and he cabled to Canada that
54Victoria would welcome a conference in Melbourne.
51. Stanley to Loch, 17 November 1888, Telecom Archives, Sydney.
52. Atkinson to Dibbs, 21 January 1889, ibid.
53. "Statement of the Case" Postmaster-General's Department, 29 
September 1890, ibid.
54. Australasian, 23 February 1889. Dibbs took umbrage with 
Gillies' actions. In responding, he informed Gillies that New 
South Wales had asked for Victoria's views on the subject, "We 
did not ask you to be the mouthpiece of all the Colonies in
(Footnote continued to page 74)
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In commenting on the aims of a proposed conference, the two
major Sydney newspapers took decidedly different stands. The Sydney 
Morning Herald welcomed the interest which the Dibbs' administration 
had taken in the Pacific cable. It had "long advocated" an 
alternative means of communication. By having only one 
question on the agenda, such a conference could only advance the 
cause. The advantages of further communication in the south Pacific 
would enhance Australia's influence in the region. Inexpensive 
communication to the ever-growing markets of North America would be 
a boon to antipodean commerce. The Herald did not deny that Canada, 
too, would gain materially from closer trade and telegraphic ties; 
but, they chose to emphasise this motivation as secondary to her 
desire to bring together the strands of the Empire.56
The Daily Telegraph was not nearly as convinced of the
mercantile justification of the Pacific cable.57 As little
trade had hithertofore arisen, and only a small amount of
telegraphic business had been conducted, what was the point of
artificially creating demand? The editorial further contended that 
the expectation of immediate trade resulting from a Pacific cable 
was a misconception. "Profitable interchange rests on dissimilarity
of product. When two countries produce mainly the same things what
58advantage is to be secured by their interchanging them?"
(Footnote continued from page 73)
communication with Canada." As the Governor General had 
communicated with all the colonies separately, Gillies was 
certainly justified in responding individually.
55. Sydney Morning Herald, 9 February 1889.
56. Idem.
57. Daily Telegraph, 15 February 1889.
58. Idem. In 1889 New South Wales imported £37,959 of goods from
(Footnote continued to page 75)
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What, then, was the motive of the Conference? The Daily Telegraph 
saw it as merely another attempt to promote Imperial Federation, 
which it did not support. Such a scheme in Canada may have been 
preferable to annexation by the United States. But, no such fears 
existed in Australia. The greatest service a conference could make 
to Australian development was to highlight the differing political 
aspirations of the two societies, and therefore have "a beneficial
and instructive effect on the deliberations and the action of both
. . „59countries."
It was not until August that Canada decided to accept, and to 
send a contingent to Australia.60 The Canadian chief 
commissioner, and future premier, John Abbott, proceeded directly to 
London to ascertain the views of the various agents-general. Abbott 
was informed that, by the time he could arrive in Australia, the 
several colonial legislatures would be in session, making a 
conference difficult.61 Before returning to Canada, Abbott 
engaged the assistance of Sir Charles Tupper, the High Commissioner, 
in an attempt to have the admiralty move the "Egeria" from its work 
west of Hawaii to the less certain route east of Hawaii, to
(Footnote continued from page 74)
Canada, while exporting only £4. New South Wales Statistical 
Register.
59. Idem.
60. Minute of Council, Ottawa, 17 
Sydney.
61. Samuel to Colonial Secretary, 
Council Minute 3 January 1890,
August 1889, Telecom Archives,
7 March 1890. Enclosing Privy 
Telecom Archives, Sydney.
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Vancouver. One month later, the admiralty replied that they
were not disposed to "lose valuable time" by sending the "Eqeria"
many miles from its location, to conduct soundings which would "be
63obtained in the ordinary course."
After this unsuccessful attempt at co-ordination, the Macdonald
ministry informed the Australian colonies that Canada was still
willing to instigate a delegation to the south. On Abbott's
suggestion, Macdonald proposed that the Australian colonies arrange
a conference at a "convenient season" at which Canada could be 
64represented. Gillies informed Canada that Victoria, and the
other Australian colonies, were considering a convention to review
the question of f e d e r a t i o n . A s  the various governments would
be engaged on this subject for some time, it was "difficult to
indicate a suitable time for the Conference with Canada.
With the proposed conference postponed indefinitely, and the Pacific
Telegraph Company no longer functioning, the idea of challenging the
67Eastern Extension Company was dropped.
When the Australian postmasters-general met, in Adelaide, 
during May 1890, Sir John Pender introduced a modified scheme to
62
62. Abbott to Tupper, 24 September 1889, Pari Paps., 1894, op. 
cit., p 308.
63. Admiralty to Colonial Office, 23 October 1889 ibid, p. 310.
64. Stanley to Carrington, 27 January 1890, Telecom Archives, 
Sydney.
65. Gillies to Madden (acting Governor), 3 May 1890, ibid.
66. Idem.
67. The Pacific Telegraph Company ceased lobbying the various
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reduce the tariff to Europe. Pender immediately offered to reduce
the cost of ordinary messages to 5s., government telegrams to 4s.
5d.f and press messages to Is. lOd. - provided the Australian
68colonies guaranteed one half of any loss in profit. After
initial discussion, the Victorian delegate moved that the proposal 
be undertaken for a three year trial-period, with the rates being 
4s. for ordinary, 2s. 6d. for government, and Is. lOd. for press 
messages.^ He also argued that Great Britain should be 
included in the guarantee, as she would undoubtably take up the 
lower rates.
A series of cables were dispatched to the colonial
agents-general in London, with the aim of convincing Pender and his
associates that a further reduction would not be injurious to the
Eastern Extension Company. Upon receiving confirmation of Pender's
approval, the conference resolved to enter into an agreement to
reduce the tariff. But, not all the colonies favoured the new
agreement. The Queensland representative refused to bind his
goverment to a guarantee. He argued that any further assistance
toward the maintenance of a profitable monopoly would only entrench
70colonial reliance on the one company. Queensland had
maintained a constant position on this issue over the years. As it
(Footnote continued from page 76)
governments for support shortly after the Cannon St. meeting. 
No further mention of the Company being active beyond 1888 has 
been found by the author.
68. Pender to Agents-General, (no date), Post and Telegraph 
Conference, (Adelaide, 1890), p.55.
69. Ibid, p. 23.
70. Ibid, p. 35.
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had not been party to the subsidy arranged by the other colonies, it 
would not be part of a guarantee. However, as New Zealand had not 
sent a delegate to the conference, Queensland was alone in its 
opposition.
In correspondence with the colonial office following this
acquiescence of the Australian colonies, Fleming deplored the
71'guarantee plan'. If the Eastern Extension Company proposal
was agreed to, it would "put an end to any prospect of connecting
72Canada and Australasia." Such a situation would seriously
hamper empire development, and surely deal a blow to British
supremacy in the Pacific. While welcoming a reduction in the
tariff, Fleming suggested that the reduction would only transfer the
burden of rates. The proposal was purely cosmetic and deceptive, as
the colonial treasuries would be called upon to maintain a more than
adequate profit margin for the monopoly. If a real reduction of
rates was desired, the best course was competition; and if a Pacific
cable was laid, that end would be achieved.
Dissatisfied with the silence from the colonial office, and
anxious for a larger audience, Fleming now addressed a letter to
various newspapers in London, and the colonies, entitled "Fellow 
73Colonists". He pointed out that although the Imperial
government did not intend to join in the guarantee, he feared "force 
of circumstance" might compel the Australians to come to terms with
71. Fleming to Colonial Office, 26 June 1890, Pari Pap., 1894, 
Vol. LVI, p. 314.
72. Fleming to Colonial Office, 26 June 1890, op. cit.
73. "Fellow Colonists" 18 July 1890, 1894 Postal Conference
Papers, 4/910, New South Wales Archives.
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the monopoly. Assuming that the guarantee would bring the
indebtedness of the colonies to £54,000 more or less, Fleming
submitted that, for the same sum, the colonies could have a Pacific
cable, under joint government control. Fleming asked rhetorically,
Should a monopoly of telegraph business be built up in the 
hands of the existing Companies, or is it in the public 
interest to establish an independent line, owned by the 
public, and under Government control?^
The question, however, fell upon deaf ears in Australia. Economic 
depression quelled further discussion of a Pacific cable for a year 
and a half. Pender had been fortunate to secure a guarantee of 
profits before the full impact of the economic crisis could affect 
telegraph business.^5
Ill
The disappearance of the Pacific Telegraph Company from the 
cable debate had left Fleming's plan of government ownership the 
only active proposal until the early months of 1892. At that time 
Audley Coote arrived in Brisbane, with a scheme privately to 
undertake a Pacific cable, section by section, beginning with a line 
from Queensland to New Caledonia. After the demise of the Pacific 
Telegraph Company, Coote had aligned himself with a French 
syndicate, the "Société Française des Télégraphes Sous-marins of 
Paris". Acting as the attorney of the French company, Coote met 
with the Queensland postmaster-general, and offered to lay, and to 
maintain, a submarine cable for a guarantee of £12,000 a year for
74. Idem.
75. The guarantee and lower rates did not come into effect until 
May 1891. Annual Report on Posts and Telegraph, New South 
Wales, 1892.
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thirty years. As the French government was the primary party, it
agreed to guarantee £8,000 - leaving £4,000 to be met by the
76interested Australian governments. Coote informed the
Queensland authorities that New South Wales had already declared an 
interest in the idea, and it was willing to guarantee £2,000 should 
Queensland do the same.
On the way to the Post and Telegraph Conference scheduled for
Hobart, Coote visited Sydney and consulted the New South Wales
77postmaster-general, John Kidd. Discussion continued in
Hobart, where both New South Wales and Queensland agreed to Coote's
terms - provided a satisfactory arrangement was arrived at so that
the guarantees would not grow disproportionately as the Pacific
cable stretched to North America. To assure the
postmasters-general, Coote declared that,
... as soon as the main Pacific cable is laid; the 
guarantee that I now ask shall be rearranged, and come in 
to, and form part of any, joint purse guarantee given by 
any of the other Colonies joining the guarantee for the 
main Pacific cable, so that the Governments of New South 
Wales, and Queensland shall then stand on the same ground 
floor as the other Colonies when the main Pacific cable is 
laid.78
During the previous decade, Coote had been actively involved in 
promoting a Pacific cable. Aside from his association with Rowan
76. Coote to Unmack, 19 February 1892. Post and Telegraph 
Conference, (Hobart, 1892), p.72.
77. Coote to Unmack, 15 March 1892, ibid, p.75. An ardent 
protectionist and orangeman, Kidd was first elected to the New 
South Wales legislative assembly in 1880. Appointed 
postmaster-general by Dibbs in 1891 to counter orange 
criticism, he "proved to be a conscientious, unadventurous 
minister." Australian Dictionary of Biography. Vol.5, p.24.
78. Coote to Kidd, 7 March 1892, New South Wales Pari Paps., 1892,
211- p.2.
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and the Pacific Telegraph Company, he had lobbied the various
Pacific island governments along the route of the cable. In 1884
Coote secured exclusive landing rights in Samoa, as well as similar
79concessions from the Hawaiian government. Coote's diligence
now proved sufficient to convince New South Wales and Queensland
that the New Caledonia line was indeed a first step across the
Pacific. From New Caledonia the cable was to be extended to Fiji,
then to Samoa, before going north to Honolulu, and then finally to 
„ 80San Francisco or Vancouver. Coote and his French associates
undoubtedly preferred to have the North Pacific terminus in the
United States, in the hope of securing a much larger telegraphic
market. However, conscious of the growth of Imperial sentiment,
Coote offered Vancouver as a possible destination.
At the Hobart conference, the Queensland delegate outlined the
colony's stand on the telegraph question. He argued that the policy
since 1876 had been the establishment of an alternative means of
81overseas communication to abolish the existing monopoly. The
conference proceedings record that,
After many years of waiting, that object now seemed to be 
within reach, inasmuch as certain proposals had been made 
to the Governments of Queensland and New South Wales for 
the laying of the first section of the Pacific cable from 
the Queensland coast, probably Bundaberg, to New 
Caledonia. The Governments of Queensland and New South 
Wales had undertaken, in connection with the Government of 
France to pay the guarantee required for the working of
79. Coote to Kidd, 15 March 1892, Enclosing declaration by King 
Malietoa, May 1884, and statement by Hawaiian Finance Minister 
W.L. Green, July 1887, ibid, p.3.
80. Coote to Kidd, 7 March 1892, op. cit.
81. Proceedings, Post and Telegraph Conference, (Hobart, 1892) , p. 
97.
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that portion of the cable. Queensland and New South Wales 
had no intention of asking the other Colonies to contribute 
towards these guarantees at present, but as the line was 
extended and the proper time came the Colonies would be 
asked to make up the full guarantee, which would be a fair 
and reasonable one, as the line was extended section by 
section.82
He went on to rebut objections from other delegates about the line
passing through foreign territory, by declaring that any Pacific
cable would have to traverse foreign soil, either at Samoa or
Hawaii. John Gavan Duffy, representing Victoria, was sympathetic to
a Pacific cable, but he condemned the proposition that the other
colonies should eventually assist in a guarantee - while Queensland
steadfastly refused to join the colonies in their present guarantee
83and subsidy arrangement with the Eastern Extension Company.
For its part, South Australia maintained that, if a monopoly was not 
injurious - which the Eastern Extension Company was not - there was 
no reason to abolish it.
The subject of a Pacific cable was not raised at a subsequent 
Post and Telegraph Conference in Melbourne during August 1892. 
Instead, the postmasters-general of New South Wales, Victoria and 
South Australia, met to address the heavy loss incurred by the 
principal colonies, resulting from the Eastern Extension Company 
guarantee. Kidd argued that the delegates to the Adelaide
82. Idem.
83. Idem. The son of Sir Charles Gavan Duffy, John succeeded his 
father as representative for the Catholic seat of Dalhousie 
where he served from 1874 to 1904 with only one brief 
interruption in 1886. First appointed postmaster-general in 
1890, he resigned to contest unsuccessfully the speakership in 
April 1892. Reappointed postmaster-general in 1894, he 
remained in the post until November 1899, making him the 
longest serving postmaster-general during the years of the 
Pacific cable debate.
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conference had erred when they assumed business would be so greatly
increased by the lower tariff that the guarantee would be minimal.
So convinced had been the New South Wales government, that no monies
were allocated for the guarantee in the treasury estimates for 
841891. Consequently, New South Wales found itself with a
guarantee bill of £15,000, and no allocated funds with which to
pay. In an attempt to ease the financial situation, it was proposed
that the tariff be raised from 4s. to 4s. 9d., with 7d. going to the
Eastern Extension Company, and 2d. going to South Australia, to meet
85requirements along the landline to Port Darwin. The meeting 
was also called to hear a request from New Zealand to enter into the 
guarantee, and partake in the reduced tariff enjoyed by the other 
colonies, save Queensland. The New Zealand request was timely. 
After hearing evidence from the Eastern Extension manager in 
Australia, the assembled colonies agreed to admit New Zealand, and 
thus reduce further the guarantee burden.
Despite the successful resolution of the guarantee problem, the 
Pacific cable question resurfaced in the Australian colonies in 
March 1893. The renewed interest was created by the culmination of 
the New Caledonia cable contract. The prospect of the cable falling 
into foreign hands moved numerous commercial organisations to 
unleash a further series of resolutions in support of an 
'all-British' line of communications. Fleming took the opportunity, 
of the second Congress of Chambers of Commerce of the Empire, to
84. Proceedings, Post and Telegraph Conference, (Melbourne, 1892), 
p. 17.
85. Ibid, p. 19.
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revive the sputtering Pacific cable movement. He lamented that five
years had been lost since colonial representatives first endorsed
the scheme, while nothing of substance had been accomplished.
British interest in submarine cables in 1892 amounted to 90,000 of 
. . 86the existing 125,000 miles. Despite this domination of the
world's submarine cables by British subjects, the Pacific Ocean
remained free of a cable. The two largest possessions in the
British Empire were without direct telegraphic communications. In
Fleming's view, nothing seriously was being undertaken.
This condition of things presents a serious hindrance to 
commercial development; that from a strategic point of view 
it indicates a serious flaw in our National system for the 
defence of commerce, are positions [which] appear capable 
of conclusive proof.®7
By connecting Imperial security and commercial security, Fleming
astutely argued that not only was a Pacific cable imperative, but an
'all-British' route was essential
Following these appeals from Fleming, the Association of
Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom unanimously passed a
resolution at its annual meeting which declared,
That, in the opinion of this Association, the extension of 
direct telegraphic communication between the component 
parts of the British Empire will facilitate defence, the 
development of trade and investments, emphasize community 
of interests, and generally stimulate the development and 
consolidation of the Empire.®8
In the view of the Association, the five existing lines of 
communication to Australia and the East all suffered "the fatal
86. Fleming Memorandum to the Second Congress of Chambers of 
Commerce of the Empire. 1894 Post and Telegraph Conference, 
4/910, New South Wales Archives.
87. Idem.
88. Association of Chambers of Commerce to Colonial Office, 25 
October 1892, Pari Paps., 1894, op. cit., p.319.
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defect of passing through possibly hostile countries 89 The
establishment, by Canada, of uninterrupted communication from the
Atlantic to the Pacific, created the opportunity of an alternative
route to the East without, that "fatal defect". The Ottawa Board of
Trade also praised the merits of an 'all-British' line. At a
general meeting it moved that the project would take a giant step
forward should a royal commission of inquiry be formed to make a
90full investigation of the matter. Hopes for a favourable
response from the colonial office, - following Knutsford's
replacement by Liberal the Marquis of Ripon - were quickly dashed.
Responding to the call for a commission, Ripon stated flatly that,
Her Majesty's Government takes a great interest in this 
matter, and would welcome any proposal which would afford a 
practical solution of the question which is of considerable 
importance to the Empire from a strategic point of view ...
The financial depression unfortunately existing in the 
Australian Colonies, moreover, renders the present a very 
unfavourable moment for bringing before them a proposal 
which would involve them in heavy pecuniary liabilities for 
an objective which it would be impossible to expect would 
be remunerative within a reasonable period.91
Although it would appear that Ripon was merely repeating a familiar 
offical view - in fact he was stating the realities of the moment 
based on all available information. The enormous distances between 
potential British landing sites, combined with the high cost of such 
a work, as well as the uncertainty surrounding the ocean bottom, all 
worked against a swift conclusion to the Pacific cable problem.
That same day, Ripon attempted to remove at least one of the 
obstacles. Citing the admiralty's 'position-paper', of April 1888,
89. Idem.
90. Stanley to Colonial Office, 9 January 1893, ibid, p.321.
91. Ripon to Stanley, 22 March 1893, ibid, p.323.
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and the instructions issued to H.M.S. Egeria in connection with deep
water soundings, Ripon requested that the admiralty supply him with
92all available information. The response was unexpected and
deserving of quotation in full,
I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty 
to request that you inform the Secretary of State that 
press of circumstances compelled them to remove the 
"Egeria1 in the year 1890 from the work of surveying the 
Central Pacific, and that, in consequence, as much progress 
in gaining knowledge of the depths that might be followed 
by a cable as was at one time hoped for has not been
accomplished.^
The importance of timing in Imperial interests had been overlooked
by the admiralty. No notice of the "Egeria* s" withdrawal had been
given to the colonies interested in the survey. What "press of
circumstances" moved the admiralty to terminate the orders of the
"Egeria" was never divulged. Indeed, before being removed from the
Pacific, after two full years of work, the survey had advanced from
New Zealand to the Phoenix Islands, with the "Egeria" finding no
abnormalities. However, the admiralty warned that although no
soundings had been taken between the Phoenix group and Vancouver,
"it may be assumed with a fair degree of certainty that depths of
94over three miles exist along that route."
Advocates of a Pacific cable were convinced that the Eastern 
Extension Company was directly responsible for the admiralty 
position, but they were helpless to change the situation. The 
extent of Pender's influence was ominous. John Hennicker-Heaton 
capsulised this when he stated,
92. Ripon to Admiralty, 22 March 1893, ibid, p.324.
93. Admiralty to Ripon, 30 March 1893, ibid, p.324.
94. Idem.
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I know of no monopoly in the world that is doing more 
injury to trade than the concentrated companies 
represented by the Eastern Telegraph Company and its 
six or seven satellites... I once described John 
Pender and co. as an octopus which, with its tentacles 
in every direction, is sucking the life blood out of 
the Empire...
The absence of co-operation from the British authorities prevented 
the promoters of a Pacific cable from making concrete progress in 
the battle to remove the Eastern Extension Company from its 
commanding position.
Meanwhile, the Pacific cable was being discussed at the Post 
and Telegraph Conference in Brisbane. The mood of the delegates 
was, however, one of hostility, as the reservations about the New 
Caledonia line became clearer. The feeling around the 
conference-table was that Queensland and New South Wales had acted 
in a cavalier manner towards a subject that was best suited to joint 
consideration. Australian press reports erroneously claimed that 
Queensland had relinquished exclusive cable landing rights for 
thirty years infavour of a foreign company; and, along with New 
South Wales, was bound to support a Pacific cable laid, controlled 
and operated by France.^6 In reply to the press notice, Coote 
stated unequivocally;
Again, the newspapers I have referred to have forgotten, or 
do not take the trouble to learn, that it is impossible to 
lay a cable through the Pacific Ocean from Australia to any 
part of North America without landing at some place outside 
the British sphere of influence - for instance, "Samoa", 
this archipelago is under the protection of Germany, 
America and England; then, again, "Hawaii", this kingdom is 
under the protection of France, America and England; so the
95. Speech to the House of Commons, 12 August 1901. Cited in, 
Barty King, op. cit., pp. 137-38.
96. Sydney Morning Herald, 3 March 1893.
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cable going via New Caledonia can do no possible harm to 
Australia.97
Coote argued that the International Telegraph Convention of 1884
98prohibited the cutting of submarine cables. What was here
neglected was the fact that, if England and France went to war
against each other, the cable would be of little value while France 
controlled any part of the line.
Queensland accepted Coote's contentions. But, the other
delegates in Brisbane were not convinced. When the
postmaster-general of New Zealand, Joseph Ward, called for a second
Pacific cable which touched only British soil, the Queensland
99representative denounced it as impractical. Ward moved "that 
in the opinion of this Conference, the time has arrived when a
second cable route should be established, via the Pacific to 
Vancouver, touching at such places en route as may be hereafter 
agreed upon."^0<^ With the exception of South and Western
Australia, the delegates were all in favour of this broad motion.
Kidd attempted to distance New South Wales from the criticism of the 
other delegates, by declaring that all his government had done was 
open communication with New Caledonia, and had not committed itself 
further. The Queensland delegate defended the colony's stand toward 
the New Caledonia line. Queensland had always stood aloof from the 
policy of subsidising cable companies. But in the case of the New
97. Coote to Unmack, 4 March 1893. Appendix E. Post and Telegraph 
Conference, (Brisbane, 1893), p. 68.
98. Ibid, p. 68.
99. Idem.
100. Idem.
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Caledonia line, the Griffith administration was assisting a cable
venture in the hope of thwarting an undesirable monopoly. The 
extension of that line, through the Pacific, could only benefit the 
colonies. Consequently, it was now argued, New South Wales and 
Queensland should be commended for their actions, rather than 
condemned.
Few of the delegates shared this conclusion. The Victorian
postmaster-general would not interfere in the affairs of the other
colonies. But, if a cable was to have the support of Victoria, "it
should be through British territory, and under the control of the
British Government, or a British company. The Victorian
representative would not meddle, but he made it clear he would not
commend the contractors or the project. Kidd pointed out that, by
supporting the Ward resolution, the colonies would not commit
themselves to a cable line through New Caledonia. Rather, he argued,
It is merely an expression of opinion which may hold out 
some inducement to a company to lay down a line of cable.
All we have to do now is to recognise the advantage of 
having a second cable by way of the Pacific and Vancouver.
I should be no party to making San Francisco a terminus.
If we are to have a second cable at all, it should be by 
way of Vancouver, and through Canadian territory. On that 
point I do not think there are two views on the 
question.^°2
Should Coote be proved incorrect, New South Wales would support an 
'all-British' cable. The principle of an 'all-red route' had at
last been won. But, in light of the statements by Kidd, the idea of
state ownership had not been established.
101. Idem, Victoria saw New Caledonia as a "plague spot in the 
Pacific".
102. Idem.
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Realising the reluctance of the colonies to incur any further
debts in communications, Charles Todd mounted South Australia's
objection to competition by detailing the unwarranted cost of a
Pacific cable. Using estimates provided by the Eastern Extension
Company, Todd reckoned on an actual total revenue of £97,500. A
Pacific cable would require £60,000 for working expenses, £40,000
for interest on debentures, and at least £75,000 for amortisation -
103leaving any company interested £78,000 in the red. As the
manufacture and laying of a cable would, by the promoters'
estimates, cost £2,000,000, Todd could not see how any company could 
conceivably operate without a far greater subisdy than the
Australian colonies were willing to pay. Ward responded by accusing 
Todd of grossly exaggerating the total expenditure by estimating
£500,000 more than necessary for the construction of the
k1 104 cable.
Dissatisfied with the proceedings at the Brisbane conference, 
the Victorian premier, J.B. Patterson, dispatched a letter to Dibbs 
in New South Wales, and the newly-returned Sir Thomas Macllwraith of 
Queensland, confirming press reports of Victoria's opposition to the
New Caledonia cable . He informed his counterparts that Victoria
viewed the scheme as more than 'just a line of wire' to New
Caledonia. Rather, he depicted it as the primary step in the
foreign dominance of Australian telegraph traffic over the
103. Idem.
104. Idem.
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P a c i f i c . P a t t e r s o n  also reminded the premiers of the spirit
of co-operation shown at the 1887 Colonial Conference, and he
deplored the sudden departure from the principle by New South Wales
and Queensland. As a result of the independent course of the two
colonies, Patterson cabled a disclaimer to Canada, and to the
colonial office, disavowing any responsibility in the 
106matter. By neglecting to make Victoria privy to
negotiations, Coote and the contracting colonies had created an 
unneeded nemesis.
IV
Following the Brisbane meeting, the 'all-red' movement received 
a boost, with the culmination of a proposal to link Canada and 
Australia with a line of fast mail steamers. From 18 May the 
Canadian Australian Steamship line, under the management of James
Huddard, - of Huddard, Packer and Company, Sydney - had begun a
, 107monthly mail and passenger service from Sydney to Vancouver.
An alternate mail service across the Pacific had been under
discussion for some years in both Canada and the Australian
colonies. In March 1893 Huddard found himself with two new
steamships unsuccessfully competing on the New Zealand-Australia 
trade route with the Union Steamship Company. Keen profitably to
105. Patterson to Dibbs, 8 May 1893, Pari Paps., 1894, op. cit. 
p.325. Patterson was seen as an ally to the promoters of the 
Pacific cable. However, his short lived ministry (January 
1893 to September 1894) was crippled by the financial crisis 
in Victoria and, consequently, he could do little to advance 
the project. Australian Dictionary of Biography. Vol.5, 
p.415.
106. Patterson to Madden (acting Governor) 8 May 1893, idem.
107. Hamilton, J.H. "The All-Red Route: 1893-1953" British 
Columbia Historical Quarterly. Vol XX, January 1956, p.16.
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utilise the "Miowera" and the "Warrimoo Huddard negotiated a
contract with Canada and New South Wales, providing subsidies of
108£25,000 and £10,000 respectively. It was generally expected
that the new line would lead to expanded trade between the two
British settlement societies. The Canadian Pacific Railway had
pursued this end unsuccessfully in negotiations with New 
109Zealand. Huddard's plan was warmly received by the Canadian
Pacific syndicate which would receive the benefits of increased
traffic, without incurring the expense of establishing the line.
Imperialists were bouyed by the sudden emergence of an
'all-British' mail service on the Pacific. But, if commerce was to
follow, direct telegraphic communication was vital. Fleming
approached the Canadian premier, John Thompson, with the idea of
renewing efforts to send a delegation to Australia. Thompson
complied; and an Order-in-Council was issued, directing the minister
of trade and commerce, Mackenzie Bowell, to proceed to 
110Australia. Bowell's mission was to promote inter-colonial
trade, and to confer with the several colonial governments on the 
subject of establishing direct telegraphic communications. Upon 
receiving news of Bowell's pending journey, Fleming resolved to
108. Ibid, p. 17.
109. The Argus, (Melbourne) 15 October 1888.
110. Thompson to Bowell, 7 Sept. 1893, Report on the Mission to 
Australia. Canada Sessional Paper. no. 5a-1894. First 
elected to the Canadian House of Commons in 1867, Bowell 
served as minister of customs and later as minister of militia 
before taking over trade and commerce in 1892. He succeeded 
Thompson as premier on 20 December 1894, but was replaced as 
conservative leader in April 1896 because of growing 
dissatisfaction with him among prominent tory members. 
MacMillan Dictionary of Canadian Biography, p.77.
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accompany the delegation at his own expense. The proceedings
of the Brisbane conference had reached Ottawa; and, if the dual 
threat of Coote and Pender was to be overcome, Fleming knew he had 
to meet them head on.
Upon arrival in Sydney, (9 October) Bowell arranged a private
interview with Sir George Dibbs and other members of the New South
Wales administration. From Sydney, the Canadian contingent then
travelled to Brisbane, where they were received by the premier, Sir
Thomas Mcllwraith. Mcllwraith expressed his warm support for an
'all-British' cable, and maintained that Queensland's commitment to
the New Caledonia line would, in no way, impair the Imperial 
112
project. While in Queensland, the Canadian delegation
received word of Lord Ripon's reply to Victoria's disapproval of the
New Caledonia line. Patterson released the contents of the message
to the press, adding the admonitions of the colonial office to his 
113own. Ripon stated that Her Majesty's Government shared
Victoria's views that "danger, to both Colonial and Imperial
interests" would arise, should the Pacific cable pass through
114foreign territory. Although Ripon welcomed the telegraphic
connection of the Australian colonies and New Caledonia, the action
111. Johnson, op. cit., p. 92.
112. Report on the Mission to Australia. Canada Sessional Papers, 
no. 5a-1894. Mcllwraith, the on-again, off-again premier, 
would have been a valuable convert to the Pacific cable 
cause. However, he abdicated the premiership for the last 
time on 27 October 1893, just days after assuring Bowell and 
Fleming that he would vigorously promote the scheme in 
Queensland. Australian Dictionary of Biography. Vol.5, p.161.
113. Daily Telegraph, 16 October 1893.
114. Idem.
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of New South Wales and Queensland significantly appeared "to
diminish the chance of their assistance in laying any future Pacific
115cable passing through British Possessions."
From Sydney Dibbs was quick to justify the New Caledonia 
project, and to offer his support to an alternative route touching 
only British territory. He argued that the New Caledonia line would 
assist commerce in New South Wales, as French capital was spent in 
Australia. Coupled to that was the increased traffic along the New 
South Wales land lines, which should result from French 'messages'. 
The primary objective of the cable, however, was to "wake up the 
English Government" to the desirability of an "all-British" line, 
and to prompt the Imperial government to assist in the 
undertaking.^"^
By agreeing to guarantee the new line, New South Wales and
Queensland had taken a material step towards breaking the Eastern
Extension Company's monopoly. But, the colonies faced a powerful
organisation. Dibbs admitted publicly that,
Many of their directors are members of Parliament, and they 
bring a great amount of pressure to bear upon the English 
Government to prevent anything like a rival line being 
laid. They have feelers throughout the world to stop 
competition. I don't blame them, but we are fools to 
submit to it.117
Despite this sound reasoning, Dibbs continued to receive an 
unfavourable local press. The New Caledonia cable guarantee which 
was approved without parliamentary sanction, went against the
115. Idem.
116. Daily Telegraph, 17 October 1893.
117. Idem.
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fragüe convention of colonial cohesion, and would create little
commerce in light of French protective tariffs.
Within the same week, a second circular arrived from the
British colonial office, transmitting the opinion of the British
post office on the prospects for a Pacific cable. The untimely
correspondence was antagonistic to the proposal of an 'all-British'
line, estimating the cost of construction at nearly £3,000,000 to
118achieve a working speed of only twelve words per minute. The
engineer-in-chief of the post office suggested that an 'all-Red'
cable through the Pacific, allowing for 20% slack, would require
7623 knots of cable. The estimate projected distances of 3298 knots
from Victoria, British Columbia to Fanning Island; 845 knots to
Canton Island; 1130 knots to Fiji; and 1180 knots to New Zealand.
The shorter, southern distances, could be bridged by standard cable,
with a core of 130 pounds of copper, and an equal weight of gutta
percha to the knot. However, the Victoria-Fanning Island section
would require a core of 940 pounds of copper and the same amount of
gutta percha per knot. Consequently, the expert engineer doubted
whether this section could "be either laid or maintained", as it
would surpass the total weight of any existing cable by more than
1191000 pounds per knot.
Not to be dismayed by the contradictory comments emanating from 
Britain, Fleming set about his task of convincing the colonials that 
an 'all-British' cable was attainable at a minimum cost. In a
118. Idem.
119. Colonial Office Circular 
Archives, Sydney.
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15 September 1893. Telecom
Memorandum prepared for Bowell, and for distribution to the various
governments, Fleming formulated the most comprehensive statement yet 
on the subject. At the outset, Fleming remarked upon the New 
Caledonia cable debate. He concurred with the project's adversaries 
that the plan was ill-conceived and stated that not only was an 
'all-British' route possible, but that four alternatives were 
available.
The first route was obviously that which was suggested by the
British post office; Vancouver Island to Fanning Island, then to
Fiji, on to Norfolk Island, where the cable would bifurcate to New
Zealand and Queensland. A second possibility was from Vancouver
Island to Necker Island in the Hawaiian group; from there to Fiji;
and then, as with the first route. Thirdly, the route from
Vancouver Island to Necker, then to any British possession in the
Gilbert Group, with two branches - one to Bowen, Queensland, via the
Solomon Islands, and the other to Fiji, and then New Zealand. And
finally, using the same pattern as the previous route, without the
additional lines to New Zealand. This route would have the added
appeal of being taken from Bowen to Port Darwin, then to be
. 120connected to the South Australian land-line.
In each case, Fleming estimated the cost of a cable to be at 
least £1,000,000 less than the previous projections. Allowing for 
the best possible type of cable, he projected 'route one' at 7,145 
knots, costing £1,978,000; 'route two', 7,175 knots, at £1,585,000; 
'route three', 8,264 knots connecting New Zealand and Queensland, at 
£1,825,000; and, 'route four', the shortest line at 6,244 knots, was
120. Idem.
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estimated to cost £1,380,000. There were two means of
realising any of these four options. One would be by the generous
subsidisation of a private company; and, secondly, as a public
work. "If economy, low rates for telegraphy, and the highest
efficiency be desired", he argued, "the latter means of establishing
122the cable is undoubtably the best."
Fleming also addressed the difficulty faced by certain colonies 
who were considering state ownership, while yet obliged to subsidise 
the Eastern Extension Company the sum of £32,400 per annum. Here he
suggested that this sum could be incorporated into the charge for a
. . . . 123Pacific cable by providing an annuity to meet the subsidy.
By way of example, Fleming pointed out that route two could be
completed at a cost of approximately £1,600,000. Added to this
would be the sum of £145,000 to purchase an annuity to meet the
remaining five years of the subsidy arrangement, - making the total
expenditure £1,745,000. If this course was followed, and the
capital was raised by a joint guarantee between Canada, New Zealand
and the Australian colonies, at a rate of 3%, Fleming calculated the
124total annual charge to be £52,350.
In projecting the potential revenue of a Pacific cable, Fleming 
argued that a new line could expect a 50 per cent share of the
121. Fleming Memorandum, Sydney, 11 October 1893, Post and 
Telegraph Conference, (Wellington, 1894) , p. xxxii. Also see 
Johnson, p. 95. As in the Memorandum, the routes will be 
hereafter numbered 1 to 4.
122. Fleming Memorandum, Johnson, ibid, p. 97.
123. Idem.
124. Ibid, p. 99.
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existing traffic. Between 1882 and 1890 the Australian traffic had
increased by about fourteen per cent annually, to the point of being
1251,275,191 words in 1892. At a tariff of 2s. a word, Fleming
projected, the revenue of a Pacific cable to be £63,759 in 1894.
Accounting for a 7% increase in business over a government line, he
expected the revenue to reach £108,391 by 1899. Of that sum, the
cost of working a cable "from the best authorities" would be
£60,000. Revenue was also required to meet a renewal fund equal to
12 62% of the original expenditure, or £32,000 per annum.
In concluding this significant Memorandum, Fleming attempted to
prove the superior financial advantages of a Pacific cable, operated
under State control, over the existing situation. He pointed out
that for the year 1891-1892, the contracting colonies had expended
127£59,920 in subsidy and guarantee to the monopoly. In
comparison, a Pacific cable, at half the tariff, would involve only
£52,300 in interest. This liability could be met by the contracting
colonies already saddled with telegraph payments, plus Canada,
Queensland, New Zealand and Fiji. At no time did Fleming suggest
that the Imperial government would be involved. Presumably, he had
come to realise that Britain was not interested in prosecuting a
telegraphic connection "which every British subject will recognize
128to be of the greatest national and commercial value.
125. Ibid, p. 100.
126. Ibid, p. 105.
127. Ibid, p. 106. The breakdown of payments was: Vic.
N.S.W. £23,787; S.A. £7,966; Tas. £1,447; W.A. £990.
128. Ibid, p. 106.
£25,730;
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After the distribution of Fleming's statement on the Pacific 
cable, Bowell and his entourage continued on to Melbourne and 
Adelaide. Now aware of the difficulties in separate consultations, 
Bowell attempted to move the colonies to hold yet another conference 
to discuss trade and communications. But, this was negated by the 
separate sitting of the various colonial legislatures. Bowell was 
warmly received in Melbourne by both the Chamber of Commerce, and by 
Patterson. Regretting the inability of convening a conference to 
accomodate Bowell's mission, Patterson intimated that Victoria would 
be disposed to attend a conference in Canada, should one be
arranged.
129
Upon his return to Sydney, Bowell heard similar
views expressed by Edmond Barton, then attorney-general of New South 
Wales.130
The delegation left Sydney on 18 November, having accomplished 
little. The mission had laid the foundations for the colonial 
conference in Ottawa the following year, and had enabled Fleming to 
circulate his views on the subject of a cable directly to the 
interested parties in Australia. Fleming had received sympathetic 
hearings in every colony, with the exception of South Australia. 
But, the New Caledonia issue was still alive, making the suggestion 
of any alternative welcome. What the Canadian expedition did reveal 
was the decided lack of unity on the project in Australia. It was 
clear that no policies had been formulated in the colonies prior to 
the Canadian visit. By not exploiting the visit of a statesman of
129. Report on the Mission to Australia. Canada Sessional Papers, 
no. 5a-1894.
130. Johnson, o p , cit., p.lll.
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Bowell's stature, the Australians demonstrated their comparative 
indifference to the Pacific cable scheme at that time.
V
The death of E.C. Cracknell, in January of 1893 led to the
reformation of the Postmaster-General's Department in New South
Wales. The former secretary of the general post office, Stephen H.
Lambton, was appointed deputy postmaster-general in February, and
131the mails and telegraph services were amalgamated.
Cracknell's death removed the main antagonist to the Pacific cable
from within the New South Wales postal service. But, his
replacement, P.B. Walker, was no more sympathetic. Walker had
joined the telegraph service with Cracknell in 1858; and, as deputy
superintendent of telegraphs, was greatly influenced by his 
132superior.
Once settled in office, Walker submitted a Memorandum (November 
1893) to the postmaster-general which discussed Fleming's proposals
131. Lambton file, Australia Post, Sydney. See also, The
Transmitter. March 15 1901, p.4.
132. The permenant officials of the New South Wales telegraph
service were accused of being in league with the Eastern 
Extension Company since the completion of the overland 
telegraph. The Queensland press noted that, "New South Wales, 
as everybody familiar with the subject knows, has been
helplessly chained to the Eastern Extension Company for years 
past. The origin of the baneful influence is obscure. But it 
is understood that the superintendents of telegraphs both in 
New South Wales and South Australia were for many years
permitted by their respective Governments to draw a retaining 
fee from the Eastern Company. It need not be questioned that 
those officers rendered the Company useful service for this 
emolument, but obviously they were placed in a false position 
when the project of a competing cable was brought forward." 
Brisbane Daily Mail, 1 December 1903.
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for an 'all-British' Pacific cable. It was Walker's
contention that, by committing themselves to an 'all-British' route,
the Australian colonies would exclude the many non-British islands
of the Pacific, and also any local trade. Walker found all four of
Fleming's proposed routes subject to major objections. The first
route provided for a length of cable extending uninterrupted for
over 3,200 nautical miles. As such a cable had never been
manufactured, Walker presumed it was impracticable. The primary
complaint of the remaining routes appeared to focus on the use of
Necker Island as a landing station, rather than one of the more
commercially-attractive Sandwich Islands. As to public ownership,
it seemed to Walker that bureaucaries were not as experienced as
businessmen, and thus accordingly could not possibly operate a cable
134as effectively as a private company. Nor was a subsidy
desirable to achieve the creation of a Pacific cable: Walker
considered the project attractive only if undertaken by a private 
company, for a moderate guarantee.
Audley Coote also took exception to Fleming's memorandum. With 
the New Caledonia line becoming an accomplished fact by October 
1893, Coote was concerned that Fleming's contentions would add to 
the growing reluctance to continue the New Caledonia cable across 
the Pacific. Coote argued that Fleming had not been "impelled by a 
sense of duty", as he had claimed; but, rather, he was acting as 
"the mouthpiece of financial operators, who know very little about
133
133. Memorandum by P.B. Walker, Appended to Queensland Report, Post 
and Telegraph Conference, (Wellington, 1894), p.xxxvi.
134. Ibid, p.xxxviii.
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the wants of the Colonies in regard to a Pacific cable." He
could not imagine that the colonies would ever consent to Fleming's 
plan for joint government ownership. In Coote's view, this would 
involve "a large annual expenditure", and never gain a profit. As
the call for an 'all-British' cable was only the "bogey cry of
nationality", he could not see how this would usurp commercial
prosperity as the final goal of creating a new line of
. .. 136communication.
Coote found an unlikely ally in London. In a letter to the
colonial office, Sir John Pender had also criticised Fleming's
estimates, and he had deplored the conception of the various
governments apparently combining to challenge his Company:
It is difficult to conceive that either the Home Government 
or Colonial Governments would act so unfairly towards the 
pioneer company, to whom they are so much indebted, as to 
enter into unnecessary and ruinous competition with it. Not 
only would it be a complete reversal of the policy they have 
hitherto pursued toward submarine telegraphy, but it might 
result in so weakening the Company that in times of 
political trouble it would be unable to efficiently maintain 
the service.137
If the colonies were determined to have a Pacific cable, and "the 
necessary subsidies" were granted, Pender and his consortium would 
be willing to co-operate. Pender concluded by remarking that the 
agitation for an 'all-British' cable was "almost entirely based on
135
135. Coote to Unmack, 27 October 1893, ibid, p.xxxix.
136. Idem.
137. Pender to Colonial Office, 3 January 1894, Pari Paps., 1894,
op. cit., p.347.
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138 . . . . .sentiment". Therefore, "when the time was ripe , Pender
argued that he would prefer to see a Pacific cable from Australia to
San Francisco, via Samoa and Hawaii.
When the Post and Telegraph Conference convened in Wellington
in the March of 1894, invitations had been received from Canada,
proposing a meeting in Ottawa to discuss trade and telegraph 
139matters. The Wellington gathering gave the colonies a final
opportunity to come to a united position on the Pacific cable
question before the Ottawa conference. In an attempt to clear the
road and allow the the Canadian conference every opportunity of
success, Joseph Ward moved that,
This Conference recommend their Governments to consider the 
desirability of entering into a guarantee with the other 
countries interested for a period not exceeding fourteen 
years, and to guarantee interest at 4 per cent, on a 
capital of not more than £1,800,00 to any company
undertaking the laying of a Pacific cable.140
In seconding the motion, Kidd expressed satisfaction with Ward's 
resolution, saying it was in accord with the New South Wales 
position.
I arrived at this conclusion with the aid of Mr. Walker, of 
the Telegraph Department of New South Wales, after going 
very fully into the scheme submitted by Mr. Sandford
138. Idem.
139. The Earl of Aberdeen to Colonial Office, 8 February 1894,
ibid, p.352.
140. Proceedings, Post and Telegraph Conference, (Wellington,
1894), p.ll. Ward was a key figure in the Seddon ministries
from 1893 to 1906. First appointed postmaster-general in 
1891, he continued in that department until 1897 when
financial difficulties forced him to resign. A stong advocate 
of cheapening postal and telegraphic communication, Ward 
continued to promote closer ties within the Empire when he 
returned to cabinet in 1898 as colonial secretary. Dictionary 
of New Zealand Biography, Vol. 2. p.460.
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Fleming, and, his and other schemes seemed to be of such an 
impracticable character that the only scheme we thought at 
all practicable was that submitted by yourself.
With the usual exception of South and Western Australia - who
abstained - the Pacific colonies unanimously supported the plan for
a privately-run Pacific cable. The common position in the
Australian colonies, and New Zealand, was at odds with the Canadian
proposal espoused by Fleming. However, the conference had also
distanced the colonies from the New Caledonia plan. All the
delegations, including Queensland and New South Wales, significantly
142now supported the idea of an 'all-Red' route.
Hopes for a successful conclusion to the Pacific cable affair
were heightened when in March of 1894 Lord Rosebery succeeded
Gladstone as the British Prime Minister. As a former president and
founding member of the Imperial Federation League, Rosebery was
expected to become a champion of the Pacific cable idea. And in
what was construed as a positive gesture of support, Rosebery
appointed the Earl of Jersey to represent the Imperial government at
the Colonial Conference in Ottawa, from 28 June to 9 July. As a
former Governor of New South Wales, Jersey was familiar with the
particulars of the Pacific cable debate and failure. However, he
was assigned to "hear and report what passes, and to give
information to the Conference on matters of fact; but it will not be
143in his power to bind Her Majesty's Government." Coupled with
141. Ibid, p. 14.
142. Idem.
143. Ripon to Aberdeen, 6 June 1894, Pari Paps., 1894, op cit. , 
p.364.
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the fact that information regarding the depths and topography of the
Pacific had not advanced since 1887, this proved to be a constant 
problem to the Ottawa conference with respect to a Pacific cable.
Upon receiving word of the pending conference, the Eastern
Extension Company renewed its drive to thwart the Pacific cable
project. Pender reminded the colonial office of his Company's
service in the field of submarine telegraphy, and requested that it
144be represented in Ottawa. Ripon replied that the Ottawa
meeting was not being held under the auspices of the Imperial
govenment; and, should Pender feel his presence was required, he
would be better served by contacting the Canadian
145authorities. In one sense, this was a pre-conference victory 
for Fleming and his allies. It pointed to the fall from grace of 
the Eastern Extension Company. It also pointed out, however, that 
the Imperial government was reluctant to give official sanction to a 
conference, called by Canada, for the expressed purpose of 
discussing the cable and preferential trade.
Almost from the beginning of the proceedings, the unfinished 
survey loomed as a major stumbling block. Fleming tried, in vain - 
with the assistance of the New Zealand delegate - to convince the 
conference that technology was at such a level that a complete 
survey was no longer necessary; and, the information available, was 
sufficient to justify the work. However, even with the admission of 
the main adversary that a Pacific cable was feasible, the delegates 
defeated a motion to immediately lay a cable. Again they resolved
144. Pender to Colonial Office, 4 April 1894, ibid, p. 359.
145. Ripon to Pender, 12 April 1894, ibid, p. 360.
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146to ask the Imperial government to complete the survey.
The next question to be addressed was the process by which the
cable should be undertaken. A.J. Thynne, of Queensland, went
against the conclusions reached at Wellington, and moved that the
project be a joint, "national and public work". Of the three
proposals suggested by Walker in his memorandum - by guarantee, by
subsidy, or as a state work - Queensland favoured the 
147latter. The interests of a private company were not always
in accord with the interests of the public. In opposing the motion,
the New South Wales delegate, F.B. Suttor, raised the resolution
unanimously passed in Wellington, and stated that his government
would stand by their committment to a guarantee. Suttor's
instructions were clear on this matter, and he was not willing to
148override his Cabinet. Victoria and South Australia also
146. Report on the Colonial Conference at Ottawa, New South Wales 
Pari. Paps., 1894, 175-a, p. 22.
147. Ibid, p. 23. Thynne was appointed to the legislative council 
in 1882 and became minister of justice in the second 
Mcllwraith ministry in 1888. After holding various other 
portfolios he was appointed postmaster-general in October 1894 
until March 1897. He became close to Fleming at Ottawa and 
championed public ownership of a Pacific cable from that point 
until its completion. Australian Dictionary of Biography. 
Vol.2, p.424.
148. A successful pastoralist, Suttor was first elected to the 
legislative assembly as a free trader in 1875. A falling out 
with Sir Henry Parkes and the conviction that protection would 
reverse falling rural prices led him to Dibbs' camp after 
1885. Although he served as postmaster-general briefly under 
Parkes in the 1870's, he travelled to Ottawa as minister for 
public instruction under Dibbs. Consequently, he was briefed 
on the Pacific cable by the antagonistic permanent officials 
of the post office and went to Ottawa with reservations about 
the viability of a Pacific service. See Australian Dictionary 
of Biography. Vol.6, p. 227, and "Notes on the Pacific cable 
for F.B.Suttor" Telecom Archives, Sydney.
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rejected the motion, primarily because of the uncertainty of the 
survey.
In an attempt to answer both the question of practicability and
means, New Zealand moved that the "most speedy and effective manner"
149to establish the work was to call for tenders. The problem
of the survey could be quickly overcome, and costs accurately 
estimated, if the various international cable companies were invited 
to complete the work. Should the tenders prove the work to be too 
costly to be undertaken by a private concern, the interested 
colonies could consider initiating a joint arrangement. This motion 
was also defeated, but a modified proposal by Thynne was accepted. 
This declared,
That the Canadian Government be requested, after the rising 
of this Conference to make all necessary enquiries, and 
generally to take such steps as may be expedient, in order 
to ascertain the cost of the proposed Pacific cable, and 
promote the establishment of the undertaking in accordance 
with the views expressed in this Conference.^0
A total of five resolutions concerning a trans-Pacific cable were 
adopted, and embodied "the views expressed in this Conference". 
Although the resolutions were of a general nature, confirming only 
the desirability of the scheme, this last resolution granted the 
Canadian authorities and, by extension, Fleming, carte blanche to 
further the Pacific cable.
Seven years had passed since the project was first broached by 
Imperial and colonial delegates in conference. The Ottawa meeting 
had come no closer to laying a cable. The idea of a Pacific line
149. Idem.
150. Ibid, p. 24.
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had been discussed, and resolutions passed in its favour, at 
numerous commercial and governmental meetings throughout the period 
with little effect. The Eastern Extension Company remained 
unchallenged in the south seas, with the exception of 900 miles of 
cable from Queensland to New Caledonia. Sandford Fleming had become 
convinced that the best course of action was state ownership. But, 
despite all of his memoranda and correspondence, he had as yet not 
persuaded all the Australian colonies to his way of thinking. The 
majority of the representatives who favoured a Pacific line were not 
willing to depart from convention and take responsibility for 
overseas communications. The Imperial government, primarily the 
admiralty, continued to profess support for the scheme, while 
intermittently issuing documents to the contrary. The colonies 
expected Great Britain to take the lead, but neither Knutsford nor 
Ripon were willing to stand resolutely beside this apparently 
Imperial objective.
Joseph Chamberlain's appointment to the colonial office would 
transform Imperial opinion regarding the cable. By resolving to 
have Canada take the necessary steps to have a Pacific cable 
constructed, the Ottawa Conference enabled Fleming to dispell the 
uncertainty of the scheme's practicability by following New 
Zealand's advice and calling for tenders. The information gained 
from the tenders would accelerate the discussion. But, the 
Australian colonies had to demonstrate their willingness to accept 
at least partial responsibility for the project before it could be 
achieved.
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CHAPTER THREE
AFTER OTTAWA: CO-ORDINATION AND THE PACIFIC CABLE COMMITTEE, 
(1894-1897)
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The decided lack of progress made at the Ottawa conference of
1894, highlighted the primary difficulty that faced the Pacific
cable. Officials from the various colonies had frequently met in
conference and confirmed the desirability of a Pacific cable. The
Ottawa gathering provided a venue further to promote the Pacific
cable, and to give substance to the favourable sentiments expressed
in the Australian colonies and New Zealand. However, the inability
of the colonies to come to a united position on the route and means
of constructing a Pacific cable stifled any momentum created prior
to the Ottawa meeting. The absence of cohesion within the
Australian delegation was not lost on Lord Jersey. In his report to
the Imperial government, he had commented that
On more than one occasion an indication of united 
Australasian opinion was lacking, and this, to a certain 
extent, made it impossible for the Conference to be as 
definite in its conclusions as was desirable upon those 
points which involved united Australasian support. In 
the event of its being considered advisable to carry out 
the resolutions agreed upon, this want of cohesion for the 
development of Australian interests will stand in the way 
and may cause indefinite delays.^
The hesitation of South Australia and Western Australia was to be 
expected in light of their vested interest in the existing system of 
overseas communication; while the minute international traffic 
generated by Tasmania was well served by the Eastern Extension 
Company. That left the three more populous colonies and New Zealand 
to resolve the finer points in the cable discussions.
Queensland and New Zealand had long expressed dissatisfaction 
with the monopoly, and both colonies were eager to promote a cable 
which projected landing stations within their territories.
1. Pari. Paps., 1894, Vol. LV1, Cd. 7553, p.2.
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Queensland's postmaster-general, A.J. Thynne, left no doubt as to
his preference for having the cable operate as a public work. His
resolution to that effect was defeated as premature, and was
replaced by a less ambitious motion to persuade the Imperial
2government to resume the aborted survey. New Zealand's
delegate also moved a progressive resolution which raised the
possibility of inviting cable syndicates to submit proposals for the
3construction of a Pacific cable. Once again, however, the 
conference found the suggestion inappropriate in view of the limited
information available and, to achieve consensus, a broader
4resolution was adopted.
It was left to Victoria and New South Wales to urge caution. 
The Victorian delegate plainly expressed the stand of his colony
when he stated that "we Australian colonies ask for the cable; we
5earnestly desire it." But, his New South Wales counterpart, 
F.B. Suttor, was not willing to assume more authority than was 
granted by his government. In a report to parliament, Suttor 
defined his own moderation. Referring to his resolution "that 
immediate steps be taken" to telegraphically connect Canada and 
'Australasia', Suttor stated rather -
2. Report on the Colonial Conference at Ottawa, New South Wales 
Pari. Paps., 1894, 175-a, p.22.
3. Ibid, p.23.
4. "That the Canadian Government be requested, after the rising 
of this Conference, to make all necessary inquiries, and 
generally to take such steps as may be expedient in order to 
ascertain the cost of the proposed Pacific Cable, and promote 
the establishment of the undertaking in accordance with the 
views expressed in the Conference." New South Wales Pari. 
Paps., 1894, 175-a, p.30.
5. Pari. Paps., op. cit., p.13.
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I pointed out that the position had been advanced but very 
little, and that we were as ignorant now as then (1887) of 
particulars essential to a right understanding of the 
question. Though all the governments concerned in the 
project appear to be agreed as to the advantages to be 
derived from a cable such as that proposed, the want of a 
thorough ocean survey between Canada and Australasia makes 
it impossible to say whether the cable can be laid in a 
manner and at a cost that shall be satisfactory. At 
present, therefore, the project can be considered only in a 
general way, and so far as regards my motion, that course 
was adopted at the Conference.6 78
The conference was not as "definite in its conclusions" as many
would have had it. However, the failure of the Australian colonists 
to act harmoniously on the questions of the route, means of
ownership, and the extent to which each colony was committed to the 
venture, proved to be more disconcerting to Fleming and the Canadian 
delegates than the vagueness of the resolutions.
Regardless of the hesitant attitude toward the Pacific cable, 
the conference was seen as a "triumph". The Times of London
remarked on the overall success of the conference - not in national
terms, but in bringing together the self-governing colonies of their
, 7own accord, without direction from the Imperial government.
When the conference opened, the Times wrote that,
The Ottawa conference constitutes a new departure in the
organization of the Empire ... it has reaffirmed, in the 
most striking way, the faith in the principle of Imperial 
unity which has developed, both at home and in the 
colonies, in recent years.8
The Times praised the delegates' "commonsense" in recommending the 
Pacific cable project be left until "the facts of the case are fully
6. New South Wales Pari. Paps., op. cit., p.19.
7. The Times, (London), 2 August 1894, p.8.
8. Ibid, 9 July 1894, p.9. Indeed, the meeting was a "new
(Footnote continued to page 113)
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before them." If the Pacific cable was to proceed, the facts
of the matter would have to be presented in such a fashion that any
lingering doubts as to its practicability were arrested.
This cause was significantly assisted by the arrival in Ottawa
of Alexander Siemens on the very day the conference rose. President
of the Institute of Electrical Engineers, and chairman of Siemens
Brothers, Siemens was engaged in laying his Company's seventh cable
across the Atlantic, and he was unable to reach Ottawa before the
conference adjourned. ^  Even if not in time to give evidence,
Siemens had prepared a paper which argued that no further survey
work was necessary, and that sufficient soundings existed to justify
the immediate laying of the Pacific cabl e. ^ The primary reason
for requiring definitive information of the ocean floor along the
route of a submarine cable was to establish the brake power required
to hold the cable, and to ensure an even distribution of slack,
according to the depth of the water.
If the adjustment on the brake power depended entirely on 
the knowledge acquired by soundings taken previously on the 
selected route of the cable, grave doubts might still exist 
whether the laying of the Pacific cable could proceed 
without further information being obtained by carefully 
taking soundings over the exact route. Fortunately, means 
have been devised to indicate to the brakeman continuously 
the percentage of slack with which the cable is payed out, 
and thus it is possible to lay a cable over a route of 
which only the general features are know.l^
(Footnote continued from page 112)
departure". However, without the full participation of the 
Imperial authorities, the colonial delegates could do little 
more than reconfirm their differences.
9. Idem.
10. Ibid, 11 July 1894, p.5.
11. Remarks on the Pacific Cable by Alexander Siemens. New Zealand 
Pari. Paps., 1894, 1-F.5A, p.7.
12. Idem.
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This contention was corroborated by Siemens' experience in laying 
Atlantic cables. Siemens Brothers had successfully laid six
submarine cables in the Atlantic without a comprehensive survey of 
any particular route.
Having concluded that no technical obstacles remained, Siemens
set about addressing the financial question. For a capital outlay
of £2,000,000, Siemens reckoned that an adequate cable could be
manufactured and laid, two repairing-steamers supplied, and stations
13constructed and managed. Annual working expenses would reach
£119,000 consisting of £5,000 for general management, £24,000 for
staff and office expenses, and £90,000 allocated for repair and
maintenance of the cable. The greatest difficulty in discussing the
financial aspects of a Pacific cable was estimating income. Siemens
assumed that the new cable would transmit 50% of the existing
traffic. He stated that Sir John Pender had declared 'Australasian'
* 14traffic at 1,306,716 words, for a net worth of £209,628.
Should a Pacific cable generate half of the Eastern Extension 
Company profit, only £15,000 would be required to meet working 
expenses.
Siemens then departed from previous methods of calculating 
revenue. By 1887 there were 100,000 nautical miles of submarine 
cable laid, at an expenditure of £35,000,000. The revenue from 
these cables was £3,173,692 per annum. From these figures, Siemens
13. Idem.
14. Ibid, p.8.
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computed that the average outlay per nautical mile of cable was
15
£350, and the average revenue £31. 15s.. Considering the
Pacific cable to be 7,340 nautical miles, at a cost of £2,000,000,
Siemens concluded the cost per mile would be £273, while the line
could expect to earn £30 per mile, leaving the annual income at just 
16
over £220,000.
Siemens' proposal was too late to have any effect on the
conference proceedings, but his opinions were given due weight.
Jersey included Siemens' statement in his final report; and,
although Suttor surely conveyed the information to his government,
no mention of it appears in his report to parliament. Anxious to
highlight the significance of Siemens' contentions, and put his
tardy evidence to good use, Fleming wrote to Bowell that,
This opinion, coming from such an authority, strongly
impressed the delegates, and in conversations I had with 
them I found the general feeling to be that the Canadian 
Government should not wait for a survey such as proposed, 
but should at once invite cable manufacturers to state the 
terms upon which they would carry out the work and leave it 
in a complete and perfect condition.^
Fleming felt that the best way to institute the final conference 
resolution - that Canada take steps to promote the establishment of 
the proposed Pacific cable - was to follow the New Zealand plan, and 
call for tenders. Although the motion was withdrawn, Fleming was 
confident that such action would be in keeping with the wishes of 
the delegates.
15. Idem.
16. Idem.
17. Fleming to Bowell, 20 July 1894, New Zealand Pari. Paps., 
1894, 1-F.5A, p.5.
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Accordingly, on 6 August, the Canadian minister of trade and
commerce, Mackenzie Bowell, issued an advertisement to be placed in
the Times of London, the Canadian Gazette, and the Australasian, all
inviting cable manufacturers to state the terms of which they were
18prepared to lay and maintain a cable across the Pacific. To
obtain complete information, and to allow the governments concerned
to adopt the most expedient medium of completing the cable, the
tenders were to be divided into three forms:
Form A - The cable to be owned and controlled by
Government, to be worked under Government 
authority, and to be kept in repair by the 
contractor for three years.
Form B - The cable to be owned, maintained, and worked by 
a subsidized company.
Form C - The cable to be owned, maintained, and worked by
1 Qa company, under a Government guarantee. *
Under Form A, contractors were required to state the lowest amount
required to supply a cable and operate it satisfactorily for three
years. Forms B and C demanded that the competing contractors
stipulate how much subsidy or guarantee would be necessary to
construct, lay and operate a cable with the maximum tariff for
messages between Great Britain and the Australian colonies being 3s.
20a word for ordinary messages. The tenders were to cover any, 
or all, of the eight routes specified by the Canadian
government. ^
18. Bowell to Seddon, 6 August 1894, ibid, p.l.
19. Enclosure, General Conditions, ibid, p.2.
20. Idem.
21. See Appendix B, below.
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One of the first respondents to the call for tenders was Sir
John Pender, representing his Eastern Extension Company. Rather
than comply with the appeal for specific information, Pender
reiterated his doubts about the practicability of the scheme. It
was his view that a Pacific cable was "not needed at present on
commercial grounds." But, if the interested governments deemed the
project necessary, in the interest of the Empire, and were willing
to contribute toward the cost of the venture, he would "be found
22quite ready to co-operate in the matter." Pender also
regretted the condition of a maximum tariff. He argued that
Fleming's estimate, that Australian traffic could be expected to
increase at an annual rate of 15% was a fallacy, and that a 3s.
tariff would not possibly meet working expenses and interest on 
, 23capital. Pender noted that the 1894 financial year showed a 
12% decrease in traffic on the previous year. His company had
increased the tariff from 4s. to 4s.9d., at the request of the
Australian colonies, and still expected to lose "nearly
£30,000."24
22. Pender to Bowell, 19 October 1894, Telecom Archives, Sydney.
23. Ibid. Fleming estimated on 20 July 1894, that the business
for 1898 would be 1,105,000 words. At a 2s. tariff per word, 
he predicted a revenue of £110,000 in the first year of
operation. To support his contentions, Fleming quoted "a
friend" in London as stating "I have been overlooking the 
proceedings of the Colonial Conference of 1887, where a
memorandum of yours is given, dated April, 1886 (page 101). 
In it you show a probable traffic for the year 1893 of 133,000 
messages, equal to 1,330,000 words. The actual business for 
the past year according to Sir John Pender, was 1,306,716 
words, and, according to Australian returns, 1,401,293 words. 
In either case, the prediction made eight years ago is 
approximately correct." See New Zealand Pari. Paps., 1894,
1-F.5A., p.5.
24. Idem.
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Upon receiving the tenders, Bowell transmitted them to Fleming 
for report. By 20 November he had submitted his findings, which 
showed four cable manufacturers had answered the invitation under
25the heading of regular tenders. Of those, none were willing 
to take up the work under Form B, and only one, the "India Rubber, 
Gutta Percha and Telegraph Works Company"(Silvertown), was inclined 
to operate a cable under Form C. The remaining tenders fell within 
Form A of the general conditions, confirming Pender's contention 
that as a private enterprise a Pacific cable would be unprofitable. 
But the tenders also put to rest, once and for all, any doubts about 
the feasibility of a Pacific cable. Reputable cable companies were 
willing to lay, operate and maintain a cable for three years. The 
lowest offer for all eight routes came from the India Rubber Company.
Route No. 1 £1,517,000
Route No. 2 £1,416,000
Route No. 3 £1,303,000
Route No. 4 £1,068,000
Route No. 5 £1,291,000
Route No. 6 £1,391,000
Route No. 7 £1,081,000
Route No. 8 £1,243,000 26
well as 1being the lowest,
included the construction of operating rooms, equipment and
dwellings at each landing place, and the use of two cable repairing 
27steamships.
25. Report on Tenders, 20 November, 1894, Telecom Archives, 
Sydney. The four companies submitting tenders were: Siemens 
Bros. and Company, London; Fowler-Waring Cable Company, 
London; W.T. Hemley Telegraph Works Company, London; and the 
India Rubber, Gutta Percha and Telegraph Works, London.
26. Idem.
27. Idem.
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By calling for tenders, the Canadian government had established
"indisputably" that the British Empire could be brought together by
28telegraph cable, without having to traverse foreign soil. The 
offers effectively negated the need for the colonies concerned to 
make further preliminary soundings, and they supplied detailed 
information as to costs and the best means of operating the cable. 
The tenders as received also confirmed, after years of opposition 
and criticism, that Fleming*s initial estimates of the cost of 
constructing a cable were in fact substantially correct.
I
Events now began to move more swiftly. A sense of momentum 
enters the story. Provided with this concrete evidence, Fleming for 
example set about outlining his proposals for further action. In a 
Memorandum of 1 December 1894, he worked from the assumption that 
the principle of state ownership was to be followed, and the capital 
required could be raised by one of three methods. Firstly, the 
finances needed could be attracted by the Canadian, Australian and 
New Zealand governments, with the interest being guaranteed by the 
Imperial government. Secondly, the whole of the capital might be 
raised by Great Britain, the interest to be guaranteed by the 
colonial governments and Canada. And, finally, there might be the 
establishment of an "Imperial Colonial Cable Commission" comprised 
of representatives acting on behalf of the various governments, all
28. Sandford Fleming, "Memorandum Respecting the Establishment of 
the Pacific Cable," 1 December 1894, Attached to the Report on 
Tenders, Telecom Archives, Sydney.
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of which would jointly guarantee payment of interest. Fleming
proposed that this "Commission" be given responsibility by the
several parliaments "to obtain capital and to assume responsibility
-30for establishing the work and carrying it on when completed."
Fleming then addressed the question of working expenses and
potential revenue. Guided by Siemens' estimates, and reckoning on
the Silvertown Company's offer to lay a cable over Route No.l, he
calculated the amount required to meet interest at 2 1/2% on a
31capital of £1,600,000 would be £45,000. Added to this would 
be £30,000 for working expenses, leaving £75,000 as the total fixed 
charge on revenue for the first three years of operation. After 
that, an additional £50,000 would be necessary for maintenance and 
amortisation. In assessing prospective revenue, Fleming adopted his 
previous formula - condemned of course by Pender - and assumed an 
annual increase of 15% in Australian traffic. Based on the total 
number of words transmitted in 1893 (1,401,293), and a tariff of
only 2s. per word, he estimated the revenue in the first year of 
operation (1898) at £110,000; in 1899, £126,500; and in 1900,
£143,000.32
An opinion was here raised by the new Canadian minister of 
trade and commerce, who argued that revenue from the proposed cable 
could be hampered if the existing company, after several decades of 
operation, had established exclusive control of telegrams collected
29. Ibid, p.4.
30. Idem.
31. Idem.
32. Ibid, p.5.
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in the 'Australasian' colonies. Fleming dismissed this,
arguing instead that the land lines in the Australian colonies and
New Zealand were owned and operated by the individual colonies.
Should the cable be undertaken as a state project, "the colonies
would have a direct interest in the success of the new line, and
every telegraph and post office throughout Australia and New Zealand
would practically become offices or agencies of the Pacific 
34cable." Under the existing conditions, the Pacific cable
could expect to transmit all messages not expressly marked for the
Eastern Extension line. Although such a situation would affect the
profits of the prevailing company, Fleming concluded positively that
the proposed reduction in tariff would "stimulate telegraphy above
its normal growth" and over time the Eastern Extension Company's
35traffic would be restored.
Despite the confirmation that several companies were willing to 
initiate the laying of a Pacific cable, and the favourable estimates 
as to its future as a public work, there remained the considerable 
task, of course, in convincing the colonial and Imperial governments 
to join with Canada and actually finance the plan. The information 
collected after the adjournment of the Ottawa conference "placed the 
project of a Pacific cable in a perfectly unassailable 
p o s i t i o n . N o w ,  in order to give the proposal a "definite
33. Fleming to Ives, 28 December 1894, New Zealand Pari. Paps., 
1895, F-8, p.37.
34. Idem.
35. Idem.
36. Fleming to Ives, 5 January 1895, ibid, p.36.
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form and character", Fleming once again urged that an appropriate
37working joint commission be appointed. Having representatives
from all interested parties, such a commission could examine the 
extent to which the governments concerned were willing to commit 
themselves to the principle of state-ownership, and to other details 
of the cable's operation.
Reaction to Fleming's proposal was positive. But, the various 
delegates had returned to their respective colonies, and the problem 
of distance resurfaced. Co-ordination would continue to elude the 
interested parties, unless some action was taken by the governments 
concerned. Again, it fell on Canada to take the lead. For 
example, to facilitate closer contact, the new Canadian premier, 
Mackenzie Bowell, appointed John Short Larke as commercial agent to
Australia "for the purpose of investigating and reporting upon the
38requirements of the various markets." In commenting on the
appointment, Bowell noted that "in order to make our venture in
establishing the Australian line a success, it is absolutely
39necessary to have a resident agent in Sydney." Although
Bowell was speaking of the recent steamship line, his reference also 
incorporated the Pacific cable. If a commercial agent was to be of
37. Idem.
38. Bowell to Larke, 26 August 1894, Larke Papers, MS 598, 
National Library of Australia.
39. "Canada in Western Australia", Canadian High Commission.
Canberra, 1982. A school teacher before moving on to
journalism, Larke was both an imperialist and a federalist. 
His presence in Australia during the federation debate was 
welcomed by the first Australian premier Edmond Barton. 
Barton to Larke, 9 June 1905, and 26 April 1910. Larke
Papers, op. cit.
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any value at all, and the steamship line a success, direct
telegraphic communications were essential.
Larke reached Sydney in January, 1895. The presence of a
Canadian, officially appointed as a liaison for the government,
augured well for the Pacific cable. However, before he could
beginning building on the success of the Ottawa conference he was
set back by the news of the unsuccessful mission to Hawaii. The aim
of that mission was to comply with the Ottawa resolution, which
called on the Imperial government to secure one of the Hawaiian
40
islands as a mid-ocean landing station. The Canadian
government suggested that the best means of achieving that end was 
to despatch a delegation to Honolulu. Canada was willing to
instigate the mission, but deemed it proper that the Imperial 
government be represented. Ripon responded to the request in 
September.
Your agent should go therefore as proposed. H.M. 
Government cannot send anyone as their representative but 
as it is understood that Canadian Government wish some one 
to be sent from England who is conversant with proceedings 
of and wishes of conference I am willing to place at their 
disposal for this purpose W.H. Mercer who as Lord Jersey's 
Secretary appears to fulfill conditions.
A week later, 10 September, the Canadian Committee of the Privy
Council passed a Minute authorising Fleming to visit Hawaii and
institute "discussions without compromising Her Majesty's Government
42
or the Government of Canada."
40. "That in view of the desirability of having a choice of routes 
for a cable connection between Canada and Australasia, the 
Home Government be requested to take immediate steps to secure 
neutral landing ground on some one of the Hawaiian Islands, in 
order that the cable may remain permanently under British 
control." New South Wales Pari. Paps., 1894, 175-a. p.29.
41. Ripon to Aberdeen, 4 September 1894. Telecom Archives, Sydney.
42. Privy Council, Canada. 481 J., 10 September 1894, ibid.
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Upon arrival in Honolulu, on 6 October, Fleming and Mercer
immediately reported to the British Consul. The following day, the
three then met with the foreign minister and the acting president,
Francis Hatch. The delegation made it clear that their mission was
not intended to intrude on Hawaiian sovereignty or jurisdiction over
any island which may be selected. Rather, "what was wanted was the
private, as distinguished from the political ownership of the 
43island." Hatch sympathised with the proposal, and strongly
supported the overall plan of creating cable links between Canada
and Australia. However, the Treaty of Reciprocity between the
United States and Hawaii precluded any agreement. In particular,
Article IV of the Treaty stated that the King of Hawaii was bound
"so long as this Treaty shall remain in force, he will not lease or
otherwise dispose of, or create any lien upon any port, harbour, or
other territory in his Dominion, or grant any special privileges or
rights of use therein, to any other power, State, or
44government." Before any lease could be arranged, consent was 
needed from the United States government. Hatch then placed the 
matter before the United States authorities; to no effect.
The inability of the delegation to secure a landing station in 
the Hawaiian islands seriously affected the significance of the 
report on tenders. With no neutral ground available in the Hawaiian 
group, only the first of the original eight prospective routes 
remained open for an 'all-British' cable. In a Memorandum dealing 
with the tenders, P.B. Walker, the secretary of the New South Wales
43. Fleming to Aberdeen, 25 October 1894, ibid.
44. Idem.
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telegraph service, criticised Fleming's financial estimates, and 
once again brought into question the feasibility of the Fanning 
Island route.
According to Walker, the Eastern Extension Company had only
transmitted 1,223,241 words in 1893 - and not 1,401,293 words, as
45
claimed by Siemens and Fleming. The type of cable proposed
was "not of sufficiently large a core" to obtain a satisfactory
working speed over the distance between Vancouver and Fanning 
46Islands. He also argued that the existing company had such a 
huge reserve fund that
... they could without even feeling it transmit all their 
Australasian traffic over their cables from Singapore to 
Port Darwin via Java for nothing, and by this means their 
charges would be brought down to a level with those 
proposed to be adopted for the Pacific cable which would 
cause such a keen competition that I do not think a Pacific 
cable under the conditions proposed touching at Fanning 
Island leaving out Honolulu and Samoa [could] be conducted 
without very serious loss to the Governments, or a Company 
undertaking it.(sic)
Besides ignoring two important sources of revenue, Honolulu and 
Samoa, the Fanning Island route also unnecessarily bifurcated at 
Norfolk Island to New Zealand. In Walker's opinion, this extension 
was unjustified, considering that New Zealand was already connected 
to Australia with two cables. The whole scheme appeared to have 
foundered again.
II
It was against this negative backdrop that the next important 
Post and Telegraph Conference convened in Hobart on 2 February
45. Walker, P.B., "Memorandum for the N.S.W. Postmaster-General", 
24 January 1895. Telecom Archives, Sydney.
46. Idem.
47. Idem.
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1895. Unlike previous conferences, this Hobart meeting had the
opportunity to address definite proposals regarding a Pacific
cable. In bringing the matter before the conference, A.J. Thynne
quoted extensively from the favourable report on tenders. He argued
that the Pacific cable problem was "within measurable distance of
solution" and all that need be addressed was "the question of
48getting combined action in Australasia." Thynne observed that
Canada had admirably advanced the position of the project by so
rapidly and successfully acting upon the wishes of the Ottawa
conference, as set out in the final resolution.
Referring to Fleming's efforts to promote the cable over the
years despite severe opposition, Thynne indeed remarked that
Sir John Pender has made several reports and estimates 
ridiculing the proposals which have been made by Mr. 
Fleming; but one after the other the objections have been 
raised and fallen down, and we have come now to the 
question of the cost of the cable, after all the bogies 
which have been raised to deter the different governments 
from carrying out this scheme have melted and 
disappeared.49
With solid evidence of the viability of a Pacific cable at hand, and 
the past resolutions of support moved at previous conferences, 
Thynne saw Hobart as the time for affirmative action. He 
assertively now moved that,
In the opinion of this Conference it is desirable that (a) 
the construction, working and maintenance of a submarine 
cable through British territory or under British control 
from Vancouver Island to Australasia be undertaken by the 
Governments of Great Britain, the Dominion of Canada, and 
the Australasian Colonies as a joint national and public 
work; (b) the cost of its construction, working and
48. Proceedings, Post and Telegraph Conference, (Hobart, 1895), 
p.41.
49. Ibid, p.42.
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maintenance be borne in the following proportions, viz:
Great Britain one-third, the Dominion of Canada one-third, 
and the Australasian Colonies one-third. 0^
Although the motion was seconded by the postmaster-general of
New Zealand, Joseph Ward, he curiously could not support it! New
Zealand was anxious to have a second means of overseas
communications. But, Ward maintained, if the conference was to
arrive at such a "far-reaching" conclusion, some practical
demonstration of support was required, from Canada and Great 
51 . .Britain. Citing the Wellington meeting as an example, Ward
pointed out that New Zealand and the Australian colonies had done 
much to promote the idea in material terms. Yet neither the 
Imperial nor the Canadian governments had responded officially, with 
a firm commitment to a Pacific cable. The Canadian authorities had 
passed on valuable data dispelling any doubts about the
practicability of the scheme. But nowhere was there a confirmation 
of real support.^
Before moving an amendment to the motion, Joseph Cook, the New 
South Wales postmaster-general, also expressed his colony's desire 
for an alternative cable. Yet he, too, suspected Canada's resolve 
in the matter. Cook argued bluntly:
50. Idem. See also Sydney Morning Herald, 4 February 1895.
51. Proceedings, (Hobart, 1895), op. cit. p.43.
52. Thompson to Ward, 16 May 1894, ibid, p.28. Ward had written 
to Canada following the Wellington conference asking the 
ministry's position on the Pacific cable. Thompson replied: 
"I beg to say that the Government of Canada has not formulated 
any policy guaranteeing aid to the proposed trans-Pacific 
cable. The matter will no doubt be fully discussed at the 
coming Conference to be held here next month, but in the 
meantime no assurance can be given that the Canadian 
Government will be in a position to make any appropriation in 
aid of the project."
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I desire to emphasize what Mr. Ward has said in regard 
to the want of practical sympathy on the part of Great 
Britain, as I do not think we have been treated as 
well as we had a right to expect; the same may be said 
of Canada - she sends us out these bald tenders for 
our information, and hopes we will continue from our 
side of the water to agitate to bring matters to a 
practical conclusion.55
Not yet convinced of the merits of state ownership, Cook asked 
aloud, why if the proposal was so sound, were none of the 
contractors willing to carry out the work on commercial grounds? As 
the conference was not in receipt of the views of the other 
prospective partners, Cook concluded that it would be unwise to 
support the "drastic resolutions" raised by Thynne. The better 
course was, once again, to declare the desirability of the cable, 
and to urge the interested parties to take the steps necessary to 
advance the proposition.5^
Speaking on the motion for Victoria, John Gavan Duffy, their 
postmaster-general, stressed that although the conference was only a 
recommendatory body, each delegate was responsible to his ministry. 
Consequently, he felt the motion should be judged on its commercial 
value, in a practical and business-like fashion. Duffy noted that 
the tenders received did not conclusively prove anything more than 
the fact that a cable could physically be constructed. In light of 
the enormous financial questions involved, haste was the last thing 
the colonies needed. Duffy exemplified this point by arguing that,
53. Ibid, p.43. Cook was originally elected to the legislative 
assemby as a member of the labour party and became the 
parliamentary leader in 1893. However, he refused to sign a 
'solidarity pledge' in 1894 and accepted an invitation from 
the free trade premier George Reid to become 
postmaster-general. He held the post until August 1898 when 
he moved to agriculture. Australian Dictionary of Biography. 
Vol.8, p.96.
54. Idem.
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The various tendering companies have all treated the 
matter in a very chary manner, and I was greatly 
struck by the action of Mr. Siemens in the matter. He 
came forward and gave some very straightforward and no 
doubt valuable evidence as to the practicability of 
laying this cable; but when it came to a question of 
cold business tendering, that gentleman puts in a 
higher tender than any other, which shows that he knew 
that the theory was one thing, and taking a business 
risk was another thing. From the conduct of these 
tendering companies, and the evidence produced, I am 
inclined to think that as a commercial transaction 
this Pacific cable would not pay.^5
The financial aspect of the question was paramount to the Victorian 
government. The colony was forced to practise rigid economy as a 
result of the severe depression in Australia, and a further 
liability for cable communications was undesirable.
The Victorian ministry had indeed given notice before the 
conference met that they were about to withdraw from the guarantee 
agreement with the Eastern Extension Company. This realisation had 
a fatally destablising effect upon the proceedings. As the largest 
contributor to the guarantee, Victoria's withdrawal would place a 
further burden on the treasuries of the other contributing 
colonies. Anticipating an increase in the existing cable agreement, 
the remaining colonies were reticent about promising financial 
assistance to the Pacific cable. Thynne was able to act 
independently, and promise resources that his counterparts could 
not, because Queensland was not bound to support the Eastern 
Extension Company.
These unsatisfactory developments highlighted the primary aim 
of the Australian colonists in regard to submarine telegraphs. The 
colonies could simply not afford to support sentimental ideals which
55. Ibid, p.45.
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dealt with the Imperial character of the cable project. 56 The
Sydney Morning Herald rightly noted that the "halo of ideality" 
surrounding the plan, since 1887, had been tarnished by the economic 
conditions in Australia:
In the first inception of this project it is undoubted that 
the Imperial aspect of it was made to play an important 
part. To Canada the sentiment was a dominating influence, 
and, though it never assumed the same dimensions to the 
Australian view, it exercised a considerable influence ...
What the colonies really want is an alternative cable 
service on commercial principles; and if these require that 
Hawaii is to be included in the route, it will require 
substantial considerations in the form of material 
assistance to induce the colonies to make sacrifice to 
sentiment.
Whether the line was proposed or completed, owned publicly or
privately, through British or foreign territory - as long as the
subject was alive the Australian colonies were in a favourable
position to ask the Eastern Extension Company for concessions. If
the prospect of competition could induce the monopoly to weaken its
grip, as it had in 1891, then there was no need to incur the further
58expense of actually constructing a Pacific cable.
Even the mammoth efforts of Fleming to this point could not 
convince the Australian colonies of Canada's commitment to what he 
deemed as a necessity to the development of the Empire. Clearly, he 
had misread the motives of the colonies in the matter. To Fleming, 
the cable had become a full-time occupation. However, the
56. Sydney Morning Herald, 5 February 1895.
57. Idem.
58. Sydney Morning Herald, 4 February 1895. The Eastern Extension 
Company agreed to lower the base level of earnings before a 
guarantee was required from £237,000 to £227,000 for 
Australian traffic and provided that the maximum total 
guarantee payable would never exceed £10,000.
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scheme was not as high a priority with the colonies, or with the
Canadian government. Still, Fleming had allies. Following the
stalemate at the Hobart conference, Bowell flatly wired to Sydney:
"Inform Colonial Government, circumstances have arisen, absolutely
necessary, immediate action, submarine cable. Joint commission,
59
suggested last mail, strongly recommended."
In an effort to comply with Bowell's cryptic request, the New
South Wales premier, G.H. Reid, cabled his opposite numbers in the
other colonies. All the replies were luke-warm, Queensland
excepted. The premiers of Tasmania, Western and South Australia
could not see their way to join in the proposal. The premier of
South Australia was the most adamant. He argued as follows -
... it strikes me, however, that to comply would be a 
mistake, resulting, probably, in ill-considered action.
Vague suggestion of emergency in matter of this description 
is rather thin, and delegation of powers by any Government 
to members of a commission altogether undesirable and 
unnecessary, particularly as matter lately fully 
considered, and any new features can be disposed of by 
Colonial Governments themselves on telegraphic advice.
New Zealand agreed to the idea of a commission, but chose to be 
represented separately, while Victoria preferred to leave the 
question open. Only Queensland fully embraced the proposal of a 
joint commission. In a telegram of 27 February 1895, the Queensland 
premier, Hugh Nelson, concluded that the Pacific cable should be 
constructed on the "principle of State ownership, and that 
Australasian Colonies, or such of them as sympathise with the 
project, should join in appointment of the Commission proposed by
59. Bowell to Reid, 12 February 1895, Telecom Archives, Sydney.
60. Kingston to Reid, 14 February 1895, ibid.
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Canada. 61
Growing decidedly apprehensive that the Pacific cable plan was
continuing to drift, Fleming now wrote from Ottawa to Larke,
strongly urging him to push the Australian authorities for an
expression of support. Fleming was convinced that the Imperial
government "would take a leading part in the project", if only the
62
colonies demonstrated their commitment to the plan.
Moreover, I cannot conceal a feeling existing here that the 
Australasians have apparently assumed an attitude of 
indifference to the project of a Pacific cable or they 
would be the foremost in its advocacy. I cannot but think 
that the feeling is without real foundation as no one knows 
better than Australians that if there be no Pacific cable 
when the subsidy to the Eastern Extension Company expires 
that Company will be in a position to make fresh demands on
the colonies.^3
Fleming's intention was to spur the Australian colonies and New 
Zealand to continue 'agitating' for the construction of the Pacific 
cable. However, when Larke submitted the correspondence to Joseph 
Cook, for the perusal of the New South Wales government, it sparked 
a backlash of resentment and criticism. Enclosed with the 
correspondence, Larke attached his own estimates of the anticipated
61. Nelson to Reid, 27 February 1895, ibid. First elected to the 
legislative assembly in 1883 Nelson became secretary of 
railways under Mcllwraith in 1888. When Griffith resigned as 
premier in March 1893, Nelson formed a coalition with 
Mcllwraith, taking on the posts of treasurer and 
vice-president of the executive council. After Mcllwraith 
departed in October, following Bowell's visit, Nelson formed a 
ministry which lasted 4 1/2 years. Throughout that period he 
supported any moves to institute an alternative means of 
communications. Australian Dictionary of Biography. Vol.2, 
p. 185.
62. Fleming to Larke, 7 March 1895, Larke Papers, MS 598, National 
Library of Australia.
63. Idem.
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revenue and expenditure of the Pacific cable. His figures were in 
conflict with those of Fleming from 1 December, 1894. Consequently, 
and most unfortunately, he had added to the uncertainty of the 
scheme, rather than the reverse.
The response to this latest effort by Fleming was swift.
Firstly, from the Sydney post office, P.B. Walker attacked the
estimates of both Fleming and Larke. Once again he considered that
Fleming's proposal of operating the cable as a public work was
ill-conceived and unadvisable. Reviewing the financial question,
Walker maintained that both the Canadians were too sanguine in
predicting revenue. He conceded that 1893 was "an exceptionally
good year" for telegraphic traffic, but cautioned against basing
64
future revenue on a good year. He also felt that the proposed 
cost of construction and the rate of interest on capital were too 
low. Therefore, he argued, the annual expenditure would reach 
£141,000, instead of the £75,000 as stated by Fleming.65 Walker 
calculated that the cable would have a net deficit of £18,000 -
after ten years of operation - while Fleming had predicted a surplus 
of £742,000 and Larke £354,000.66
This divergence of opinion was not, of course, lost on Cook 
when he placed the matter before Reid. The postmaster-general took 
umbrage at Fleming's claim of a want of earnestness on the part of 
the 'Australasian' colonies. In a letter to the premier, Cook 
countered forcefully that
64. Walker, P.B. "Report to the Postmaster-General", 27 March
1895. Telecom Archives, Sydney.
65. Idem.
66. Walker, P.B. "Estimates of Traffic on Proposed Pacific
Cable", 29 March 1895, ibid.
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Our delegates to the Ottawa Conference, whom we 
despatched at great expense to open the deliberation 
on the project have only recently returned and 
submitted their respective reports. Since then, every 
new development of the matter has been carefully 
noted, and no delay has occurred beyond the caution 
necessary in dealing with a proposal affecting the 
whole Empire.6^
Of the many points that remained to be resolved, two struck Cook as
paramount. Firstly, the commercial aspect; and, secondly, the
Imperial dimension. In view of the contradictory nature of the two
Canadian estimates, and that of the New South Wales expert, the
first point could "hardly be said to be reasonably
68established." As to the Imperial connection, it seemed to
Cook that nothing definite could be done until the position of the
Imperial government was known. Cook advised that the next course of
action should be to request the agent-general to ascertain the
opinion of Great Britain on the subject.
Before Cook's recommendation could be acted upon New South
Wales duly responded (16 April) to Bowell's urgent plea for
immediate pursuit of a joint commission. Reid did not wish to
appear unfriendly to the proposals. However, as he pointed out,
... the Government of New South Wales, on a full review of 
the whole of the circumstances, see no prospect of united 
action on the lines suggested ... and further we are of
opinion that it is not advisable.69
Shortly after the transmission of the New South Wales position on 
the Pacific cable to Canada, the deputy postmaster-general, S.H.
Lambton, also added his voice to the dissent. Lambton amplified the
67. Cook to Reid, 11 April 1895. Larke Papers, MS 598, National 
Library of Australia.
68. Idem.
69. Reid to Bowell, 16 April 1895, Telecom Archives, Sydney.
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difficulty inherent in calculating receipts and expenditures, by
70predicting an even lower income than Walker. He argued that
the Pacific cable would not transmit any messages from South or
Western Australia, and considerably less than half of the messages
which would originate in the other colonies. Like Walker, Lambton
was strongly of the opinion that the cable should be undertaken by a
private company operating on a government guarantee or subsidy.
However, in light of his unfavourable calculations on the future
receipts of the project, he concluded that the subsidy or guarantee
required by any contractor "could hardly be less than 125,000 a 
«71year.
This evolving and contentious Pacific cable discussion of 1895 
was not muted by the opinions of the Sydney general post office. 
The Sydney Chamber of Commerce held a "largely attended meeting" in 
May of that year to reaffirm its support of an 'all-British'
alternative to the Eastern Extension „ 72 Company. The Chamber
emphasised the commercial importance of the scheme. It observed
that the existing Company, in co-ordination with South Australia, 
had supplied the business community with the luxury of telegraphy. 
However, what was once a luxury, was now a necessity to commercial 
life. As such, the interests of commerce dictated that overseas 
communication be placed on the most secure footing possible. The 
proposed Pacific cable, being many miles from the present cables and 
traversing only British territory, would go far toward securing
70. Lambton, S.H. "Memorandum for the General Post Office", ibid.
71. Idem.
72. Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 10 May 1895.
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communications from interruption.
Larke was then in Sydney, of course, and he could therefore
support the motion. He outlined the plans evolved, in Canada by
Fleming, to construct and operate the cable under state control, and
he ardently stressed the significance of the cable to the British
Empire. The Daily Telegraph well captured Larke's timely comments:
In Canada they believe that their security, as well as 
their interests, lay in their connection with the Empire.
They, therefore, believed in promoting the Empire; and one 
of their methods of doing so was in promoting its trade.
They believed that a cable was the herald of trade between 
the two countries, and that no greater bond could possibly 
exist than closer relations in matters of trade.
The principle of public ownership, and the appeal to Imperial
sentiment, struck a responsive chord with the Sydney businessmen.
The Chamber resolved that the Canadian proposal was "one worthy of
close consideration", and urged the New South Wales government to
communicate with other interested governments "with the object of
having an early and searching investigation into its
75practicability". The meeting further resolved that a
deputation from the Chamber should meet with the government, at the 
earliest opportunity, to promote the institution of the project.
While Larke was lobbying the New South Wales ministry, Fleming 
was at work in Canada. Upon learning of Joseph Ward's visit to 
London, Fleming urged Bowell to wire Sir Charles Tupper, the 
Canadian High Commissioner, in the following terms: "Suggest
73
73. Sydney Chamber of Commerce to Reid, 15 May 1895, Telecom 
Archives, Sydney.
74. Daily Telegraph, op cit.
75. Sydney Chamber, op cit.
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propriety of Ward and yourself seeing Colonial Minister, and
representing importance of Government initiating joint Commission
76respecting cable." Fleming felt that as Ward had so recently
departed from the Hobart conference, he could speak for the whole of
the southern colonies, and that Tupper could speak for Canada. This
now took place, and on 22 April Tupper and Ward called at the
colonial office to discuss the proposals. From these discussions,
Tupper concluded that the Imperial authorities were not inclined to
move on the appointment of a commission until they were informed of
. . 77a formal colonial opinion.
Thus: the paradox of the Pacific cable at 1895. On the one
side, the Australians were anxious for a more tangible commitment
from Ottawa and London. On the other hand, the Imperial government
was unwilling to commit itself until the matter was placed before
them in a positive and unified fashion. But, as Fleming pointed
out, "until the terms be settled on equitable principles by some
joint authority there will always be more or less hesitation on the
part of the several Governments in deciding what financial or other
78assistance they should offer."
The impetus for bringing the matter of a commission to a head, 
in Australia, came from the Victorian premier, George Turner. 
Having reviewed the crucial correspondence of Fleming and sent from 
Larke in Sydney, Turner cabled to the premiers of New South Wales,
76. Fleming to Seddon, 9 May 1895, New Zealand Pari. Paps., 1895, 
F-8, P.40.
77. Idem.
78. Idem.
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New Zealand and Queensland in plain terms, trying to move along
events.
Have received letter from Mr. Larke, Canadian Commercial 
Agent, asking that Agent-General be instructed to 
co-operate with representatives of Canada and other 
colonies in impressing upon Imperial Government the 
importance of the cable, and in securing information 
relating to its construction ... I am disposed to instruct 
our Agent-General to co-operate as proposed, and to join in 
Commission, and hope to receive a reply that you will 
similarly instruct your Agent-General, as united action is 
desirable.79
With Victoria pledged to assist in pressing the Imperial government 
to appoint a commission, the number of colonies which supported the 
proposal was now raised to three, New Zealand and Queensland having 
agreed to join earlier. It was 'progress', even if slow, agonising 
progress.
New South Wales was at last edged closer to co-operating with
the other colonies (13 June) after the deputation from the Sydney
80Chamber of Commerce, including Larke, waited on the premier.
The deputation urged Reid to carry into effect the resolution of the
Hobart conference, and submitted Larke's figures to support their
claims. Reid, as premier, pointed out that the estimates submitted
were at variance with those produced by the Sydney post office.
Regardless of this fact, he agreed that the cable was desirable, and
81he promised to place the matter before his government. It is 
important to note that the pressure of the commercial community, 
coupled with the position of Victoria, tended to negate the
79. Turner to Seddon, 22 May 1895, ibid, p.39.
80. "Precis ... Proposed Pacific Cable," G.P.O., Sydney, 1 
December 1895. Telecom Archives, Sydney.
81. Idem.
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influence of Walker and Lambton upon the views of the New South
Wales ministry. Consequently,(on 1 July) Reid cabled the
agent-general, Sir Saul Samuel, requesting that he join the other
agents-general and the High Commissioner of Canada in recommending
82the scheme to the Imperial authorities. It seemed that the
Pacific cable might arise out of all the complex and confusing
intra-colonial negotiations after all.
The initiative had in fact passed to the colonial leaders. For
example, on 24 August, a meeting in Sydney of the
postmasters-general from New South Wales, Victoria, and Queensland
was now held to mold a unified Australian stand on the Pacific
cable. At that meeting the postmasters-general resolved that:
... the Agent-General of the Colonies of New South Wales, 
Victoria, New Zealand, and Queensland be instructed to 
co-operate with Canada in pressing upon the Imperial 
Government the necessity of the construction of the Pacific 
cable, and the appointment of a joint Commission to 
consider and report upon the scheme and the best mode of 
carrying it into effect.00
New Zealand's postmaster-general did not attend the impromptu
conference, but he did wire the concurrence of his government on 17 
84September. By so doing the "four important Australasian
colonies" were able to make representations to the Imperial 
government from a position of solidarity, something new in the long
4 - 85story.
82. Samuel to Reid, 6 September 1895, ibid.
83. Under Secretary of Telegraphs, Qld., to Lambton, 19 September 
1895, ibid.
84. Ward to Thynne, 17 September 1895, ibid.
85. Thynne to Ward, 12 September 1895, ibid.
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However, this political resolution did little to convince the 
permanent heads of the New South Wales postmaster-general's 
department that a Pacific cable was either required or possible. 
Inseparably allied to the cause of the existing monopoly, the 
'experts' wished to protect the interests of the Eastern Extension 
Company, regardless of the growing political will to do otherwise. 
Lambton continued to urge caution. Again, he submitted financial 
estimates which predicted a net deficit of £364,400 after four years
 ^ . 86 of operation. He conceded that any estimate must be
speculative, "if not imaginary". and argued that it was highly
improbable that Fleming's projected increases would be realised. In
1890, when the tariff was lowered, - from 9s. 4d. to 4s. - the
number of words carried over the Eastern Extension cable increased
8 749.87 %; the next year, the traffic increase was only 2 %.
Consequently, to predict an annual increase of 14 per cent, in the 
manner of Fleming - when the number of Australians that used the 
technology was comparatively small - was, in Lambton's view, an 
exaggerated calculation.
To corroborate his contentions, Lambton solicited the opinions 
of Sir Charles Todd, the postmaster-general of South Australia and 
father of the overland telegraph. Not surprisingly, Todd, the
long-time enemy of the Pacific cable, was eager to assist Lambton in 
persuading the New South Wales government to withhold support for a 
rival cable. He argued that as the project involved a considerable
86. Lambton, S.H. Memorandum, 27 August 1895, ibid.
87. Idem.
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capital outlay, it "should be treated in a business manner without
88regard to sentiment." Todd's argument centered on the
unreliable nature of Fleming's estimates. However, he introduced 
his opinions by stating that the existing lines of communication 
were, by all accounts, satisfactory, and capable of carrying many 
times more traffic. Moreover, should the Pacific cable be realised 
and,
if it comes, as it undoubtably must, to a war of tariffs, 
the Eastern Extension Company, with cables connecting so 
many countries of commercial importance and supported by 
such rich and powerful allies as the Eastern and other 
Companies, will be able to compete with their rival with 
the greatest of ease and success.
Todd attested that it was this consideration that undoubtably
convinced those companies which submitted tenders to decline from
operating the cable after construction. Under such circumstances,
the interested colonies would be ill-advised to undertake the
operation of a cable with no chance of meeting expenses.
Cook passed Lambton's report on to Larke for comment. The
latter argued that, although the estimates varied on the surface,
the figures could be reconciled. Firstly, Lambton calculated
interest on capital at 3% per annum, while Fleming had assumed 2
1/2% per annum. Considering the security of the capital would be
guaranteed by the several governments, Larke did not expect any
90trouble in finding capital at the lower rate. Lambton had
also unnecessarily allowed for £16,000 expenses on floatation and a
88. Todd to Lambton, 13 September 1895, ibid.
89. Idem.
90. Larke to Cook, 11 September 1895, ibid.
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further £80,000 for amortisation. The expenses on floatation were
included in the expenditure on capital in Fleming's estimate, while
a renewal fund had not been considered advisable when the cable was
still finding its feet. Moreover, the estimates of what sum should
be put aside for amortisation differed so widely that the Canadians
91deemed it best to leave it aside. All other expenses
working expenses £30,000, unforeseen expenses £5,000 - were common 
in all the estimates.
Referring to the projected traffic of the Pacific cable, Larke
agreed with Lambton that the venture would not receive business from
South or Western Australia. By the same token, he maintained that
the new line would get at least fifty per cent of the traffic from
Victoria and New South Wales, and probably all of the business from
New Zealand and Queensland. Moreover, the calculations of the
project's opponents did not allow for a decided increase in the
amount of traffic between North America and Australia resulting from
the new connection. Todd stated that the traffic between the two
continents in 1894 amounted to only five per cent of the 
92total. But, a significant motive in promoting the cable at
all, was to accommodate the large increase in commerce expected to
result from the steamship line, and any preferential trade
agreements which would follow the initial talks on that subject in 
93Ottawa.
91. Idem. Sir John Pender considered £100,000 per annum was 
advisable for a renewal fund; Sir Charles Todd, £60,000 per 
annum; Alexander Siemens, 2% of the capital of £32,000; P.B. 
Walker calculated that the sum should be equivalent to laying 
a new cable in 20 years.
92. Todd to Lambton, op. cit.
93. Larke argued that even without a significant increase in 
traffic from America the cable would pay with only a 5% annual 
increase.
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With the New South Wales government having given its tacit
support to the Pacific cable, Lambton from within tried another
approach to curb the ministry's growing enthusiasm. He argued that
the government could secure lower rates, without incurring the risk
of financing an alternative route, by increasing the annual subsidy
to the Eastern Extension Company. Lambton suggested that the
colonies raise the subsidy from £32,400 to £50,000 per annum
provided the Company lower the tariff to 4s. per word to London and
94waive the guarantee. The subsidy would be apportioned on the
basis of population and in this way, from a business standpoint,
meet with the approval of all the colonies. He stated further that,
... seeing that it is contemplated to spend over £1,500,000 
in putting down a single line: whilst we have already got 
two by another route: and to put another one down between 
Australia and New Zealand where there are already two: it 
occurred to me as only a matter of duty to put a 
proposition to the Postmaster-General which, while
affording a reasonable reduction in the tariff, would, if 
agreed to, obviate a large expenditure of money, and a 
great risk in the event of the service being a non-paying 
one. ^
Lambton admitted to leaving out the strategic element in the 
debate. But, the force of the financial question seemed, to him, to 
over-ride the sentiment of an 'all-British' line. Here he might 
have been able to convince the Reid administration of its folly had 
it not been for the activities of Audley Coote at that time.
By July 1895, Coote was in Honolulu, negotiating the
preliminaries of a contract to lay a cable from San Francisco to the
94. Lambton, S.H. "Submarine Cable Service" 19 September 1895, 
Telecom Archives, Sydney.
95. Idem.
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Hawaiian islands. By September, it was learned, an American
company had been formed to lay the cable, and was to be granted a
subsidy from the Hawaiian Republic of $40,000 for twenty years, as
. 9 7well as exclusive landing privileges m  the Hawaiian chain.
Coote was the main promoter of the scheme; it was accordingly
concluded that a cable would also be laid between Honolulu and New
Caledonia. This series of events would lead to the main southern
Pacific cable being controlled by France; and by the United States 
98in the north. The financial prospects of an 'all-British'
cable, nebulous from the start, would surely be seriously impaired 
should it face competition in the Pacific as well as from the 
Eastern Extension Company.
IV
With the election of the Salisbury unionist ministry in the 
northern summer of 1895, and the subsequent appointment of Joseph 
Chamberlain as secretary of state for the colonies, hopes ran high 
that some action would finally be forthcoming from the Imperial 
government. But, little progress was made on the proposed joint 
commission. Returning to the government benches after three years 
across the floor, Salisbury was not eager to embark on an 
imperialist campaign until his new ministers were well entrenched in 
their posts. The inertia in London would not be transformed until 
some definitive proposals were forthcoming from the interested
96. Fleming to Bowell, 11 October 1895, New Zealand, Pari. Paps., 
1896, F-8. p.3.
97. Idem.
98. Samuel to Reid, 22 November 1895, Telecom Archives, Sydney.
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colonies. This latest government had more than enough to do without 
taking the lead in a project that had yet to receive unanimous 
support in the colonies.
The impact of a foreign cable on the strategic significance of
the Pacific cable was dramatic in the extreme. Indeed it led to
sudden colonial co-operation and subsequent Imperial support. In
September 1895, the various agents-general and the High Commissioner
for Canada had requested an interview with Chamberlain. But due to
the opening of parliament and the "consequent pressure of business",
the colonial office requested that the meeting be put off until a
99more "convenient season." However, local events intervened
when the report of Coote's manouevers in Hawaii reached London. 
This prompted the Imperial government to move quickly indeed. In a 
letter to the colonial representatives in London, the colonial 
office reported that,
It seems therefore to Mr. Chamberlain to be highly 
desirable that no further time be lost in considering the 
subject, and that some open step should be taken which will 
disabuse foreign promoters of the idea that no competition 
is to be feared from a British line as recommended last 
year by the Ottawa Conference.
Concern over the implications of being bested in the Pacific led to 
the Imperial government agreeing to take steps to advance the common 
interests of the Empire. The "new Imperialism" was in action!
Chamberlain termed the meeting of representatives from all the 
'Australasian' colonies - except South and Western Australia - and
99. Colonial Office to Agent-General, 11 November 1895, ibid.
100. Idem.
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Canada, as a "meeting of the council of Empire." By
consenting to appoint a commission, Chamberlain removed much of the
frustration experienced during the inter-conference years. This
fresh start for the Pacific cable debate was one of Chamberlain's
first initiatives toward the implementation of a "new
102Imperialism." He did not only commit his energy to the
project; Chamberlain contended that the proposal had a fair chance 
of being profitable, and the prospect that the cable would weigh
. 1°3 muheavily on the contributing governments, was remote. Tne
"terms of reference" as now outlined by the colonial office, called
upon the Australian colonies and New Zealand to nominate two
delegates, Canada to nominate two, and the Imperial government two.
The royal commission would then be appointed in the name of the
Queen, to look into all aspects of the question, and to submit its
. . 104findings to the Imperial authorities.
With the transmission of these terms of reference the idea of a 
joint commission was at last achieved. It was now a full eleven 
months since Fleming had first broached the subject. Yet it would
101. The Times, (London), 20 November 1895.
102. Koerper, Philip. "The Pacific Cable; a Link in the
Telegraphic Communications of the British Empire". Ph.D. 
thesis, University of Georgia, 1971. Koerper gives great 
emphasis to Chamberlain's policies and their effect on the 
Pacific cable. As with most great men, the circumstances 
which existed dictated the policy rather than the reverse. 
For an account of Chamberlain's tenure in the colonial office, 
see Robert V. Kubicek, The Administration of Imperialism: 
Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office. Duke University 
Press, Durham, N.C., 1969.
103. Samuel to Reid, op. cit.
104. Colonial Office to Agent-General, 30 November 1895, New 
Zealand Pari. Paps., 1896, F-8, p.9.
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be another twelve months before the commission would sit to hear
evidence. Why was this? Ultimately, the answer lay in the 
difficulty of bringing together so many different groups scattered 
in all corners of the world. The lack of local co-operation in the 
antipodes was certainly part of the delay. However, although the 
electric telegraph had annihilated time and distance, the cost to 
the interested governments of communicating fully must carry some of 
the blame. Fleming had recognised this problem, and even speculated 
on the consequences.
Owing to the great distance between Australasia and Canada, 
together with the infrequency of the mail service, there 
has been much delay in communicating information. 
Meanwhile, the opponents of the contemplated telegraph 
between Canada and Australasia have been ceaseless in their 
vigilance and untiring in their efforts to defeat the 
project. Having the Eastern Extension telegraph at their 
command, they possess the means of communicating hourly, 
free of cost, between opposite sides of the globe - an 
incalculable advantage, which it may be inferred they have 
not failed to use in order to obstruct in every possible 
way the intercolonial project, and advance their own 
ends.
This situation grew even more significant as the cable debate 
progressed. The business of bringing the strands of the Empire 
together was an arduous task, as this narrative has repeatedly 
shown. With their financial interests at stake, the Eastern 
Extension Company was hardly likely to assist the colonies in 
bringing about Imperial unity.
V
The story now moved forward at its own inimitable pace. With 
the appointment of the commission confirmed, the colonies began the 
work of nominating delegates. Also to be considered were the
105. Fleming to Bowell, 11 October 1895, ibid, p.3.
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'instructions' the delegates would be given, and how far they would
be able to commit the colonies they represented. After unsuccessful
attempts to conclude the matter by telegraph, it was decided to
convene a local conference in Sydney, on 17 January 1896.^^
From the beginning, the Sydney conference took on an informal
air. Thynne, Duffy and Cook had already rehearsed their 'lines' the
previous August, and they were anxious to deal with the business at
hand swiftly. The South Australian delegate, J.A. Cockburn - also
representing Western Australia and Tasmania - and W.P. Reeves of New
Zealand, were not so eager. Reeves had been appointed to replace
Ward and, although he had been briefed on the subject, he was not
willing to take any initiatives in matters which had not been
107confirmed before his arrival in Sydney by his government.
For his part, Cockburn did not attend to frustrate the proceedings.
But he did wish to protect the interests of his colony, which
108sometimes seemed to amount to the same thing.
Cook opened this significant local gathering, and stated that 
the representatives should consider five primary questions. 
Firstly, the matter of government or private ownership; secondly,
106. Cook to Ward, 9 January 1895, ibid, p.9.
107. Reeves was noted more as an intellectual and writer than a 
politician. He was appointed agent-general after the Sydney
conference and actively promoted the Pacific cable in that 
capacity until its completion. Dictionary of New Zealand
Biography, Vol.2. p.214.
108. A former premier of South Australia, Cockburn was an ardent 
federalist. As South Australian representative to the 1890
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advocated decentralism and states' rights. Appointed 
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the division of cost among the interested governments; thirdly, the
route to be followed; fourthly, the special position of South and
Western Australia; and finally, the nomination of 
109commissioners. Hopes of an early united front were stalled
when Cockburn was quick to point out that the conference might be
binding the delegates too closely if they sent them off to London
saddled with preconceived ideas. Thynne dismissed this notion, and
argued somewhat impatiently that,
... we should endeavour to do away with all points of local 
conflicting interest, so that our representatives on the 
Commission will be able to state that such and such is what 
Australasia desires. Let Australasia speak with one voice 
in the matter ... I think considerable weight would be 
attached by the Commission to our opinion on those points 
on which we are in unity.
The federal spirit, he argued with some feeling, must be evidenced 
at the conference, or the 'Australasian' commissioners would be 
dismissed, as not representing the whole of colonial opinion. The 
three representatives from Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland 
were as one on this point, and were determined to push ahead.
The first two resolutions were passed without discussion. The 
conference was unanimous that "the Pacific cable should be 
constructed and owned by the various Governments", and that "the 
landing places of such a cable should be only upon territory 
belonging to or under the control of the British Empire.
The scheme of apportioning the cost of the cable however met with
109. Proceedings, Post and Telegraph Conference, (Sydney, 1896) ,
p. 6.
110. Idem.
111. Ibid, p. 1.
149
opposition from South Australia and New Zealand. The proposal that
the cost be divided into thirds, between Great Britain, Canada and
the interested southern colonies, was simply accepted. Problems
arose however when Duffy and Cook moved that the 'Australasian'
portion be shared equally, rather than on the basis of
112population. Reeves personally agreed with the plan; but he
was without instructions from his government, and he would not
independently commit New Zealand. Cockburn argued that South
Australia could not reasonably be expected to contribute equally to
a project that was designed to compete with the overland telegraph.
This last objection led to discussion of the difficult issue of
how best to compensate South Australia for any loss of revenue
resulting from the Pacific cable. Cockburn pointed out that, at the
Wellington conference, it had been assumed South Australia would not
be expected to contribute to the cost of the Pacific cable; and,
113instead, should rather be given special consideration. 
Thynne then contributed by suggesting that any compensation be made 
conditional on South Australia joining equally with the other 
colonies. This proposition was particularly interesting, as South 
Australia had always maintained an attitude of disapproval toward 
the Pacific cable. At every gathering since 1887, where the subject 
was put to a vote, South Australia had abstained. In Sydney, where 
the delegates were eager to prove that the federal
112. Ibid, p. 7.
113. Cook doubted that such a thing had been said, "... if in 
committee, it was not reported. But you will find that the 
statement that South Australia could not be expected to 
contribute was reported." ibid, p. 9.
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spirit prevailed, South Australia was suddenly asked to contribute 
equally with the larger and more interested sister colonies.
The local conflict was now magnified when Reeves informed
fellow delegates that he had received a cable from Ward indicating
that it would be "very disadvantageous" for New Zealand to accept
114
equal responsibility with the other colonies. The New
Zealand stand strengthened Cockburn's position, and he urged the
other delegates not to depart from the principle of responsibility
on the basis of population. An exasperated Cook informed the
conference paternalistically that,
Both Victoria and New South Wales came into this project, 
not because there was any intense feeling throughout the 
community that we ought to, or to gain any pressing
commercial advantages. In that respect we are different 
from both Queensland and New Zealand. We came in without 
stipulation or reservation of any kind, and I do not see 
that the Colonies more directly interested should raise all 
these objections, trying to saddle the two older Colonies 
who are coming in purely on federal lines, for
international purposes, with equal responsibilities.H-5
Duffy suddenly added the unwelcome information that Victoria did not
"care two-straws whether the cable is constructed or not."^^
Victoria had "a very fair cable service", and had only agreed to
assist the project because of "patriotic sentiment and a federal 
117idea." In an effort to break the impasse, Thynne supported
the position of New South Wales and Victoria, and suggested that the
other two
compromise
114. Ibid,
115. Idem.
116. Idem.
117. Idem.
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The final outstanding matter of business was to nominate the
commissioners. The opinions of New South Wales and Victoria also
dominated this phase of the conference. Thynne moved that Lord
Jersey and Edwyn Dawes be nominated to represent the colonies - on
the grounds Lord Jersey was familiar with the colonies and the
Pacific cable, while Dawes had experience in "large undertakings",
118through his position as chairman of the Suez Canal. Cook and
Duffy however preferred the appointment of their agents-general, Sir
Saul Samuel and Duncan Gillies. They argued that by designating
outsiders, such as Jersey and Dawes, the colonies would be impaired
in their dealings with the commissioners. Cook even suggested that
Imperial considerations may conflict with Colonial, and as 
the policies in England differ very materially on some 
points, it would be an advantage to have people directly 
under our own control to whom we can talk freely.
As the interests of 'East' and 'West' clearly differed in Australia, 
Cockburn requested that one of the nominees be from South or Western 
Australia. To reconcile this proposition, a proviso was added, by 
New South Wales and Victoria, that simply suggested the 
commissioners should consult the other agents-general on all matters 
of importance.
VI
By mid-Feburary, following the authorisation of the various 
colonial governments, Reid had cabled Samuel in London to inform him 
of his appointment, along with Gillies, as the colonial
118. Ibid, p.17.
119. Idem.
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representatives to the royal Pacific cable commission. A
copy of the tortured Sydney proceedings was dispatched, outlining 
the views of the various colonies. The Sydney conference had 
eventually aided the work of the commission, by settling many of the 
important local questions beforehand. Armed with draft
instructions, Gillies and Samuel would not constantly need to cable 
Australia to clarify every detail of the commission's work. The 
result was that the Australian delegates were potentially placed on 
an equal footing with those from Canada and Great Britain. The 
Imperial government could no longer point to a want of unity and 
cohesion in the antipodes. Instead, the colonies had taken the 
initiative boldly to express their singular stand on the key issues 
of route and financial responsibility.
The Canadian nominees to the commission were to be Mackenzie
Bowell and Lord Strathcona, with Fleming also attending as expert
adviser. Bowell had been replaced by Tupper, as premier, in an
attempt by the conservative government to boost its failing popular 
121
support. With Tupper in Ottawa, the renowned Canadian
capitalist, Lord Strathcona, was appointed High Commissioner. Both 
representatives were actually knowledgeable in matters of the 
Pacific cable - Bowell by virtue of his mission to Australia in 1893 
and his subsequent years as premier; while Strathcona had been among 
the financiers involved with the defunct Pacific Telegraph Company,
120. Reid to Samuel, 17 February 1896, Telecom Archives, Sydney.
121. For an account of the upheaval in the Canadian conservative 
party see, Clark, Lovell, C. "Macdonald's Conservative 
Successors, 1891-1896", in Character and Circumstances; 
Essays in Honour of Donald G. Creighton. John S. Moir (ed) 
Toronto, 1970.
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and, as president of the Canadian Pacific Railway, he was materially
122interested in the promotion of the project.
As the Imperial and Australian delegates were resident in
London, it was assumed that they would be available for meetings at
short notice. Accordingly, on 14 May, the Canadian contingent
departed Ottawa and they reached London on 23 May, at "more or less 
123inconvenience". By 5 June the committee had met; and Lord
Selborne, the under secretary of state for the colonies, was chosen
124to be chairman and W.H. Mercer as secretary. Immediately
after the preliminaries were concluded, the committee was suddenly 
informed by Gillies and Samuel that they were scheduled to attend an 
International Telegraph Conference in Budapest. Consequently, the 
Australians asked that the committee be deferred until their return 
- in five weeks.
This extraordinary action placed the committee in a most 
awkward position. The firm tone adopted by the Australian spokesmen 
even placed an air of hostility about the proceedings. Fleming 
wrote to Thynne in Queensland,
122. For Strathcona's motives to propagate the Pacific cable, see
G.N. Savory "Colonial Business Initiatives and the Pacific 
Cable: A Study in the Role of Private Enterprise in the
Development of Imperial Communication". MA Thesis, University 
of Washington, 1972.
123. Fleming to Thynne, 16 July 1896, Larke Papers, op, cit.
124. Joining Selborne on the committee was the principle clerk of 
the treasury, George Herbert Murray. The conference was 
referred to as a commission in all previous correspondence. 
Upon sitting, it was constituted as a committee, and not a 
Royal Commission. See Pari. Paps., 1899, Vol. LIX, Cd. 9247, 
p. 4.
125. Samuel to Reid, 29 May 1896, Telecom Archives, Sydney.
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The Canadian representatives remonstrated in the 
strongest possible manner, to no purpose. They had 
come from Canada for the sole purpose of attending the 
Conference and at the opening of the first meeting, 
they were told by two resident members that no 
business could be entered upon for a period of 4, 5 or 
possibly 6 weeks. The latter further insisted that no 
evidence should be taken and nothing done whatever 
during their absence, and that if anything was 
attempted to be done during their absence, they would 
claim the right to have it gone over again on their 
return.1^6
As Budapest was calculated to be only forty hours from London, and
the telegraph conference would not meet until 16 June, it was argued
by the Canadian delegation that the committee could make substantial
progress, and even possibly complete their major tasks, in the
interim. This proposition was however defeated; and the committee
duly adjourned, without any business having been conducted.
The committee at last reconvened on 8 July, but it was again
127amazingly "found necessary to adjourn." The date fixed for
the next sitting was now to be 26 October. Did anyone really want
the cable? The delays in the proceedings caused the Canadians
12 8"considerable regret and vexation." Indeed, Fleming fiercely
intimated that the Canadians would not return to London unless there
129were some prospect of "reaching some useful result." Much of
126. Fleming to Thynne, op. cit.
127. Idem.
128. Reeves to Seddon, 10 June 1896. New Zealand Pari. Paps., 
1896, op. cit., p.ll.
129. Fleming to Thynne, op. cit., Bowell also expressed some 
dissatisfaction with the series of events stating: "I am not 
at all pleased with the action of the Australian gentlemen. 
You know that this enterprise is of more importance to 
Australia than to Canada, hence the representatives of their 
colonies should take the most interest in its success." 
Bowell to Larke, 16 July 1896, Larke Papers, op. cit.
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the blame for delay can be attached directly to the Australians.
However, the agents-general had wired Ottawa and informed Canada of
130their prior commitment. Fleming claimed that the information
did not come into hand until the Canadians were in New York,
preparing to depart; and it was felt that some resolution of the
. 131conflict could be arranged in London. Either way, the
controversy did create most unnecessary animosity between the
Canadians and Australians at what was surely a crucial point in the
negotiations for a Pacific cable.
When the committee did, again, reconvene in November 1896, two
events had occurred to affect the outcome of the proceedings. The
first was the Canadian election, of July 1896, of Wilfrid Laurier's
liberal administration. The conservative party had ruled Canada
uninterrupted since 1879, and they had charted the course of the
Pacific cable for over a decade. One overt implication of Laurier's
accession to power was the replacement of Bowell on the Pacific
132cable committee by liberal Alfred Jones. Underlying this
change was the fact that the views of the new Canadian 
administration towards the Pacific cable were unknown. The agenda 
of the committee did not alter: nor did it change the significance 
of the evidence taken. However, it did cast a shadow of uncertainty 
over the future prospects of the project. The Pacific cable 
constantly appeared to attract every difficulty possible.
The second equally significant event was the sudden death of 
Sir John Pender. His passing removed the single most powerful
130. Fleming to Thynne, 16 July 1896, ibid.
131. Idem.
132. Pari. Paps., 1899, op. cit., p.4.
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opponent to the Pacific cable. Admittedly, the Eastern Extension
Company remained intact, and it continued to resent any
competition. But, the loss of an individual of Pender's force and
influence was an incalcuable blow to the power of the monopoly, and
it weakened the impact of its evidence on the proceedings of the
committee. Pender had almost single handedly established the world
telegraph system. This is evidenced by the fact that, at his death,
he was the chairman of ten different cable companies, representing a
capital of £15,000,000 and a total of 75,000 miles of submarine 
133cable. His close association with members of parliament and
permanent officials had swayed the cable debate for over a decade.
Without him whispering in well placed ears the Pacific cable had an
even chance of receiving a fair hearing.
Examination of witnesses began, at last, on 12 November. The
committee was instructed to ascertain if the Pacific cable was
practical from a technical point of view and, if so, suggest what
route the cable should take. If the cable was practicable, then the
committee was invited to estimate the cost of laying, maintenance,
and annual expenses set against the potential revenue. Finally, the
committee was to report on the best means of establishing such a
cable? and if as a public work, what method of management should be 
134devised. A total of twenty-six witnesses appeared before the
committee, and answered 3,242 questions. The witnesses included men 
of commerce, engineers, inventors and government officials. With 
the exception of representatives from the Eastern Extension Company,
133. The Electrical Review, Vol.39, No.973, 17 July, 1896, p.66.
134. Pari. Paps., 1899, op. cit., p.4.
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and some officials from the British post office, all were in favour 
135of the project.
Once it was established that the cable could indeed be laid,
the opponents of the scheme argued that the length of cable between
Vancouver and Fanning Islands was so great that a payable working
speed could not be attained. Opinions on this subject differed,
depending on the variables considered. For example, in theory, a
paying word consisted of five letters. But, because of the
extensive use of code words, the practical length of a paying word
136
was eight letters. The Canadian government's call for
tenders required the contractor to supply a cable with a working
speed of twelve words per minute, based on "a theoretical word", or
sixty letters per minute. The witnesses from the Eastern Extension
Company argued that, to achieve the requested working speed, the
core of the cable would be 750 pounds of copper and 600 pounds of 
137
gutta percha. A cable of that weight, laid at the expected
depth between Vancouver Island and Fanning Island would be
difficult, if not impossible, to raise for repairs. This evidence
was refuted by other witnesses, the most notable being Lord Kelvin.
He argued that a working speed of twelve words per minute could be
achieved on a cable with a core of 552.7 pounds of copper and 368.5
13 8
pounds of gutta percha. The committee chose to base their
135. For dissent, see the evidence of the Marquess
Eastern Extension Company, ibid , p.205.
136. Ibid, p.175
137. Ibid, p.72
138. Kelvin to Selborne, 18 December 1896, ibid, p.88.
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recommendations on Kelvin's evidence, and the Eastern Extension 
Company finally lost their only chance to sway the ultimate 
conclusions of the committee.
The troubled Pacific cable committee eventually submitted its
findings to the Imperial government in January of 1897. After
reviewing all the voluminous evidence gathered over the course of
eight weeks, the committee recommended that the Pacific cable be
owned, operated and maintained by the interested 
139governments. To facilitate this, the committee recommended
that the various governments establish a board of management to
raise the necessary capital, and to manage the commercial aspects of
the cable once it had been laid. The route indicated was the same
as that recommended by the Sydney conference. The committee pointed
out the divergent opinion concerning the type of cable required to
accommodate a sufficient speed of transmission, and so specified
that the cable should have a core of 650 pounds of copper and 400
pounds of gutta percha. Such a cable would transmit forty-eight
paying letters per minute, which would translate into a potential of
1401,944,000 words of eight letters per year.
The recommendations were dispatched to Canada, New Zealand and
the Australian colonies (7 January). The colonial office ordered
that the report not be published, and that for the time it should be
141considered 'confidential'. Two years passed before the
139. Ibid, p.13
140. Ibid, p.9
141. Colonial Office to Reid, 7 January 1896. Telecom Archives, 
Sydney.
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findings of the committee were in fact printed. This delay further 
prolonged the plight of the Pacific cable, and allowed the Eastern 
Extension Comapny time to thwart the Imperial project. It had been 
established beyond any doubt that the Pacific cable was possible, 
and that it was desired by the colonies. After more than ten years 
of discussion in the public sphere, the Australian governments 
concerned were united in their commitment to the cable. It remained 
to be seen whether Wilfrid Laurier was willing to join in and see 
the project to a conclusion.
160
CHAPTER FOUR
THE STRETCH RUN: COLONIAL CO-OPERATION AND IMPERIAL PARTNERSHIP, 
(1897-1899)
161
The findings of the royal Imperial committee of inquiry of 1896 
placed the Pacific cable project in a favourable light. Although 
the report was considered 'confidential', it was known the committee 
had concluded that a cable was perfectly feasible? and that, as a 
public work, the cable's revenue would be ample to meet all 
expenditures, without being a burden to the tax payer. In June 
1897, the premiers of the self-governing colonies assembled by 
invitation in London to celebrate the diamond jubilee of Queen 
Victoria. Joseph Chamberlain took the opportunity to invite the 
premiers to meet in conference to discuss matters of mutual 
concern. The advocates of an 'all-British' Pacific cable hoped that 
the jubilee conference would be the last to deal with the proposed 
Pacific line, and that the premiers would actively work toward 
realising the project. Chamberlain's initial enthusiasm for the 
idea led many to believe that completion of the line was in sight.
In opening the conference in June, Chamberlain fueled this 
optimism by declaring that "in any matter in which our colonies are 
themselves deeply interested they may count on the support and 
assistance of the Mother Country."^" Those encouraged by the 
beginning of the meeting were sadly disappointed by the conclusion. 
The discussions at the conference were not made public. However, 
the minutes laid before the British parliament refer to the Pacific 
cable in the following terms:
the majority of the provinces desire that the subject 
should be deferred until they had had time to consider the 
report of the Committee appointed to consider the question 
last year. It was, however, pointed out to the members of 
the Conference that the matter was not one in which the
1. George Johnson (ed), The All-Red Line: The Annals and 
Aims of the Pacific Cable. Ottawa, 1903, p. 236.
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United Kingdom was taking the initiative, although Her 
Majesty's Government were ready to consider any proposal 
for working with and assisting the colonies, if they 
attached great importance to the project ...2
In responding to the conference inaction, the London Standard
charged that the delegates had "left the Pacific cable scheme in mid
air and it is very unlikely that anything more will be heard of it
3for a considerable time." Chamberlain desired a definitive 
proposal. With the interested legislative leaders all assembled, no 
conclusion was forthcoming.
At the time of the jubilee, the premiers of New South Wales,
Victoria, Queensland and New Zealand had all been in power for at
least three years; Canada's premier Wilfrid Laurier had, however,
been in office for less than a year. This produced a peculiar
result. In the early discussions of the Pacific cable, cabinet
instability in the Australian colonies had been the bane of those
Canadians, particularly Fleming, who supported the cable so
strongly. With success so close, it was Laurier's reticence to
appear overly imperialistic that dashed any hope of the early
establishment of the Pacific cable. Like his mentor Gladstone,
Laurier saw the Empire as 'a galaxy of independent nations', and he
4opposed the consolidation theory of Empire. In the case of a 
Pacific cable, he "mistrusted" the estimates of cost, maintenance 
and revenue; and he was therefore not prepared to pledge Canada to
2. Idem.
3. London Standard, 26 July 1897.
4. W.D. McIntyre, Colonies to Commonwealth. London, 1966,
p.120.
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the undertaking.^ Conscious of his French-Canadian
constituency, he began charting his twenty-year course through 
imperial affairs by preaching Empire in London and practicing 
colonial nationalism at home.**
Returning to Australia via Canada, George Reid, the New South
Wales premier, stated to the press that Canada was to blame for the
delay in negotiations. "Unless Canada shows herself to be in
earnest in the matter and that at an early date, the project will
7either be dropped entirely or put back for a number of years." 
The task of advancing that cause fell, once again, on Sandford 
Fleming. Convincing Laurier and the liberals of the national 
utility of a Pacific cable was not as difficult for Fleming, 
however, as it would appear. Although inseparably interlinked with 
Tupper, and to some extent Bowell, Fleming was more chameleon than 
conservative. During his service to the Canadian Pacific Railway, 
he was employed by both of the major political parties. In fact, it
was his association with Sir Alexander Mackenzie's liberals that led
/
to his being replaced as engineer-in-chief by the 
0conservatives. Fleming's over-riding philosophy was
5. Idem.
6. Robert Craig Borwn and Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896-1921, A 
Nation Transformed. Toronto, 1974, p. 32.
7. Vancouver News Advertiser, 8 August 1897.
8. For a review of the events leading up to Fleming's 
discharge from government service, see, Alan Wilson, 
"Fleming and Tupper: The Fall of the Siamese Twins, 
1880" In John S. Moir (ed) Character and Circumstance: 
Essays in Honour of Donald Grant Creighton. Toronto, 
1970.
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imperialism. He saw Empire communications in general, and the
Pacific cable in particular, as a first step toward imperial unity.
I
A large measure of the loss of political will at the jubilee 
conference can be attributed to Canada. But, the even more 
significant event in the months following the Imperial committee was 
a new proposal from the Eastern Extension Company. On 22 March 1897 
the Company dispatched a circular to the chancellor of the exchequer 
intimating its desire to provide an alternative 'all-red' line of 
cables between England, the Cape and Australia, via Gilbraltar, 
Sierra Leone, Ascension, St. Helena, Durban, Mauritius, Rodrigues 
and Cocos. The timing of the proposal anticipated the diamond
jubilee, and effectively lessened the resolve of the Australian 
delegates. Whether the plan was fostered by Sir John Pender prior 
to his death, or by his successors, is difficult to say. The new 
initiative did, however, alert the telegraphing public that the 
Eastern Extension Company was not about to relinquish its monopoly 
without a fight.
The Company professed to be motivated by the "view of meeting 
the demand, which is believed to exist, for additional telegraphic 
communication.""^ However, as the Company proposed to expend at 
least £2,000,000 to construct 14,000 nautical miles of cable in the 
interest of the Empire, it considered that various "privileges"
9. Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of 
Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914. Toronto, 1970, p. 210.
10. Eastern Extension Company to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, 22 March 1897, New South Wales Pari, Paps., 
1900, 90-a, p.l.
11. Idem.
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from the interested governments were necessary. Firstly, the
Company required a subsidy of £25,000 per annum, over twenty years,
from the British government, for connecting St. Helena, Ascension,
Rodrigues, and Cocos to the world telegraph system. Secondly, the
Australian and New Zealand governments were to extend their existing
subsidy of £32,400 for at least ten years. Finally, the Company
requested that the interested governments "not subsidise any
opposition line connecting any of the places served at present by
„12the associate companies.
The scheme to lay a cable from the Cape to Australia was not
new. The idea first achieved prominence in London at the 1887
Colonial Conference, when the Cape delegate suggested the connection
13as complementary to the Pacific cable. The Company's
objective was to deflect interest away from the Pacific cable, by
offering the Cape route as an alternative 'all-red' line. In
concluding the overture, the circular stated that,
As the companies' proposal is obviously more beneficial to 
British interests as a whole than the Pacific cable 
project, I venture to hope that it will meet with 
favourable consideration, and lead to the conclusion of a 
satisfactory arrangement between the companies and Her 
Majesty's Government.^4
The Company argued that a line from the Cape offered more security 
in time of war because the new cable would land at the main coaling 
stations of the Imperial Navy, as well as follow the major shipping 
lanes. On the other hand, with the exception of Fiji, the proposed
12. Idem.
13. See also Memorandum by Julius Vogel, 5 February 1887. 
Proceedings, Post and Telegraph Conference, (Sydney, 
1888), p.35.
14. New South Wales Pari. Paps., 1900, op, cit., p. 2.
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Pacific route would not land at any significant point, either 
commercial or strategic.
In addressing this contention of superiority, the Electrical
Review pointed out that the Cape cable would not relieve the problem
of the Australian land lines. The two existing cables landed at
Port Darwin and Roebuck Bay, Western Australia. Both depended on a
single land line to forward messages to the urban centres. Before a
message could be received in Melbourne from the Port Darwin cable,
it had first to travel 2,400 miles overland; while a telegram
15received in Roebuck Bay had to journey a further 3,300 miles.
The bulk of the Australian population was situated in the south-east 
of the continent, carrying out a total trade of over £120,000,000 
annually utilising 17,000,000 tons of shipping.^ The proposed 
Pacific cable, landing on the populous eastern seaboard, would 
connect with numerous land lines and release the commercial 
community from the tenuous reliance on a single wire thousands of 
miles from the heartland.
The "privileges" requested by the Eastern Extension Company
also drew criticism. The Eastern Telegraph Company was the parent
company of the Eastern and South African Company, which owned and
operated the two submarine cables connecting England with South
Africa. By 1898, that company had collected over £1,000,000 in
17subsidies from the interested governments. At the same time
the Eastern Extension Company had received subsidies from Australia
15. Extract from The Electrical Review, 4 and 18 March, 
1898. New Zealand Pari. Paps., 1898, F.-8A., p. 3.
16. Idem.
17. Idem.
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and New Zealand exceeding £750,000. In the Australian case,
breakdowns had been reduced dramatically. However, the cables
running along the east and west coasts of Africa were still subject
to frequent disruptions. The record of breaks along the west coast
18averaged eleven per year. The new cable would be subject to
the same seismic conditions. To supply this service, the Eastern
Extension Company felt obliged to ask for further subsidies, and a
. . 19guarantee against subsidised competition.
Despite these objections, the Australian colonies were willing
to consider the plan. In November 1897 a committee was appointed to
review the offer. New South Wales initiated correspondence with the
other colonies to determine the extent of colonial interest in the
proposal. As the interests of eastern and western Australia were
not identical it was decided, unlike the Pacific committee, to
nominate one representative from both regions. All the colonial
administrations concurred, except Queensland and New Zealand. Both
were concerned that the Cape proposal was inimical to the Pacific
cable. Queensland was so convinced of this that it demanded
separate representation, to protect the interests of the Pacific
line. But the request was challenged by the other Australian
administrations, and the agents-general of New South Wales and South
Australia were appointed. New Zealand disassociated itself
completely from the Cape proposal, preferring to await Canada's
20decision on the Pacific cable.
18. Daily Telegraph, 21 January 1898, letter to the Editor.
19. The Company later denied that they were asking for a 
guaranteed monopoly. Agent, Eastern Extension Company to 
Reid, 2 March 1898. Telecom Archives, Sydney.
20. Seddon to Reid, 22 November 1897. New South Wales Pari.
Paps., 1900 op. cit., p.3. The two representatives were 
Sir Daniel Cooper for N.S.W. and Thomas Playford for 
South Australia.
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With officials meeting in London and a Post and Telegraph Conference
due to convene in Hobart, the Eastern Extension Company attempted to
raise its offer. The colonial governments were informed in March
1898, that the Company was willing to supplement its current
proposal by laying, at their own expense, a cable from Albany,
21Western Australia, to Adelaide. Thus the Company would
eliminate the colonial reliance on a single land line and make
Adelaide the centre of international communications. Anxious to be
given authority to accept the new terms, Sir Daniel Cooper wired the
Company's offer to Reid in the following terms:
First, to lay a cable to Perth. Second, to continue to 
Adelaide. Will colonies agree to one or other; or what 
modifications of terms will they agree to, if any? 
Admiralty and War Office consider Cape route most valuable 
for strategic purposes - preferable to Pacific. 2^
Reid replied that New South Wales preferred the Pacific cable, and
would not subsidise any other scheme. Cooper then cabled his
personal opinion that the Pacific route was "a hopeless scheme" and
that the treasury was "not prepared to advise Her Majesty's
Government to take any part in the scheme for laying a cable across 
23the Pacific."
Several factors moved Reid to conclude that colonial opinion
favoured the Pacific cable over the Cape route. Foremost was the
desire to create competition. In responding to Cooper's appeal,
George Turner, the Victorian premier, telegrammed that,
21. W. Warren to Reid, 1 March 1898, Telecom Archives, Sydney.
22. Cooper to Reid, 9 March 1898, ibid.
23. Cooper to Reid, 14 March 1898 and 22 March 1898, Precis, 
Cable Subsidies and Guarantees and the Eastern Extension 
Telegraph Company's proposal for an alternative cable via 
the Cape, pp. 8-9. Ibid.
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While I do not object to Company laying another cable 
I consider it necessary to have competition to prevent 
monopoly, and, therefore, am inclined to support 
Canadian cable. If Company lays cable no necessity 
[to] go to Adelaide, but at present cannot agree to 
any subsidy.
With Queensland and New Zealand already on record as objecting to
the new scheme, Reid was faced with the possibility of being the
lone supporter of the Company's proposal. The previous March, prior
to the inception of the new plan, Reid had joined with the other
interested premiers in expressing satisfaction at the findings of
the Pacific cable committee. With federal sentiment running high in
25New South Wales, he was bound to stand by the other colonies.
Added to this, there was the continued lobbying for a Pacific 
cable from the business community. The Congress of Australasian 
Chambers of Commerce met in conference at Sydney in May, 1897, and 
resolved that a Pacific cable,
... under Imperial control and passing through British 
possessions only, is a necessity not only- in commercial 
interests but for Imperial strategic reasons, and will 
materially assist, not only the great cause of Australian 
Federation, but will also form a strong bond of union 
between Great and Greater Britain.
The following March a deputation from the Sydney Chamber of Commerce 
met the New South Wales postmaster-general, Joseph Cook, and urged 
that the Pacific cable be no longer delayed. Beside providing an 
alternative means of communication with Britain, the Pacific line
24. Turner to Agent-General, 14 March 1898, Victorian Pari. 
Paps., 1900, 40, p.4.
25. The premiers of N.S.W., Victoria and Qld. met in 
Melbourne before the Postal Conference and agreed to each
contribute one-ninth of the cost of the cable. See
Canada, Sessional Papers, (No. 51), 1899, p.13.
26. W.E. Smith, Conference of Australasian Chambers of
Commerce, Report on Proceedings. (Sydney, May 1897).
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would open up the growing markets of North America to Australian and 
New Zealand commerce.
When the post and telegraph conference opened at Hobart in late
March 1898, the fate of the Cape proposal was all but sealed. The
subsidy and "guarantee contract" with the Eastern Extension Company
were due to expire on October 1899. The conference interviewed the
Company's Australian representative to ascertain on what basis new
arrangements could be initiated to continue cable business over its
lines. The delegates asked what rates the Company would charge
should the contract not be renewed, and what concessions they would
offer if the colonies continued the .existing agreement. All the
Company proposed was to lay an alternative cable from the Cape. No
27reduction in rates for the public were included in that plan.
The Company's stance forced the conference to decide that
... in the absence of any satisfactory proposal from the 
Eastern Extension Telegraph Company, and of any proposal at 
all except on the basis of an alternative cable via Africa, 
this Conference is unable to make any fresh arrangements 
with that Company.28
The Victorian postmaster-general, John Gavan Duffy, claimed that the
colonies had "spoon-fed the Company" long enough, and that he
favoured the Pacific line 29. J • R. Dickson, the Queensland
delegate, also considered the Pacific cable to be "of primary
27. Proceedings, Post and Telegraph Conference, (Hobart, 
1898), p.100.
28. Ibid, p.101.
29. Idem.
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importance". It would have the advantage of connecting the
different portions of Empire, as well as "destroying a 
monopoly".31
The representatives of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland
were in unison on the Imperial benefits of the Pacific line.
However, all three placed greater significance on securing lower
telegraph rates. Joseph Cook declared "the feeling that the present
rates were too high for the purposes of business"; Duffy argued that
all Victoria wanted was "cheaper communication with the old
country"; and Dickson stated that a Pacific cable would "introduce a
32cheaper system of telegraphic communication". Admittedly, the
primary function of the conference was to have the various 
postmasters-general assemble to discuss matters of joint concern, in 
a business-like manner - which meant rates would be of major 
importance. However, this emphasis on tariff reduction highlights 
the stand of New South Wales and Victoria from the beginning of the 
Pacific cable story, and would lead to its subsequent demise. For 
the moment, the conference passed a further resolution, re-affirming 
that a Pacific cable was desirable, and that "if Great Britain and 
Canada would each contribute one-third of the cost, the Colonies 
would be
30. Idem. Dickson first entered public life in 1873. After
serving in several cabinet posts, he was appointed 
postmaster-general to replace Thynne in March 1897 and 
acted as stop-gap premier from October, 1898, to
December, 1899, when Robert Philp was reluctant to 
replace Nelson. A strong imperialist, Dickson was
instrumental in ensuring that Queensland was the first 
colony to offer troops for the Imperial cause in the 
Transvaal. Australian Dictionary of Biography. Vol. 8, 
p.304.
31. Ibid, p.103.
32. Idem.
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prepared to contribute the remaining one-third." Once again, 
the position of the Pacific cable had been advanced by the 
Australian colonies.
However, response to the moves by the postmasters-general was,
predictably, slow. Finally, after months of silence, Cook suggested
that the Pacific cable be considered by the three eastern colonies
at a conference of premiers. In August 1898 the premiers of New
South Wales, Victoria and Queensland assembled in Sydney to forge a
common decision on the Pacific cable question. It was decided that
if the Canadian and British governments would guarantee five-ninths
of the cost of the cable, the premiers would recommend their
34respective colonies each to contribute one-ninth. At the same
time, in New Zealand a public accounts committee was considering the
question of establishing a Pacific telegraph service. The committee
recommended that the New Zealand portion of the cost should not
exceed one-eighth of the total? and the premier, Richard Seddon,
assured his peers across the Tasman that his government would
. . 35
happily supply one-ninth.
II
The commitment of the four premiers was now transmitted to the 
colonial office. The colonial initiative had at last been taken - 
not by Canada, but by the Australian colonies and New Zealand. The 
Pacific cable proposition now only required the co-operation of the 
Dominion and the Imperial government to become a reality. The
Canadian position had been uncertain since the election of Laurier.
33. Idem.
34. New South Wales Pari. Paps., 1900, op. cit., p.45.
35. New Zealand Pari. Paps., 1899, F.-8, p.5.
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Although the commitment of the Canadian government was in question, 
the determination of Fleming and other British-Empire loyalists had 
remained firm. What separated the advocates of a Pacific cable was 
their motives in pursuing the project. While the Australians paid 
lip service to the imperial importance of the scheme, the Canadians 
were unceasing in championing the cable as imperative to imperial 
unity.
Due to his intimate association with the plan, Fleming was
foremost in promoting the cable. However, he carefully solicited
the assistance of noted Canadian imperialists, especially G.M. Grant
and G.R. Parkin. Both were first class propagandists for the cause
of imperial federation, and had promoted closer ties with Britain 
36since 1884. As the principle of Queen's University, Grant
constantly preached the "religious duty" of all British subjects to 
work towards the consolidation of the Empire. Of all the British 
people, because of their geographical position, Canadians were 
obliged to seek the unification of the Empire. In an article 
written in July 1898, entitled "Canada, the halfway house of the 
Empire", Grant stated that,
... the British Empire is not a myth but a reality, a 
reality which it is the duty of all its members to make 
more effective; that Canada occupies a unique and most 
important position in that Empire, as its great half-way 
house, between Australasia on the one side and the United 
Kingdom on the other, and that it is our duty to rise to 
the demands of the position and of the time in which we 
live.37
36. For an excellent account of Grant's significance to the 
cause of British imperialism in Canada, see Berger op. 
cit.
37. G.M. Grant, reprint from the Westminster in New Zealand 
Pari. Paps., 1898, 1-7, p.44.
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The best means of exploiting that favoured position was to link the
two ends telegraphically, via Canada. The existing telegraphic
situation robbed Canadians of this status. "In other words", as
Grant continued, "instead of being the half-way house of the Empire,
as God has made us, Canada is shunted and sidetracked away up a
3 8distant back street."
Parkin lamented the dependence of the Empire upon the cables of
the Eastern Extension Company. For the most part, the existing
telegraphic communications network was either laid in shallow
waters, or landed on or near potentially hostile territories. The
possibility of the cables being severed in time of war was
intolerable for a great oceanic Empire. Parkin declared that,
The comparative paralysis which would fall upon this
gigantic machinery if the power of concerned action were 
removed, as it is likely to be without a Pacific cable,
cannot be contemplated with equanimity by a nation which 
has such vast industrial and commercial interests at stake 
as have our British people.^
He called on the government of Canada to move boldly in dealing with
the question. As the Dominion did not contribute to Imperial
defence, she could at the very least show "national pluck and
-40patriotism in a peaceful enterprise like this."
Fleming also saw Canada as the "elder brother in the British
41family of kindred nationalities". In a letter to Launer,
38. Ibid, p.45.
39. G.R. Parkin, "Now for a Pacific Cable" (No date). 
Reprinted in ibid, p.42. Parkin unsuccessfully toured 
Australia in 1889 championing Imperial federation.
40. Idem.
41. Fleming to Laurier, 28 December 1897, in Electrical
Review. Vol.42, No. 1,055. 11 February 1898, p.199.
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dated 28 December 1897, he urged the Canadian premier to push
forward the cause of the Pacific cable, and take the lead by issuing
a proposal to the colonial office. Unconscious of the progress
being made in Australia, Fleming argued that the disunited colonies
could not be expected to advance the issue. Canada should seize the
opportunity to prove "to the world that the Canadian Government and
42people are determined in all ways to promote Imperial unity."
Fleming took care not to blame Laurier while discussing the
delay in negotiations. Instead, he criticised the Eastern Extension
Company. Considering the unsatisfactory state of communications
with South Africa, he welcomed the plan to supply an additional
cable to the Cape and on to Australia. But, he did not see it as an
alternative to the Pacific route. The Eastern Extension Company had
been the determined opponent of the Pacific line from the
beginning. Fleming argued that the Company had only moved to
increase its service to protect its profits, and to draw attention
43away from the Pacific cable. The Pacific line, according to
Fleming, was never intended to be "hostile to any company or to any 
44country". The same could not be said of the Eastern Extension 
Company. By promoting the Cape route as a superior option, the 
Company was merely "exercising its manifold and widely ramified
42. Ibid, p.200.
43. Ibid, p.164. The combined share capital of the three 
companies making up the Eastern Extension Company was 
£1,525,000 before their amalgamation. Through the 
process of "watering" the share capital was increased to 
£1,997,500. By 1896, while paying dividends of 7%, the 
Company also expended £1,571,540 on extensions and other 
Capital works and established an undivided reserve fund 
of £804,193.
44. Idem.
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influence to keep Canada and Australasia disunited".
These appeals to the ministry's sense of imperial duty went
unheeded. However, the subject was brought to the fore again in
March 1898, at the annual meeting of the British Empire League. In
passing resolutions on the Pacific cable, the League noted that such
a telegraph connection would be "of the utmost importance to
Imperial unity" as well as a catalyst to expanding trade across the 
46Pacific. They further urged the Canadian government to take 
whatever action was necessary to secure the completion of the 
cable. But the administration was still unmoved.
Finally, on 26 May 1898, the subject was raised in the Canadian 
House of Commons. In an attempt to "shame" the government into 
action, the opposition tabled a letter to Fleming from Sir Hugh 
Nelson, the former premier of Queensland. Referring to the 
proceedings of the jubilee conference, Nelson was quoted as saying 
that,
It was with some surprise that I heard Sir Wilfrid Laurier 
announce during the course of the proceedings that his 
Government was not yet prepared to give practical effect, 
so far as the Dominion of Canada was concerned, to the 
proposal that the colonies interested should guarantee 
their shares of the cost of the construction of the 
cable.^
The question had been considered by numerous experts and had been 
shown to be a practical one. The conservatives, led by Sir Charles 
Tupper, pointed out that the financial aspects of the question had 
been examined and no one had refuted Fleming's argument that the
45. Idem.
46. Fleming to R.R. Dobell, 14 April 1898, New Zealand Pari. 
Paps., 1898, 1-7., p.35.
47. Canada Sessional Paper, in ibid, p.42.
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cable would be a paying concern from the start. Yet it was reported
48that Laurier "mistrusted" these conclusions.
The House was told that the telegraphic traffic to and from the
Australian colonies and New Zealand in 1896 was 2,326,984 words - up
49from 1,110,869 in 1891. Consequently, the total words
transmitted in 1901 could be expected to surpass four million.
Should the Pacific cable only command one quarter of the total
traffic it would, at a tariff of 3s. per word, produce £150,000 and
thereby meet anticipated expenditures. The majority of the
telegraphic business was conducted by the four colonies interested
in the Pacific cable. As the premiers had announced their
willingness to contribute one-third of the cost, it was concluded
"that if these colonies have a proprietory interest in the
.50undertaking its complete financial success will be assured."
The minister for trade and commerce, Sir Richard Cartwright,
defended government policy. The Imperial government had not
released the report of the Pacific cable committee. Nor had they
offered any evidence of being prepared to contribute to the
undertaking. Canada had done much to advance the idea of a Pacific
cables foremost being the construction of the transcontinental
51railway, at great cost. Of the three interested parties,
Canada had done the most to realise the cable, and ultimately would
48. Ibid, p.40. It is doubtful that Laurier would have known 
of the antagonistic estimates produced by Walker and 
Lambton.
49. Fleming to G.E. Casey, 26 May 1898, ibid, p.37.
50. Idem.
51. Ibid, p.41•
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derive the least benefit from its completion. Cartwright continued
significantly,
... while it may be of interest to Canada, it is of very 
much more interest to the Australian group, whose 
inhabitants are wealthy people, quite as wealthy, and 
perhaps more so, than are Canadians as yet; and to the 
people of Great Britain, whose interest would be very 
largely served by having a second line of cable through 
British territory which would be practically inaccessible 
to any attempts that may be made by any foe at any time to
interrupt communication.^2
The resources of Canada were "very fully engaged" and the
administration was not about to incur a further liability, without
very careful consideration. Canada would not lose sight of the
Pacific cable. But, Cartwright concluded, the Dominion was not
going to be called upon to bear "more than her portion of the 
53cost".
In July 1898, the character of that "portion" became clearer.
While in London to attend a postal conference, the Canadian
postmaster-general, W.M. Mulock, met with the* High Commissioner,
Lord Strathcona, and the Australian and New Zealand agents-general,
to discuss the Pacific cable. At these informal meetings, Mulock
54stressed he had not been authorised to finalise the matter. 
However, he did indicate that Canada was friendly toward the scheme, 
and might be expected to contribute no more than two-ninths of the 
cost. This information was cabled to the colonial premiers, and it
52. Idem.
53. Idem. In a letter to Seddon, of 5 July 1898, Fleming
stated that Cartwright felt that 'Australasia' should pay 
one half of the cost, leaving the remainder to be met by 
Canada and Great Britain. Ibid, p.43.
54. Mulock to Cartwright, 29 July 1898. Canada, (No. 51) , 
op. cit., p.14.
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led to the August resolution pledging support for four-ninths of the 
, 55enterprise. Strathcona relayed the colonial position to
Cartwright in Ottawa, and suggested that "it would be the best of
good effects if it were possible for the Canadian government to
follow this up"56 - to which he replied that the ministry would
57consider the subject "at the earliest practical moment."
But by late October the Canadian administration had still not 
indicated their willingness to join with the Australian colonies and 
New Zealand. Now growing anxious to keep the debate moving, Fleming 
presented a proposal to Joseph Chamberlain in London, outlining a 
scheme to establish a state-run British Empire cable service. The
idea was not a new one. It had been raised at the Colonial
Conference in 1887, and again at Ottawa in 1894. 58 Fleming's
plan was to cross the world's oceans with submarine cables which 
landed only on British territory. The first step was to lay a 
Pacific cable from Vancouver Island to Australia. From Australia, a 
cable would be laid to the Cape, and then across the Atlantic to
Bermuda - where it would connect with the existing cable to
„ - 59Canada.
Such a scheme would interfere with the profits of the existing 
cable companies. But, Fleming argued that the interest of the
55. Agent-General to Reid, 29 July 1898, New South 
Pari. Paps., 1899, op. cit., p.44.
Wales
56. Strathcona to Cartwright, 17 September 1898, Canada, 
51), op. cit., p.21.
(No.
57. Cartwright to Strathcona, 4 October 1898, ibid.
58. See Pari. Paps., 1887, Vol. LVI Cd 5091, pp. 225 
and Pari. Paps., 1894, Vol. LVI, Cd 7553, pp. 88-90.
-228;
59. Fleming to Chamberlain, 28 October 1898, Canada, 
51), op. cit., p.26.
(No.
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Empire far outweighed the furtherance of a private monopoly.
I venture to hold that no private company, however rich and 
influential, should be allowed to stand in the way when 
great Imperial interests are at stake. It must be borne in 
mind too, that telegraphy is one of the most astonishing 
results of science, and that the facilities which it 
offers, if not shackled by hinderances, may be rendered of 
greater and greater value to the human race.6^
Fleming cited the advantages to the commercial community, and to the 
general public, which resulted from the "nationalisation" of the 
inland telegraph lines of Britain in 1870.^ Those benefits 
would be greatly magnified should a similar move be made to bring 
British submarine cables under state control.
The key to Fleming's proposal was the Pacific cable. He was 
convinced that the line would be the first of many state-run 
communications systems. In concluding his Memorandum to Chamberlain 
he stated emphatically that,
the final outcome of the laying of this Pacific cable would 
be an Imperial telegraph service - there can be little 
doubt. I am satisfied that the Pacific cable would prove 
to be the entering wedge to remove forever all monopoly in 
ocean telegraphy, and free the public from excessive 
charges; that it would be the initial link in a chain of 
state cables encircling the globe, with branches ramifying 
wherever the British Empire exists.62
The admirable aims of Fleming's proposal would, however, come to 
nothing, unless the Canadian government agreed to join the 
interested Australian colonies and New Zealand in persuading the 
British colonial office to assist in the undertaking.
Progress was made when, in December 1898, the office of the 
Canadian High Commissioner unofficially informed the British
60. Ibid, p.22.
61. Ibid, p.23.
62. Ibid, p.28.
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authorities that his government was willing to join with the
Imperial government and contribute one half of five-ninths of the
63cost of the Pacific cable. After three months without
official confirmation of the Canadian offer, the Australian and New 
Zealand agents-general were directed to appeal to Chamberlain for 
action from the Imperial government. The agents-general confirmed 
the willingness of their colonies to guarantee four-ninths of the 
cost of the cable on 30 March 1899, as well as that portion of any 
deficiency. Further,
... having regard for the number of years during which this 
project has been under the consideration of both the 
Imperial Government and of the colonies, we request that 
you will be pleased to take such steps as may be necessary 
in order to obtain as soon as possible a definite assurance 
that the Imperial Government will unite with the colonies 
in giving the requisite guarantee.64
The colonial office replied by informing the colonies that the 
report of the Imperial committee on the Pacific cable was about to 
be published in London, and that the decision of the government 
would be forthcoming. It was added that publication of the report 
was not to be interpreted as acceptance of the proposals by the 
British government.65
The colonial office was at last informed in late April 
officially of Canada's desire to join in the working of the Pacific 
cable. The Canadian legislation put forward by Laurier called for
63. High Commissioner for Canada to Colonial Office, 22 
December 1898, Canada (No. 51), op. cit., p.61.
64. Agents-General to Colonial Office, 30 March 1899, New
Zealand Pari. Paps., 1899, op. cit., p.23. The
agent-general for New South Wales was not a signatory.
65. Strathcona to Cartwright, 12 April 1899, Canada, (No. 
51), op. cit., p.52.
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the establishment of a board of commissioners, under the authority 
of the British parliament. The board was to be charged with 
securing funds for the construction and working of a cable for the 
"benefit of the respective Governments sharing in the 
undertaking." For its part, Canada was willing to supply
five-eighteenths of the principal, and accept similar portion of any 
loss. By agreeing to co-operate with the southern colonies, the 
Canadian administration complied with the colonial office request 
for a definite proposal. The fact that the requests for an Imperial 
decision were separate did not detract from their significance. The 
Imperial authorities could no longer claim a lack of concerted 
colonial opinion on the cable, and were forced to address the 
question in a decisive manner.
Ill
The unified call for a Pacific cable advanced the proposition 
significantly. However, the scheme still faced great difficulties 
in London. Despite Chamberlain's forceful personality, the colonial 
office was not the only department overseeing British interests
abroad. Ronald Hyam has pointed out that in the Victorian era at
«
least six departments were concerned with overseas policy:
... the foreign office, the India office, the war office, 
the admiralty, the board of trade and the colonial office - 
and for much of the nineteenth century the last was almost 
the least important.^
Although Chamberlain supported the concept of closer ties between 
England and her colonies, the idea did not necessarily have favour
66. Ibid, p.53.
67. Ronald Hyam, Britain's Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A 
Study of Empire and Expansion. London, 1976, p.19.
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with his cabinet colleagues. It has been shown that opposition to
the Pacific cable by the admiralty played a large part in the early
attitudes of the Imperial government. When the discussion had
neared a conclusion, and the time had come to pay for the cable, it
was the treasury that intervened in a negative manner.
Writing about the relationship between Chamberlain and the
treasury, Robert Kubicek has suggested that,
If the Colonial Office under Chamberlain dropped its 
long-held inclination to avoid new overseas 
responsibilities and reduce expenses in the existing 
empire, the tradition of non-involvement and economy was 
carried on by the Treasury.^®
Treasury control over spending gave that department a unique power
over government policy. Lord Salisbury noted that "much delay and
many doubtful resolutions have been the result of the peculiar
position which, through many generations, the treasury has
69occupied." In the case of the Pacific cable, the reluctance 
of the treasury to commit the government came close to delaying the 
plans indefinitely.
Chamberlain had already, on 28 April 1899, outlined to the High 
Commissioner and the agents-general the extent to which the Imperial 
government was willing to assist in the creation of a Pacific 
cable. He pointed out that it had always been the opinion of the 
Imperial government that the scheme was of greater importance to 
Canada, New Zealand and the Australian colonies. Although keen to 
support the interested governments, Great Britain could not agree to
68. Robert Kubicek, The Administration of Imperialism: 
Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office. Durham N.C., 
1969, p.91.
69. Ibid, p.90.
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actively take part in laying and working the Pacific cable 70
Instead, it was proposed that Canada and the various southern 
colonies be responsible for the construction and working of the 
cable, with aid from the Imperial government taking the form of an 
annual subsidy. This method had "hitherto been adopted by 
Parliament in promoting the establishment of important lines of 
telegraphic communication."^ The subsidy was to exist for
twenty years, and meet five-eighteenths of any deficiency, but it 
was not to exceed £20,000 per annum.
Attached to this "liberal arrangement" were certain
conditions. Firstly, the cable was to be constructed with materials
approved by the treasury, and laid in proper working order to the
satisfaction of an officer appointed by the treasury, with adequate
stations and offices at such places as the treasury might approve.
Secondly, the treasury was to have the power to approve cable rates,
with official messages from the Imperial government having priority
over all others, and being transmitted at not more than one-half the
tariff for ordinary messages. Finally, the treasury was to be
supplied with an annual account, showing the cable's receipts and 
72expenditures. By following past principles, and treating the 
interested governments as a private company, the Imperial 
authorities hoped to eliminate the possibility of aggravating the 
existing cable companies. At the same time, the proposal offered "a
70. Chamberlain to Lord Minto, 26 April 1899, Canada, (No. 
51), op. cit., p.53.
71. Colonial Office to Agents-General and High Commissioner 
for Canada, 28 April 1899. Pari. Paps., 1899, Vol. LIX, 
Cd 9283, p.4.
72. Idem.
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proof of their cordial desire to co-operate with the colonial
governments in any undertaking of general concern, even though the 
colonial interest in the matter may be more direct and
4. *73apparent.
Colonial condemnation of this Imperial offer was swift and
comprehensive. In Australia, the colonial premiers cabled their
distress. Dissatisfaction was unanimous. But just what alternate
course the colonies should take was unclear. Duffy suggested that a
conference of the postmasters-general be called immediately, to
74emphasise colonial protest to the proposal. When a conference
could not be arranged, it was decided to authorise the various
colonial agents-general in London to express the "great
disappointment" felt in the colonies, and to urge the Imperial
government to reconsider its position.
In responding to the Imperial government's offer of a subsidy 
the agents-general and Strathcona argued that it had always been 
held that the construction and operation of the cable would be a 
joint undertaking. The main objective of the scheme was to unite 
component parts of the Empire telegraphically, with all the 
interested parties involved equally. The colonial representatives 
remonstrated:
If, as we believe, the cable cannot fail to promote 
Imperial unity, and Her Majesty's Government share that
73. Idem.
74. Duffy to Parkes, 11 May 1899, New South Wales Pari.
Paps., 1900, op. cit., p.45. Varney Parkes, the son of 
Sir Henry, replaced Cook as the New South Wales
postmaster-general on 26 August 1898.
75. Reid to the Premiers of Victoria, Queensland and New 
Zealand, 20 May 1899, idem.
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opinion, the proposal certainly seems to justify the 
principle of joint ownership and control, which has formed 
the key-note of the discussions and negotiations for so 
many years.76
Citing the report of the Pacific cable committee, it was further
noted that its recommendation was for the cable to be "constructed
77and owned by the interested governments." The terms offered
by the Imperial government clearly contradicted this recommendation.
By not agreeing to join in with the colonies, and only offering
an annual subsidy, the Imperial government was adding to the
possibility of a deficit. Without the involvement of Great Britain,
the colonies would be forced to raise capital at a higher rate of
interest, and thus increase annual expenses. Also, Fleming argued
that the proposed subisdy would be of no value in view of the 1897
committee estimates. The committee had anticipated that if rates
remained unchanged, the Pacific cable would make a profit of between
78£13,000 and £40,000 in its first year of operation. Taking
into account the predicted reduction of rates, the line would have a
deficit of £12,000 in its first year and thereafter become
self-sufficient. Consequently, in Fleming's words,
The offer then is that under a certain contingency the 
treasury may be called upon to pay five-eighteenths of 
£12,000 for one year only, and for this possible payment 
the Imperial government could claim priority of 
transmission and half price on all messages for an 
indefinite number of years.7^
76. Agents-General and High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 
9 May 1899, Pari. Paps., 1900, Vol. LV, Cd 46, p.3.
77. Idem.
78. Fleming to The British People, 5 May 1899, Canada, (No. 
51), op. cit., p.56.
79. Ibid, p.57.
187
The old campaigner predicted that the present situation, if not 
reconsidered, would be regarded in the colonies as a breach of a 
"common understanding", and an "attempt to retard the expansion and 
cripple the commerce of the Empire in the interest of a few rich 
monopolists.
The contention of the British authorities, that the line was of
greater importance to the colonies, was also debatable in the
colonial view. The cable would provide Great Britain with an
alternative 'all-red' route to her Eastern possessions, as well as
with the prestige of constructing the first cable in the Pacific.
According to Fleming, Canada was not motivated by self-interest in
the matter but, rather, by her "great zeal for Imperial
unity." An examination of the annual trade figures with
Australia and New Zealand bear this out. The total trade between
Great Britain and the colonies during the years 1895 to 1897
amounted to £53,168,642 - while during the corresponding period,
trade between Canada and the antipodes was approximately
82£190,000.
The agents-general and the High Commissioner now met with
Chamberlain on 15 May (1899) to voice colonial disapproval with the 
Imperial government's proposal. They urged that the recommendations 
of the Pacific cable committee be acted upon immediately. The 
primary desire of the colonial representatives was to secure the
80. Ibid, p.55.
81. Ibid, p.57.
82. Fleming to R.W. Scott, 15 May 1899, ibid, p.63.
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credit of Great Britian to raise the necessary capital. They
strongly argued that the co-operation of the Imperial government
was to be expected, considering Great Britain's "position at the
head of the E m p i r e . F i n a l l y ,  on 6 June, Chamberlain informed
the colonies that his government "appreciated the sentiments" which
motivated them to ask Great Britain for closer co-operation.
Accordingly, the Imperial government was willing to utilise its
, . .  ^85credit to assist in raising the capital required.
Colonial representatives again met with Chamberlain and Sir 
Michael Hicks Beach, the chancellor of the exchequer, on 4 July, to 
establish guidelines for the formation of a Pacific cable board. 
Comprised of eight members - three appointed by the Imperial 
government, three by Australia and New Zealand and two by Canada - 
the board was responsible for calling for tenders and finding the 
capital required to construct the cable. This about-face by the 
colonial office and the treasury was directly related to the 
overwhelming pressure of colonial disapproval of the original 
proposal.
IV
The news that the British government had at last agreed to 
assist the colonial governments in establishing a Pacific telegraph
83. Agents-General and High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 
18 May 1899, Pari. Paps., Cd 46, op, cit., p.9.
84. Idem.
85. Colonial Office to the High Commissioner, 6 June 1899, 
ibid, p.12. The colonial office was not gracious in 
admitting it had misread colonial opinion. It was stated 
that, "Her Majesty's Government are unable to admit that 
their previous offer was other than fair, and even 
generous, they feel the force of the considerations based 
upon higher grounds than mere commercial expediency."
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service raised the wrath of the Eastern Extension Company.
Following the death of Sir John Pender, the chairmanship of the
associated companies passed to the Marquess of Tweeddale. The
colonial office proposal, to provide a guarantee against any loss
encountered by the Pacific cable, moved Tweeddale to complain
vigorously to the British Prime Minister, then Lord Salisbury. In a
letter of 17 May 1899, Tweeddale claimed that he did not wish to
question the Imperial government's right to promote the interests of
the Empire. But, the offer of a guarantee was at variance with his
Company's interpretation of British policy. Moreover, he argued
that previously the British post and telegraph department had acted
86upon "the principle of alliance". In his view, there was no
difference between a policy of subsidising colonial governments to
conduct competition, and the British government directly opposing
the material gain of its citizens.
The Eastern and the Eastern Extension Companies had invested
millions of pounds of British capital, at considerable risk, without
87financial aid from the government. Should the government
enter into direct competition with the allied companies, they would 
be forced to claim compensation, because of the "unfairness on the 
part of the British Government in contravention of all
86. Tweeddale to Salisbury, 17 May 1899, Pari. Paps., 1900, 
Vol. LV, Cd, 46, p.7.
87. This is true of the Eastern and Eastern Extension 
Companies. However, the Eastern and South African 
Telegraph Company was granted a subsidy to connect South 
Africa with Great Britain in 1879. See Barty-King, op. 
cit., p.70.
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precedents." Tweeddale further urged Salisbury to reconsider 
his ministry's position, by ironically reminding a Victorian of the 
principles of laissez faire:
In this country, whose prosperity has been built up by the 
energy of private enterprise, I venture to hope that Your 
Lordship will not sanction any deviation from the important 
principle of non-competition by the State with private
enterprise.
Tweeddale then neglected his earlier contention that the Company was
loath to request any state aid, and repeated the offer to lay a Cape
cable, and thus provide an alternate route to Australia and the
90East, "on very moderate terms".
Tweeddale argued that the Cape route was superior to the
proposed Pacific line, both strategically and commercially. He
criticised the arguments in favour of the Pacific line on commercial
grounds, saying telegraph business between North America and the
'Australasian' colonies amounted to only five per cent of the total
traffic. It was clear to Tweeddale that the primary incentive of
the pro-Pacific forces in Australia was the anticipated reduction in
tariff. The Eastern Extension Company had lowered the ordinary
charge from 9s. 4d. per word to 4s. in May 1891, and was quite
willing to maintain that rate. However, the Australian colonies
found the price of a low tariff still too expensive, and requested
the Company increase the rate to 4s. 9d., to ease the burden of the 
L 91guarantee charges.
88. Tweeddale to Salisbury, op. cit., p.8.
89. Idem.
90. Idem. The offer of a guarantee in support of the Pacific 
cable was less than the Eastern companies originally 
requested to lay a third Cape cable.
91. Ibid, p.7.
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When it was later learned that the credit of the British
government was to be used to finance the Pacific project, Tweeddale
demanded an immediate meeting with Chamberlain and Sir Michael Hicks
Beach. A contingent representing the Eastern Extension Company duly
aired their grave misgivings on 29 June in regard to the
interference of the State in the sphere of private enterprise.
Hicks Beach argued that the Eastern Extension Company had received
subsidies in the past, and that the contention that the State had
92not previously financed submarine cables was preposterous. As
to the claim by the Company for compensation, the chancellor deemed
it unjustifiable in view of its monopoly of the existing telegraphic
93communications between Australia and England.
Chamberlain was somewhat more conciliatory. He noted the great
service the Company had rendered to the British government over the
years, but he was anxious that "hardly any critical situation arose
at the Cape, but that one or more of the cables were broken 
94down." That aside, the service to Australia in recent years 
had proven satisfactory. What the colonies deemed particularly 
unsatisfactory were the transmission rates charged by the Eastern 
Extension Company. The associated companies had been paying a seven 
per cent dividend, as well as accumulating an enormous reserve fund 
which disguised their true financial position. In view of the 
combined companies' profit margin, it was not surprising that the 
colonies desired an alternate route under
92. The Times (London), 30 June 1899.
93. Idem.
94. Idem.
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their control This was not, however, the aim of the Imperial
government. Rather, they were moved by a desire to meet the wishes 
of their colonies and to establish an 'all-British' telegraph route 
connecting the various component parts of the Empire.
If the Company received scant sympathy from Hicks Beach and
Chamberlain in person, its case was further eroded by a despatch
from the colonial office. The correspondence addressed the
"principle of alliance" between private and public interests which
95Tweeddale emphasised so strongly to Salisbury. It was the
opinion of the colonial office that no fast rules or formulae
existed to govern the extent or direction of state involvement in
services of public utility. The communique stated that,
With the progressive development of society, the tendency 
is to enlarge the functions and widen the sphere of action 
of the central Government, as well as of the local 
authorities, and to claim for them more or less exclusive 
use of powers and the performance of services, where the 
desired end is difficult to attain through private 
enterprise or where the result of entrusting such powers 
and services to private enterprise would be, detrimental to 
the public interest.^6
The Pacific cable scheme was one that could be achieved on better
terms by the associated governments acting in concert than by a
private enterprise. The fact that the project would infringe upon
the exclusive operation of the Eastern Extension Company in the
Australian colonies and New Zealand was unfortunate. However, the
Company had received over one million pounds sterling from the
colonial governments which went far toward covering the original
97outlay by the Company.
95. Colonial Office to the Eastern Extension Company, 10 July 
1899, Pari. Paps., 1900, op. cit., p.26.
96. Idem.
97. Ibid, p.29.
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Although the completion of a Pacific service would have the
two-fold benefit of bringing Canada and Australia together
telegraphically, and of reducing the cost of telegraphic
communication, the project involved another variable of greater
significance to the Imperial authorities. The British government
had decided to support the scheme unreservedly because the colonies
deeply desired its co-operation. Having received these appeals it
was "the duty of Her Majesty's Government to respect Colonial
feeling, the more so as it is the first time in the history of the
Empire that two great Colonial groups have approached Her Majesty's
Government with a view to a joint undertaking for the furtherance of
98commercial, political and social relations."
The colonial governments had done a great deal to promote the 
idea of closer ties within the Empire. Although not a quantum leap 
toward the creation of any rigid institutional bonds, the 
co-operation of the component parts of the Empire was a peace-time 
precedent. However, the formation of this Imperial partnership did 
not automatically assure the success of the Pacific cable. The 
Eastern Extension Company was not daunted by the creation of a 
government board, or the snub by the colonial office, and it 
continued actively to protect its interest in 'Australasian' 
telegraph business. The monopoly still had one more card to play. 
With the help of ministry changes and federation in Australia, the 
Eastern Extension Company was given the time it needed to disrupt an 
Imperial partnership.
98. Ibid, p.27.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE "ADELAIDE AGREEMENT" AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 1899.
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The decision of the British government to join with Canada, New 
Zealand and the Australian colonies in operating a Pacific cable 
ensured the eventual completion of the project. However, the 
agreement reached on 4 July, 1899, did not eliminate delay or curb 
the opposition of the Eastern Extension Company. After the call for 
the establishment of a provisional Pacific cable board, matters 
continued to move slowly. The initial delay was caused by only 
three delegates being accredited as representatives of the four 
interested southern colonies. The resolve of those colonies to 
accelerate the situation was then lessened by a further proposal 
from the Eastern Extension Company.
The problem with nominating only three delegates was that all
the interested parties desired separate representation. In an
attempt quickly to solve the impasse, the premiers of Victoria and
New South Wales cabled their agents-general in London instructing
them to urge the colonial office to increase the membership of the
board.^ Of all the interested colonies, Queensland seemed the
most likely to be left unrepresented, as it had been on the Pacific
cable committee in 1896. Consequently, that colony pushed hardest
to have the board enlarged. In a letter to the colonial office, of
15 August, the agent-general for Queensland stated flatly that,
As New Zealand, by its isolated position, will 
unquestionably claim one, it would almost follow that 
Queensland would have to give way to the older Colonies of 
New South Wales and Victoria. In view of the fact that 
Queensland will be the Australian terminus, and that their 
contribution on the basis of population largely exceeds 
that of any of the other sections, it is not considered
1. Reid to Agent-General, 3 August 1899, New South Wales 
Pari. Paps., 1900, op, cit., Government of Victoria to 
the Agent-General, (received 15 August 1899), Pari. 
Paps., 1900, op. cit., p.35.
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wise in the interests of the scheme that Queensland shall 
be without a direct representative.2
Regardless of the forceful argument for reopening the discussions on
representation, the colonial office considered the matter closed,
and it rejected the Australian appeals. Chamberlain explained his
reluctance to reopen the question by declaring that such a move
3would leave the project "seriously prejudiced".
Limited to only three delegates, the interested premiers set
about devising an equitable formula for selection. James Dickson,
the Queensland premier, suggested that New South Wales and
Queensland designate one nominee, Victoria and New Zealand choose
4another, and the third be agreed upon by the first two. The 
New Zealand premier, R.J. Seddon, took immediate exception to the 
proposal and, instead, hoped that the three Australian colonies 
would concede a separate representative to New Zealand and decide 
the last two amongst themselves.^ Sir George Turner, the
Victorian premier, also rejected the system broached by Dickson, and 
rather took the advice of his postmaster-general, Duffy, who 
suggested that the best course would be a small local conference to 
decide the issue unaminously.
Certainly a conference would be more suitable than separate 
negotiations via the telegraph. Seddon concurred with Turner's
2. Agent-General for Queensland to Colonial Office, 15 
August 1899, ibid, p.37.
3. Chamberlain to Colonial Governor's, 9 August 1899, ibid, 
p. 34.
4. Reid to Turner, 16 August 1899, New South Wales Pari. 
Paps., 1900, op. cit., p.52.
5. Seddon to Reid, 17 August 1899, ibid, p.52.
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proposition, and suggested that the meeting be held in New
Zealand.6 However, due to the various legislatures being in
session, the idea was deferred. With a local conference apparently
impractical, Seddon proposed that the agents-general of New South
Wales, Victoria and New Zealand be appointed, if Dickson was
agreeable, and the business of the board could get underway
immediately. This was unacceptable to Queensland. Instead, it was
agreed that New Zealand be alotted one delegate, and a ballot be
7held with two of the three Australian nominees being selected.
Finally, on 28 September, 1899, nearly three months after the
colonial office had called for delegates, the agents-general of New
South Wales and Victoria won the ballot, and Queensland was again
8without representation.
Further delaying complications now arose. At a crucial point
in the negotiations to select delegates for the provisional Pacific
cable board, a change of ministry took place in New South Wales.
The Reid ministry fell on 13 September and Willian Lyne took over
the premiership. W.P. Crick, the newly-appointed
postmaster-general, was forced immediately to familiarise himself
gwith the details of the cable debate. Unable to convince
6. Seddon to Turner, 21 August 1899, New Zealand Pari. 
Paps., 1900, F-8, p.22.
7. Turner to Lyne, 20 September 1899, and Lyne to Turner, 27 
September 1899, New South Wales Pari. Paps., 1900, op. 
cit., pp.54-55.
8. Turner to Lyne, 20 September 1899, and Lyne to Turner, 27 
September 1899, New South Wales Pari. Paps., 1900, op. 
cit., pp.54-55.
9. A staunch protectionist, Crick was first elected to the
(Footnote continued to page 199)
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successive postmaster-generals of the Reid government that the 
Pacific project was economic 'madness', the permanent officials of 
the general post office set about 'luring' Crick to the cause of the 
Eastern Extension Company.
Their efforts were assisted by a new and lucrative offer from 
the Company. Certain that the proposed Pacific cable was soon to be 
a reality, the Eastern Extension Company moved to forestall the 
impact of the pending competitor upon its share of the Australian 
telegraph market. The acting agent for the Company in Melbourne had 
already approached the Victorian government on 24 July with a 
proposal to lay a cable from the Cape to Australia for nothing. The 
offer had stated,
As public opinion in Victoria apparently favours an 
alternative cable via the Cape rather than the Pacific ... 
we are willing to meet the difficulty by making the 
following liberal concessions, namely, we will entirely 
waive the renewal of the subsidy and guarantee against 
competition, and, in addtion to providing a cable all the 
way to Glenelg, via Perth, will agree to at once reduce the 
tariff to 4s., and make further reductions on a sliding 
scale as traffic increases.10
All the Company desired, in return, was the right to establish 
offices in Perth, Adelaide, and Melbourne to collect and distribute
(Footnote continued from page 198)
legislative assemby in 1889. He was instrumental in the 
defeat of the 'free trade' government in 1899 and was 
rewarded with the position of postmaster-general. After 
the formation of the Commonwealth, and the elimination of 
the colonial postmaster-general's department, he became 
minister without portfolio before moving to lands. 
Unpopular in the assembly, he resigned on 6 December, 
1906, and was formally expelled 5 days later. The final 
insult came on 23 August, 1907, when his name was struck 
from the rolls. A heavy drinker, he died from cirrhosis 
of the liver in 1908. Australian Dictionary of 
Biography. Vol.8, p.150.
10. Squier to Duffy, 24 July 1899, ibid, pp.4-5.
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international telegrams. To facilitate this procedure the Company 
required exclusive use of an inland wire for which an annual rent
Hwould be paid.
This last offer was not transmitted to New South Wales by the
Company until 31 August. That communication expanded upon the
sliding scale already broached. The Company declared that, should
the total receipts of 1898, 1899 and 1900 average £350,000, the 4s.
tariff would be reduced to 3s. 6d. on 1 January, 1901. If receipts
were maintained at £350,000 over the three-year period between 1899
12and 1901, the rate would be lowered to 3s. per word in 1902.
If revenue remained stable during the next three-year term, the 
tariff would fall to 2s. 6d. by 1903. The Company stated further
that the Cape-to-Britain section of the cable was in manufacture,
and the whole line would be in place and operating within two
13years. However, should the colonies agree to the stipulation
to allow the Company direct access to the public, the tariff
reduction would immediately become effective.
It is evident that the Eastern Extension Company was gravely 
concerned about competing with a state-run submarine telegraph 
service. By demanding the opportunity to solicit its own business, 
the Company was attempting to by-pass the possibility of the various 
Australian post offices sending the majority of the international 
traffic over the Pacific line. The new proposal was not presented 
to either New Zealand or Queensland. This was presumably thought
11. Idem.
12. Eastern Extension Company, Second proposal submitted by 
acting manager to S.H. Lambton, 31 August 1899, ibid, p.6.
13. Idem.
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futile, given that the Pacific cable would have landing stations in 
these colonies and also because of their antagonistic position 
toward the Company.
Although the new proposal provided for rate reductions to as low
as 2s. 6d. per word, it was doubtful in 1899 that the tariff would
go that low. Should the Pacific service be established in 1902, the
Company's base revenue of £350,000 would not be realised in 1903.
Consequently, the tariff would remain at 3s. per word. As the
projected rate for the Pacific cable was 3s., the Company would have
been forced to reduce its rates to that level, just to compete with
the new line. By proposing to lower the tariff gradually prior to
the completion of the Pacific cable, the Company was able to appear
philanthropic. At the same time, it could ready the ground for
competition by usurping the power of the post offices in the two
largest markets in Australia —  Sydney and Melbourne.
The Company's request to open bureaux in Australia would allow
it to provide rebates to heavy cable users at the expense of the
Pacific cable. This was overlooked by the press in Melbourne and
Sydney. The Sydney Daily Telegraph embraced the Cape scheme,
claiming that it would be complementary to the Pacific line. It was
even argued in an editorial that,
If the public mind of Britain, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand does not undergo an astonishing change within the 
next few weeks, the Pacific cable will be eventually laid 
... Therefore, no alternative proposal can be considered 
.. • But there is no reason why a cable company of such 
assured stability as this should not be allowed to lay 
another cable, or many other cables, by different routes, 
because the Pacific line will naturally be expected to 
withstand competition, not to be entirely a thread of 
sympathy.^
14. Daily Telegraph, 3 October 1899.
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The press was self interested in all this: anxious to avail 
themselves of the promised rate reductions, they pushed Crick hard 
to accept the Company's offer.
Duffy arrived in Sydney on 4 October to discuss the situation
with Crick. The Victorian postmaster-general was conscious of the
potential effect which the new Cape plan might have upon the Pacific
service, and he recommended to Crick that they ask the Company to
guarantee that no rebates or concessions would be offered to the
general p u b l i c . T h e  Daily Telegraph took immediate exception
to the request, and harshly criticised the two postmasters-general
for placing the Pacific cable before the interests of the public:
the Victorian and New South Wales Postmasters-General have 
in conference, come to the extraordinary decision that if 
the Eastern Extension Company's proposal to lay a cable via 
the Cape is officially recognised, there must be no 
undercutting of rates which would affect business on the 
Pacific line ... That is a remarkable position for the 
Postmasters-General to assume ... which means that users of 
the cable are expected to pay highly for the privilege of 
having a second cable when they could pay less, and have 
increased facilities, if a third was laid.16
With growing local press support, the Company replied that it had
made all the concessions it could to meet the colonies' wishes and
must retain a free hand over the tariff "so that if necessary they
17can reduce them to the lowest possible limit."
By 19 October Crick was able to wire Duffy in Melbourne 
informing him that he had been in contact with the Company's
15. Duffy and Crick to the Eastern Extension Company, 5 
October 1899, New South Wales Pari, Paps., 1900, op. ci^ t., p. 7.
16. Daily Telegraph, 10 October 1899.
17. Eastern Extension Company to Crick, 8 October 1899, New 
South Wales Pari. Paps., 1900, op. cit., p.8.
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Australian representative, and he had been assured that it was not
intended to increase the rate should the minimum traffic level not 
18be achieved. Consequently, he was of the opinion that the
Company's offer could not be improved upon, and he was prepared to
recommend his colony accept the proposal. Duffy replied that he
felt any agreement with the Company should be made by all the
colonies interested in the Pacific route, not "separately and
19without the knowledge of the others." He argued that several
questions raised by the Company's proposal would be better addressed
directly to the board of directors in London. As a result, Victoria
desired to place the whole question before the Australian delegates
. 2 0to the Pacific cable board for their recommendation.
New Zealand and Queensland also voiced opposition to New South
Wales entering into an agreement with the Eastern Extension
Company. Informed of New South Wales' intentions, Seddon
accordingly wired to Lyne in Sydney,
Understand strong pressure been brought bear to grant 
concessions to Eastern Telegraph Company. To do so would 
materially affect colonies guaranteeing Pacific cable, and, 
if conceded, New Zealand will hold itself free consider 
situation, for inevitable that concessions, if granted, 
will increase contributions from Pacific cableguarantors.21
Queensland would be unable to air its disapproval in London as it 
was not represented on the Pacific cable board. However, in a 
letter to J.S. Larke, Dickson stated that "this fact will not deter
18. Crick to Duffy, 19 October 1899, ibid, p.8.
19. Duffy to Crick, 20 October 1899, ibid, p.8.
20. Idem.
21. Seddon to Lyne, 25 October 1899, New Zealand Pari. Paps., 
1900, op. cit., p.28.
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the Government from discountenancing any movement which might tend
22to delay or embarrass the consummation of that scheme.
Crick was unmoved by the protests of the other colonies
23 . .interested in the Pacific cable. He argued that the Pacific
cable board was not authorised to deal with the Eastern Extension
Company's scheme. He therefore proposed to submit the case to the
24colonial office and be guided by its opinion. The
agent-general for New South Wales was accordingly instructed (on 23
October) to obtain the views of the Imperial government regarding
the recent plan to lay a cable from the Cape colony to Australia.
It was further stated that New South Wales desired to accept the
25offer, should the British authorities have no objection. The
agent-general replied (4 November) indicating that Chamberlain saw 
no objection to accepting the Company's scheme, provided the 
colonial government insist upon the route being made 'all-British'
22. Dickson to Larke, 25 October 1899, Larke Papers, National 
Library of Australia, MS 598.
23. Crick was under tremendous pressure from the press - see 
Daily Telegraph, 11 and 17 October 1899 - as well as from 
the commercial community. The Eastern Extension Company 
submitted its proposal to the Chambers of Commerce in 
Newcastle and Sydney. On 2 October 1899, the Newcastle 
organisation approved the proposal while on 4 October the 
Sydney Chamber stated, "That while still strongly 
advocating the proposed construction of the Pacific cable 
this Chamber considers that the proposal now put forward 
by the Eastern Extension Company, for the establishment 
of a Bureau is one which should be adopted, believing 
that it will be to the immediate benefit of those using 
the cables both in the matter of cost, and facilities for 
doing the business." Precis Relating to Cable Subsidies 
and Guarantees... p.18. Telecom Archives, Sydney.
24. Crick to Duffy, 21 October 1899, New South Wales Pari. 
Paps., 1900, op. cit., p.8.
25. Lyne to Agent-General, 23 October 1899, ibid, p.9.
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and that the landing places be approved by British military
. . 26 authorities.
Responding to the negotiations between Crick, Duffy and the
Eastern Extension Company, the postmaster-general of Queensland,
James G. Drake, revealed the true aim of the Company. In a
Memorandum of 12 October he quoted Tweeddale to the effect that the
Company's shareholders could rest assured that "no stone would be
27left unturned to prevent a Pacific cable being laid." Drake
deplored the news that New South Wales and Victoria were preparing
to come to terms with the Company. He argued that granting any
concession to the monopoly, at such a crucial stage for the Pacific
cable, was "antagonistic to the object sought to be obtained by the
28promoters of that cable." In his opinion, the governments of
New South Wales and Victoria had lost sight of the main aim of a
trans-Pacific telegraph, which was to break down "a gigantic and
29unscrupulous monopoly."
Sir George Turner's suggestion, that the matter be turned over 
to the 'Australasian' delegates on the Pacific cable board, was of 
little solace to Queensland. Without a representative on the board, 
it appeared to Dickson and Drake that New South Wales and Victoria 
were merely seeking sanction from their own agents-general to alter
26. Agent-General to Lyne, 4 November 1899, ibid, p.9.
27. Report of the Post and Telegraph Department of Queensland 
for the Year 1899, p.74.
28. Idem.
29. Idem.
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the conditions of the Pacific cable. This assumption was
unfounded, as the Turner administration, spearheaded by Duffy,
genuinely desired to protect the interests of the Pacific 
31line. As New Zealand was on record as opposing any
concessions to the Eastern Extension Company, the weak link was New
South Wales, which had a new ministry, out of power for five years,
and anxious to win the support of the commercial electorate.
Armed with support from the colonial office, Crick sought to
terminate negotiations and ratify an agreement with the Company. He
requested Lyne to cable Queensland and Victoria (22 November)
declining to refer the question to the Pacific cable board and
stating that New South Wales favoured to accept the Company's 
32overture. Acting on these instructions, S.H. Lambton sent a 
message to the Company's agent asking if the reduced tariff would be
30. Dickson cabled both Turner and Lyne consenting to the 
question being presented to the local delegates on the 
Pacific cable board on 17 November 1899. However, he 
only concurred with the suggestion because he understood 
that New South Wales and Victoria were strongly in favour 
of that course of action, and was not then aware that the 
Lyne administration favoured dealing directly with the 
colonial office. Ibid, p.72.
31. Upon hearing of Crick's intention to by-pass the
provisional board, Victoria communicated with New South 
Wales urging patience. Duffy argued that the Australian 
representatives were in the best position to ascertain 
the views of Canada and Britain on the subject. He
warned that "We are drifting into a most unfortunate 
position in this affair, owing to the fact that the 
question has never been properly discussed by the
Colonies interested. The future of the Pacific cable 
scheme is involved, and if we are not careful, we will 
play into the hand of the worst enemies of that scheme." 
Turner to Lyne, 24 November 1899, Minute of the 
Postmaster-General to the Premier, New South Wales Pari, 
Paps., op. cit., p.15.
32. Precis Relating to Cable Subsidies and Guarantees...
p.23. Telecom Archives, Sydney.
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effective immediately, and if the Company was prepared to commence
at once the rental of a post office land line. Surprisingly, the
agent replied that his Company had decided to allow the new
Victorian administration time to consider the plan before
33entertaining that of New South Wales. In its 'gluttony', the
Eastern Extension Company preferred to 'snare' both Victoria and New 
South Wales, and it assumed that affronting the latter would not 
affect that goal.
II
As much as the decision of the Imperial government to
co-operate with Canada, New Zealand and the Australian colonies on
the Pacific cable scheme was a resounding triumph, Sir Sandford
34Fleming had misgivings. His doubts centred on the plan to
allow the four southern colonies only three representatives on the 
provisional Pacific cable board. In a prescient letter to Sir
Wilfrid Laurier, dated 5 September, 1899, Fleming foreshadowed 
subsequent events:
It is a mere detail, but a detail which, to my mind, 
appeared of very great importance, as it involved delay, 
and delays are always dangerous ... so far as I know, no 
progress has been made towards constituting the Board up to 
the present date. Meanwhile the Eastern Extension Company 
is displaying great activity in Australia. Its agents are 
doing everything in their power to prolong the delay. 5^
33. Squier to Crick, 8 December 1899, New South Wales Pari. 
Paps., 1900, op. cit., p.10.
34. Fleming was created K.C.M.G. in 1897. MacMillan
Dictionary of Canadian Biography. p.236. For further 
biographical information on Fleming see Lawrence J. 
Burpee, Sandford Fleming: Empire Builder. London, 1915.
35. Fleming to Laurier, 5 September 1899, New Zealand Pari. 
Paps., 1900, op. cit., p.33.
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Two days after the conference between Chamberlain, Hicks Beach and
the interested colonial representatives, in July 1899, Fleming had
arrived in London accompanied by the Canadian minister of public
works. They had been dispatched by the Canadian government to
attend the conference, and to urge the British representatives to
join in the Pacific cable project. Fleming remained in London for
five weeks, awaiting the first meeting of the proposed board of
enquiry. Had Chamberlain conceeded four delegates to the antipodes,
it would have been feasible to constitute the board immediately, and
possibly to forestall the designs of the Eastern Extension Company.
However, Fleming could do nothing to reverse the inaction of
the governments involved, and instead took steps to lessen the
impact of the Eastern Extension Company's proposal. In a letter to
Sir George Turner, of 14 September, Fleming argued that the plan to
lay a cable across the Indian Ocean from the Cape to Australia was
of great importance to the Empire. The route suggested by the
Company was identical to the one advocated by Fleming as the second
36link in a state-controlled chain of electric cables. He
argued, to Turner, that any agreement entered into with the Eastern
Extension Company carry the proviso that the governments concerned
37have the right to take possession of the line. He stated
further,
it is essential that these cables should eventually come 
under Government control. The public interests demand that 
in order to secure the cheapest telegraph transmission, the
36. See Fleming to Chamberlain, 28 October 1899, Canada, 
Sessional Papers, (No.51), 1899, p.26.
37. Fleming to Turner, 14 September 1899, Larke Papers, op. 
cit.
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greatest development of commerce, and the greatest freedom 
of intercourse throughout the Empire, the system of cables 
contemplated should be the property of the State. °
Fleming was attempting to take the initiative from the Company, and 
to redirect the developments to his own proposition, of a set of 
state-operated cables.
The idea of reserving for the state the right to purchase
privately-owned cables was not unprecedented. As early as October
1893 the then secretary of state, the Marquis of Ripon, had
concluded an agreement with the Eastern Extension Company to lay a
second cable from Singapore to Hong Kong. A clause was inserted in
that contract stating plainly that
Her Majesty's Government shall have the option at any time 
of cancelling all the foregoing articles of this agreement, 
by giving to the Company twelve months' previous notice, 
and on payment to the Company of a sum of £300,000, being 
the estimated cost of laying such a second cable.39
A similar clause attached to the Cape cable would, with the Pacific 
line, make up two-thirds of a state-owned cable system around the 
world.
Conscious of the repercussions of such an eventuality, the
Eastern Extension Company was reluctant to enter into any similar
agreement. The Pacific cable was the beginning-of-the-end for the
40Eastern and associate companies. No effort was spared to
38. Idem.
39. Fleming to Laurier, 15 November 1899, New Zealand Pari.
Paps., 1900, op, cit., p.34. For copy of the Ripon
Agreement, see ibid, pp.70-71.
40. Hugh Barty-King argues that after Sir John Pender's
death, the leadership of the allied companies was
insufficient to stem the rising tide of state-run 
submarine cables. Referring to the threat of state
(Footnote continued to page 210)
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defeat it. Once the interested governments had decided to carry out 
the project, the Company manoeuvered to make the undertaking 
unprofitable. The profits of the Eastern Extension Company in
Australia could be sacrificed, as long as the Pacific cable became a 
white elephant. If the first attempt at government ownership of 
overseas communication was a failure, subsequent schemes would be 
less likely to develop.
By the time the provisional Pacific cable board finally held
its first meeting, on 14 December, the Company's offer had gained
wide public acceptance in Australia. Nor was the Company's position
jeopardised by the committee's terms of reference. The provisional
board was charged with ascertaining the cost of laying and operating
a Pacific cable, the rates to be charged, and the best means of
41administering the line upon its completion. All conclusions
were subject to the approval of the various contracting governments, 
while the Imperial government reserved exclusive control over the 
raising of necessary capital. Under these guidelines, the committee 
was precluded from addressing the Cape cable question unless it was 
put forward by the governments interested in the Pacific service.
(Footnote continued from page 209)
competition, he wrote, "The forces which opposed Eastern 
telegraph were formidable, but its second generation 
management were less capable of meeting them than the 
pioneers. They lacked the incentive to keep the momentum 
going in the direction the times demanded." See 
Barty-King, op. cit., p.149.
41. Instrument Appointing a Committee to Consider the Scheme 
suggested by the Committee of 1896. Pari. Paps., 1900, 
Cd. 46, op. cit., p.49. Joining Sir Julian Salomons of 
New South Wales, Sir Andrew Clarke of Victoria and W. 
Pember Reeves of New Zealand were Lord Strathcona and the 
Earl of Aberdeen representing Canada, Sir G.H. Murray, 
Lord Selborne, and Sir Francis Mowatt (Chairman) 
representing Great Britain.
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The Company also had the advantage of negotiating with new
administrations in Victoria and New South Wales. This benefit was
realised when the Australian colonial premiers met in conference in
Sydney, early in 1900. When the conference convened on 27 January
to discuss the latest proposal of the Company, three premiers were
still not associated with the Pacific scheme, and had come out in
favour of the Cape line; two were bound to a Pacific route, but
under pressure to agree to the Company's terms; and only one refused
42
to consider any cable other than the Pacific. The concensus 
reached earlier, on the subject of an Imperial 'partnership', was 
disintegrating fast on the very eve of its completion.
The success of the Company's latest tactic was evident even 
before the premiers' conference. Acting on instructions from
Melbourne, the Victorian agent-general distributed correspondence 
that had passed between the various colonial premiers to his peers 
in London - representing Queensland, New Zealand and New South 
Wales. Together they determined to review the issue with the High 
Commissioner for Canada. On 8 January 1900, all parties concerned, 
except the agent-general for New South Wales, concluded that 
acceptance of the Company's offer would seriously affect the
commercial success of the Pacific line, and that the proposition had
. . 43been made with that objective in view.
42. South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania favoured 
the Cape route, Victoria and N.S.W. were of two minds and 
Queensland was firm in its commitment to the Pacific 
cable. Not party to the federation of Australia, New 
Zealand was not invited to attend the conference. The 
case of Victoria is confused at this time only because of 
the change in government. Despite pressure from the 
Melbourne press, the new administration remained true to 
the Pacific cable cause.
43. Agent-General to Seddon, 13 January 1900, New Zealand 
Pari. Paps., 1900, op. cit., p.54.
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Before the conference opened, the Daily Telegraph had renewed
its crusade to convince Crick of the wisdom in agreeing to the
Company's terms. In an editorial of 23 January it argued that there
was no further reason for delay in reaching an agreement with the
Company. As Chamberlain had given his assent to the idea, the
views of the other interested parties carried little weight.
Earlier in the month, in a Memorandum to Lyne, Crick had stated that,
It is understood that the Governments of South Australia 
and Western Australia have accepted the Company's 
proposals; and I am disposed to advise the Government of 
this colony to do the same, on condition that it agrees to 
reduce the tariff at once as regards such colonies as 
accept the proposals ... We should thus secure an immediate 
reduction of rates without subsidy or guarantee, whilst 
under the most favourable circumstaces the Pacific cable 
could not be completed for at least three years.45
The former postmaster-general for New South Wales, Joseph Cook, took
exception to Crick's position. In a letter to the Daily Telegraph,
published on 25 January, he strongly criticised his handling of the
situation. In a leading editorial of the same date, the newspaper
belittled Cook's arguments, and it reiterated the immediate benefits
46that would result from a swift conclusion of the matter.
Opposition to accepting the Company's terms continued to pour
into Sydney prior to the conference. On 23 January the Canadian
premier wired Lyne to the effect that,
Would sincerely hope that project of Eastern Extension 
Company will not be accepted. Any kind of delay at this 
moment might be fatal.
44. Daily Telegraph, 23 January 1900.
45. Minute by the Postmaster-General to the Premier of
N.S.W. 11 January 1900, New South Wales Pari. Paps.,
1900 op. cit., p.15.
46. Daily Telegraph, 25 January 1900.
47. Laurier to the Australasian Premiers, 23 January 1900, 
New Zealand Pari. Paps., 1900 op. cit., p.57.
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The same day the premier of New Zealand cabled Sydney enquiring if
Lyne had received any recommendation from Chamberlain, and stated
that he considered acceptance of the scheme as a breach of faith, as
it must reduce the earnings and increase the liabilities of the
48
Pacific cable partnership. Anxious to force the issue at the
premiers' conference, the Company publicly announced its intention
to terminate the existing tariff agreement with Australia and New
49
Zealand, on 30 April 1900.
Despite the objections raised by the other partners in the
Pacific cable, the force of the immediate benefits of the Cape-
Australian line influenced the course of discussions at the 
conference. After full consideration of the details, the premier of 
South Australia moved that,
the proposals of the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company
for a Cape-Australian cable be accepted, with the following 
qualifications: (a) The suggestion of Mr. Chamberlain be
agreed to, (b) The right to open local offices to be
exercised only on the laying of the Pacific cable ...
The motion was favoured by a majority of the premiers. However, the
premiers of Victoria and Queensland requested that a final decision
be delayed for a few days, to allow them to obtain further
information on the effects an agreement would have on the Pacific
, , 51cable.
48. Seddon to Lyne, 23 January 1900, ibid, p.57.
49. Precis Relating ... op. cit., p.27.
50. Extract from the Proceedings of Conference of Premiers, 
Sydney, 27 January 1900, New South Wales Pari. Paps., 
1900 op. cit., p.15.
51. Idem. Victoria's position had been influenced by a 
deputation from the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce. See 
Daily Telegraph, 31 January 1900.
213
Press reports from Sydney suggested that the premiers had come
52to terms with the Company. But the issue was far, in fact,
from settled. To the Brisbane Courier the question had reached the
point where Australians must decide whether the time had arrived for
a state-owned cable, or whether the private monopoly was to retain
its dominance. The Courier asked Queenslanders,
... to reflect on their experience of large private 
monopolies ... Why should we, with world-wide acceptance of 
State control of the Post Office, prefer the continuance of 
a private monopoly to State control of our ocean 
telegraphy? Why should we carry longer on our shoulders 
this old man of the sea, who, in fear of being unseated, 
promises to sit so much more easily upon us, when in fact 
we can use our own hands instead of his.5-*
The Queensland government concurred with this view and, in
accordance with its position in Sydney, wired its desire to have the
54conference resolution put before the Pacific cable committee.
An important telegram was received in Sydney from Laurier on 8
February registering Canada's objection to any proposal which
removed control over telegraph business from the local 
55authorities. The message was transmitted to the other
Australian colonies. The new Victorian premier replied that the
Company would only be granted terminal privileges upon the
56completion of the Pacific line. He argued that his government 
had demanded such terms so as to protect the proposed Imperial
52. Daily Telegraph, 30 January 1900.
53. Brisbane Courier, 31 January 1900.
54. Post and Telegraph Department of Queensland, 1899, op. 
cit., p.75.
55. Precis Relating ... op, cit., p.29.
56. McLean to Seddon, 19 February 1900, New Zealand Pari. 
Paps., 1900 op. cit., p.64.
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project. Laurier was not satisfied, and cabled again to Australia
the view that granting concessions to the Company, even upon
completion of the Pacific telegraph, would seriously endanger the
57financial prospects of the cable. He also maintained that the 
action contemplated by Victoria and New South Wales was a 
significant alteration of the situation which existed at the time 
when the Pacific cable partnership had been forged. He hoped,
further, that no change would be entertained without the consent of 
the other partners.
New Zealand was also firm in its resolve to convince New South
58Wales and Victoria of their folly. However, the two primary
colonies continued to negotiate privately with the Eastern Extension 
59Company. On 26 February the manager in Australia for the
Company wired Lambton, in Sydney, stating that he had been
authorised to agree to the amendments suggested by Crick, and
inquired whether the colony of New South Wales would sign the 
agreement in Sydney, or through the agent-general in London.
The same day a cable arrived from Chamberlain, which transmitted a 
unanimous resolution passed by the Pacific cable committee in 
London. This resolution urged that no concessions be granted to the
57. Laurier to Australasian Premiers, 20 February 1900, ibid, 
p. 64.
58. See Seddon to McLean and Seddon to Lyne, 25 February 
1900, ibid, p.64.
59. See Eastern Extension Company to Crick, 13 February 1900, 
McLean to Lyne, 19 February 1900, and Crick to Watt, 23 
February 1900, New South Wales Pari. Paps., 1900 op. 
cit., pp.16-17.
60. Eastern Extension Company to Lambton, 26 February 1900, 
ibid, p.18.
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Company for a cable between Africa and Australia until the committee 
had had an opportunity to assess the implications upon the Pacific 
scheme.Chamberlain further stated that he concurred with the 
committee's suggestion, and recommended that the colonial 
governments refrain from entering into any agreement with the 
monopoly at that time.^
This was enough to dissuade the faint-hearted 
postmaster-general of Victoria. As his cablegram to Crick (on 28 
February) demonstrated:
Since my last, vigorous protests against new proposals have 
arrived from Premiers Canada, New Zealand, and Queensland, 
also adverse report Pacific Board, endorsed by Secretary of 
State. In view of nature of last-mentioned, and its 
important bearing on Pacific scheme, do you not think final 
action should be deferred.63
Crick was not so easily sidetracked. Rather than concede to 
external pressure, he advised Lyne to wire Chamberlain and the 
premiers of Queensland, New Zealand and Canada to explain the 
administration's position.
In that communique Lyne stated that there seemed to be "some
misapprehension" with regard to New South Wales' participation in 
. . 64the Pacific cable compact. His administration was still very 
much concerned about the future of the Pacific plan. However, as 
the Pacific line would not be established "for three years, probably 
more", New South Wales desired to avail itself of the immediate rate
61. Chamberlain to the Governor of New South Wales, 26 
February 1900, ibid, p.18.
62. Idem.
63. Watt to Crick, 28 February 1900, ibid, p.18.
64. Lyne to Chamberlain et al., 2 March 1900, ibid, p.19.
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reductions offered by the Eastern Extension C o m p a n y . L y n e  
argued that the existing tariff agreement was due to expire on 30 
April 1900, and unless a new contract was signed, the Company could
"instead of reducing rates, increase them up to eight
. .. . .  „66shillings".
New Zealand was the first to baulk at the New South Wales
argument. Seddon argued that public pressure would discourage the
Company from any radical increase in the tariff, and he once again
requested that New South Wales refrain from concluding an agreement
67with the Company. Queensland also denied any
"misapprehension" regarding the Eastern Extension Company's true
designs. In response to the threat of an increase in the tariff,
the new Queensland premier, Robert Philp, stated,
It appears to this government infinitely preferable to risk 
for a time the vindictive action on the part of the 
Company, which you seem to consider probable than lose the 
magnificent opportunity now afforded to securing the 
construction of an all-British cable under state control 
which while fraught with limitless potentialities from the 
standpoint of Imperial politics cannot fail to be of 
inestimable commercial advantage.
Philp concluded by joining Seddon in the view that public opinion in 
the colonies and Britain would guard against any undue increase in 
telegraph rates. With "misapprehension" rife in the colonies, a 
cable from Chamberlain in London, raising the possibility that 
Canada and New Zealand might withdraw their support of the Pacific
65. Idem.
66. Idem.
67. Seddon to Lyne, 3 March 
1900 op. cit., p.65.
1900, New Zealand Pari. Paps.,
68. Philp to Lyne, 3 March 1900, 
Department of Queensland, 1899, op.
Post and Telegraph 
cit• § p»76*
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line, acted to further isolate New South Wales.
Keen to advance the sputtering negotiations, the Company's
manager in Australia informed the colonies on 23 March that unless
an agreement was reached within a fortnight, the offer of a sliding
70scale would have to stand over for one year. Apprehensive of
continued delay because of the two Pacific cable partners, an
agreement was now signed by the colonies of South Australia, Western
71Australia and Tasmania on 14 April. As of 1 May 1900,
pursuant with the contract, the tariff for ordinary messages to and
from the contracting colonies and Great Britain was reduced to 4s.
per word; while government messages were transmitted at 3s. per
72word; and press messages cost Is. 4d.
In an effort to share in the low rates enjoyed by the
contracting colonies, the postmasters-general of New South Wales and
Victoria hastily met in Melbourne on 3 May 1900, to prepare a
proposal that would suit the Company as well as their partners in
the Pacific cable. After discussion, the postmasters-general
73submitted a series of amendments to the existing agreement. 
Paramount in these were a purchase clause, as suggested by Fleming, 
and an arbitration clause whereby the colonies could request
69
69. Chamberlain to The Governor of New South Wales, 3 March 
1900, New South Wales, Pari. Paps., 1900 op. cit., p.19.
70. Warren to Crick, 23 March 1900, Precis Relating ... op. 
cit., p.35.
71. For copy of agreement see New Zealand Pari. Paps.,1900 
op. cit., p.65.
72. See Schedule of Rates, ibid, p.69.
73. F.L. Outtrim to Lambton, 8 May 1900, New South Wales 
Pari. Paps., 1900 op, cit., p.22.
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termination of the contract unilaterally. The Company
objected to the amendments, and stated that there could only be one
agreement. Either New South Wales and Victoria accept the terms, of
what had become known as the "Adelaide agreement", or continue to
75pay a higher tariff.
These negotiations went into abeyance. Although Victoria and
New South Wales considered the "Adelaide agreement" a fair one for
the Western colonies, for the sake of the Pacific cable project,
both were forced to stand by the suggested amendments. In truth,
the "Adelaide agreement" ensured the construction of a
Cape-Australian cable. The Eastern colonies could establish a
bureau in Adelaide so as to avail themselves of the lower rates,
without being bound to the Eastern Extension Company. It was
admitted that such a scheme was inefficient. However, the future of
76the Pacific cable demanded a cessation of negotiations.
Ill
While such lengthy negotiations were still underway with the 
Eastern Extension Company in Australia, the Pacific cable committee 
was busy in London finalising the details of the state-owned Pacific 
project. With respect to the first point of reference, the cost of
74. The agreement of 14 April 1900, hereafter referred to as 
the "Adelaide agreement", required mutual consent before 
it could be terminated.
75. Argus, (Melbourne), 29 May 1900, and Sydney Morning
Herald, 29 May 1900.
76. Daily Telegraph, 29 May 1900. A cable from Chamberlain 
on 11 May 1900, deprecating any concessions until the 
Pacific cable was established, sealed the question. 
Although Crick was desirous of an agreement he decided to 
wait with the Victorian postmaster-general until the 
Pacific line was assured. See Precis Relating ... op. 
cit., p.39.
219
laying and maintaining the cable, the committee diverged slightly
from previous estimates. Unlike the committee of 1896, the rate of
interest for raising capital was set at 3%, instead of at 2 
771/2%. This modification altered the estimated cost of
interest and the sinking fund. However, the 1899 committee
calculated the expenditure on maintenance to be considerably lower
than the first committee. Consequently, annual expenditures were
78fixed at £150,000 rather than £158,673. The consulting firm 
commissioned by the board to ascertain the cost of construction, 
including two steamers for maintenance and other initial 
expenditures, estimated that the cable could be constructed and laid 
for £1,708,659.79
The provisional board recommended that the tariff from 
Australia to Vancouver be set at 2s. per word. Predicting exactly 
what portion of the total 'Australasian' traffic which would fall to 
the new cable proved to be an impossible task. To reach a fair 
estimate, the committee accepted the mean predictions of those 
favourable to the scheme, and the antagonistic estimates of the 
Eastern Extension and associated companies. It was assumed that the 
total traffic for 1902 would be 2,300,000 words with the new line 
receiving the following portion from each colony:
77. Report of the Pacific Cable Committee, 1899-1900, 
Colonial Office, Miscellaneous No.128, p.3. Telecom 
Archives, Sydney.
78. Idem.
79. Idem. The actual tender accepted by the committee from 
Telcon was £1,795,000. Added to that was £200,000 for 
sundries not included in the call for tenders such as 
cable tanks, instruments for working the line and duplex 
apparatus.
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Western Australia 
South Australia .
Victoria ........
Tasmania ........
New Zealand .....
New South Wales .
Queensland
.. None
.. None
.. One-half
.. One-half
.. Three-quarters
.. Homeward three-quarters
.. Outward One-half
.. All or homeward all;
outward three-quarters
Reckoning on this division, the total paying traffic over the
81
Pacific route was determined at 960,000 words. Calculating a
2s. tariff, the committee estimated a total revenue of £96,000,
which, subtracted from expenditures, would leave a deficit of 
82
£54,000.
Critics of the Pacific project argued that the system would not
be 'all-British', because of a traffic agreement between the
proprietors of the Canadian landline, the Canadian Pacific Railway,
and the Commercial Cable Company. Under the agreement the
Commercial Company had exclusive rights to transmit traffic off the
Canadian Pacific Railway wire over its Atlantic cable. The
Commercial Company was incorporated in America. However, the
Company's cables landed on British soil and its repair ships flew
83
the British flag. Further, the messages between Canada and
Great Britain never left British territory. As a result, the
80. Ibid, p.4.
81. Ibid, p.5.
82. Idem. The committee was informed that the Canadian 
Pacific Railway in conjunction with the Commercial Cable 
Company would transmit the Pacific cable traffic from 
Vancouver to London at a rate of IS. per word.
83. Ibid, p.7.
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committee argued that any agreement between the governments
concerned with the Pacific cable and the Commercial Company would
. . 84not interfere with the system's 'all-British' character.
As to its last point of reference, the establishment of a
permanent board of management, the committee recommended that the
board consist of eight members appointed on the same basis as the 
. . 85provisional board. The board was to be non-remunerative, and
meet at least once a month. There was to be an executive, salaried 
manager, subservient to the board, to act on all matters of 
business, to supervise the staff and all aspects of the running of 
the cable.®
The report of the committee was sent to the interested
governments by the colonial office, and marked "confidential", in
May 1900. It was agreed, miraculously, by all parties to undertake
the project on the lines stated by the committee, and the
provisional board asked for tenders to be submitted by 14 August, 
87
1900. On 14 October Chamberlain informed the members of the
Pacific alliance that the board had recommended acceptance of the
88tender submitted by Telcon. But, before a contract could be
84. For arguments against the Commercial company see, Anglo- 
American Telegraph Company to Colonial Office, 9 May 
1899, Pari. Paps., 1900 Vol. LV, op. cit., p.l, and 
Direct United States Cable Company to The Treasury, 13 
May 1899, ibid, p.5.
85. Pacific Cable Committee, op. cit., p.7.
86. Idem.
87. Post and Telegraph Department of Queensland, 1899, op. 
cit., p.77.
88. History of the Pacific Cable Project, (No date), p.8. 
Telecom Archives, Sydney.
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entered into, the offer required ratification by the various
colonial parliaments.
When introducing the Pacific Cable Enabling Bill to the New
South Wales legislative assembly on 25 October, the
postmaster-general outlined the potential cost of the project to New
South Wales. Crick informed the assembly that New South Wales was
bound to meet one-ninth of the interest on capital, sinking fund and
89
working expenses, totalling £17,335. Against a one-ninth
share of revenue, £10,666, the estimated loss to the colony was 
90£6,669. Subtracted from that total was revenue derived from
inland rates, leaving New South Wales to bear an annual charge of
£5,699. In supporting the Bill, Crick pointed out that prior to the
expiration of the colony's former agreement with the Eastern
91
Extension Company, it was paying an annual subsidy of £13,000.
The Bill was passed in the assembly the following day, but not
without heated exchanges among members regarding the merits of the
Pacific line, as opposed to the Eastern Extension Company's proposed
rate reductions. The member for Newtown abhorred the thought of the
government gratefully accepting a liability for telegraphic
communications while the Company offered to reduce the tariff to 2s.
926d. without subsidy. The member for Waratah refuted that
argument and further exposed the Company's designs when he stated,
The newspapers have been fighting all they can for the 
acceptance of the proposal of the Eastern Extension
89. Extracts from "Pari. Debates" (Assembly) 25 October 1900, 
p.l. Telecom Archives, Sydney.
90. Idem.
91. Idem.
92. Ibid, p.2.
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Company; but is is generally known in town amongst business 
people that their proprietors were offered by the Company 
most tempting conditions should the concessions which are 
asked for be granted, and the Pacific cable proposal 
scotched.^3
Joseph Cook also joined in attacking the Company's plan and declared
that granting the concessions once the Pacific cable was secure, as
94Crick intended, was "an almost criminal thing."
Following the passage of the Pacific Cable Enabling Bill, the
postmaster-general of New Zealand wired Crick, in Sydney, inquiring
about the position of negotiations with the Eastern Extension
Company. Crick replied that he and the postmaster-general of
Victoria would not consider the Company's proposal until the Pacific
95cable contract was signed. The contract to construct the
96Pacific cable was duly entered into, on the last day of 1900.
The next day the Commonwealth of Australia was proclaimed. However,
post and telegraph matters were not transferred to the federal
department until March of 1901. Therefore, as postmaster-general,
Crick was still responsible to the crown for post and telegraph
matters involving New South Wales. And as a result, when the
Company's representative cabled Crick, on 8 January 1901, asking if
the states of New South Wales and Victoria were willing to enter
into the "Adelaide agreement", he could respond in good faith,
97having seen the Pacific cable project finalised.
93. Ibid, p.3.
94. Ibid, p.5.
95. Crick to Postmaster-General New Zealand, 29 
1901, New Zealand Pari. Paps., 1901, F-8, p.31.
December
96. Chamberlain to Lord Minto, 5 January 1901, 
Sessional Papers, (59a), 1901, p.12.
Canada,
97. Warren to Crick, 8 January 1901, Precis Relating 
cit., p.41.
••• op•
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At last, on 8 January, a joint statement was issued to the 
Company, signed by Crick and the new postmaster-general of Victoria, 
which stated plainly -
We are prepared to accept Adelaide agreement with such 
alterations as are necessary by reason of New South Wales 
and Victoria coming in at the present time ... We will 
instruct Agents-general to sign amended agreement in London 
at once in these terms.^8
That same day, Chamberlain cabled to Sydney that the Canadian
government had informed him of the renewed negotiations, and
requested that they be deferred until the Pacific cable board had
99had an opportunity to deal with the question. Crick
recognised this tactic. At his direct request, the agent-general 
was instructed to sign the "Adelaide agreement" on 16 January 1901.
The Turner administration in Victoria was not so quick to break 
faith with its partners in the Pacific cable. After the matter was 
considered in cabinet, it was decided to solicit the opinions of the 
other members involved in the Pacific project before ratifying the 
'Adelaide agreement'. In a telegram to the premiers of Canada, New 
Zealand and Queensland, dated 19 January, Turner diplomatically 
suggested -
New South Wales having obtained the advantage [of reduced 
rates] we are naturally desirous that our people should be 
in as good a position as the other states ... I shall, 
therefore, be glad to know whether, under the circumstances 
as they now exist, you will object to Victoria entering 
into the proposed agreement.1^0
98. Crick and W. Gurr to Warren, 8 January 1901, ibid, p.42. 
Turner was returned as premier of Victoria in November, 
1900.
99. Chamberlain to the Officer Administering the Government 
of New South Wales, 8 January 1901, New Zealand Pari. 
Paps., 1901, op. cit., p.33.
100. Turner to Seddon, 19 January 1901, ibid, p.32.
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Opposition to Victoria, following in New South Wales' footsteps, was
issued to Melbourne from all quarters, and no further moves were
. . .  101taken by the Victorian ministry.
Regardless of this action, the damage had been done. By
allowing the Eastern Extension Company access to the Sydney market,
the light of the Pacific cable proposal was dimmed considerably. In
responding to Chamberlain's request that the question be deferred,
the New South Wales government in fact replied to the effect that
Pacific Cable Board has no power to deal with any matter 
affecting Post Office except Pacific Cable. Our Post 
Office will probably pass to Federal Government at the end 
of next month, when cable-rates would necessarily be 
uniform. At present, this state pays 4s. lid. per word, 
while the adjoining state pays 3s. 6d. Paving the way for 
uniformity in the Federal service, my Government has 
entered into agreement with the Eastern Extension Company 
for uniformity of rate from 1 February.
This limp justification did little to lessen the impact of New South 
Wales' action upon the prospects of the Imperial Pacific 'compact'. 
Had Crick truly been motivated by a desire to simplify the 
transition of six post and telegraph departments into one federal 
body, it is most likely that he would have approached Queensland in 
the matter. He did not.
The New South Wales initiative was governed purely by the 
desire to secure cheaper communications. The shortsightedness of 
Crick and his colleagues, while providing an immediate advantage, 
cost subsequent administrations several thousands of pounds of
101. See Philp to Seddon, 23 January 1901, ibid, p.33, and 
Laurier to Strathcona, 20 February 1901, Canada, 
Sessional Papers, (59a), op. cit., pp.50-51.
102. Officer Administering the Government of New South Wales 
to Chamberlain, 17 January 1901, New Zealand Pari. 
Paps., 1901, op. cit., p.33.
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capital to maintain a non-paying state cable. By entering into the 
"Adelaide agreement", New South Wales also created further 
complications for the infant federation. The Commonwealth 
government inherited two cable agreements from the former colonies, 
in which one state was party to both.
IV
Strenuous protests from Canada, Queensland and New Zealand had
little effect upon the altered circumstances of the Pacific cable
compact. In an attempt to resolve the crisis, the interested
governments placed the question before the permanent board of
management in London. At its first general meeting, on 25 February
1901, the board resolved that the "Adelaide agreement" was
prejudicial to the interests of the Pacific cable, and concluded
that a conference representing the governments concerned be held at 
103an early date. The colonial office initiated discussions
with the agents-general and the High Commissioner, with the view to
104fulfilling the request from the board. But, as the cable was
not yet laid, negotiations subsided and the proposed conference 
lapsed.
The Pacific Cable Act was in fact ratified by the British
government on 17 August. Surveying of the route began later that 
month and the ocean floor was found to be conducive to cable
laying. It consisted mostly of 'globigerina ooze', and not coral
103. Pacific Cable Board, Abstract of Minutes of Meetings, 
Premiers Papers, Pre. 43, Queensland State Archives. See 
also, Strathcona to Laurier, 26 February 1901, Canada, 
Sessional Papers, 1901, (59A), p.54.
104. Agent-General to Seddon, 12 April and 25 April 1901, New 
Zealand, Pari Paps., 1901, p.37.
227
and mountainous volcanoes as the detractors of the scheme had 
105
predicted. The greatest depth found along the suspect
stretch between Canada and Fanning Island was 3,400 fathoms, and not
12,000 fathoms as was projected at the Colonial Conference in 1887.
Laying of the cable began on 8 March 1902 when the Telcon vessel
Anglia departed from Southport, Queensland, to submerge the section
between Australia and Norfolk Island. By 25 March the Anglia had
completed the Norfolk Island to New Zealand portion - thus
connecting the latter with Australia by a state-run cable.
As the contract required the cable to be functioning by the end
of 1902, Telcon had the Colonia constructed to pay out the long
stretch of heavy cable between Bamfield, British Columbia, and
Fanning Island. Fitted for a larger load than the Great Eastern,
the Colonia set out from Bamfield on 18 September with 4000 miles of
cable, weighing more than 8000 tons, and arrived at Fanning Island
107
in a record eighteen days. The Anglia then laid the final
section, from Fanning Island to Fiji, completing the 'all-British'
Pacific telegraph service on 31 October, two months ahead of 
108
schedule.
A deluge of congratulatory telegrams ensued between the various 
partner states, all expressing hope and faith in this latest symbol 
of Empire. Many of the cablegrams which arrived in Ottawa were 
addressed to Sir Sandford Fleming, offering cordial congratulations
105. Barty-King, op. cit., p.138.
106. Idem.
107. Ibid, p.139.
108. Idem.
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on the completion of what had grown to be known as 'his' 
109project. Quick to exploit an opportunity to demonstrate the
value of the new service, Fleming dispatched identical messages to 
the Governor-General of Canada in opposite directions. Both arrived 
in Ottawa the following day, 1 November, having circled the globe. 
The completion of the world's electric girdle had been won, and the 
first stage of Fleming's vision of a state-operated cable system was 
a success.
It still remained to be seen, however, just how costly the 
"Adelaide agreement" would be upon the financial success of the 
Pacific cable. After the initial excitement subsided, Edmund 
Barton, the premier of Australia, attempted equitably to resolve the 
conflict created by the New South Wales authorities. His answer was 
to enter into an agreement with the Eastern Extension Company, which 
extended the privileges from the former agreement to Victoria and 
Queensland, with the stipulation that the agreement could be 
terminated unilaterally after ten y e a r s . H e  considered the 
new agreement to be a victory for the Pacific line. Although it 
enabled the Company to establish offices in Melbourne and Brisbane, 
the arrangement was no longer in perpetuity. Barton argued that 
"what is done is done" and the Commonwealth had no other recourse 
but to abide by the previous contract.11'1'
R.J. Seddon, however, refused to accept Barton's rationalising 
and urged him to abort the proposed agreement. Seddon argued that
109. Johnson, (ed.). op. cit., p.442.
110. For terms of the new Commonwealth agreement see, New 
Zealand Pari Paps., 1903, F-8A, pp.2-6.
111. Barton to Seddon, 1 June 1903, ibid, p.7.
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conceding further concessions to the Company was a one-sided
compromise which benefitted the Commonwealth at the expense of the
112other partners involved in the Pacific cable. A gain for the
Eastern Extension Company was a loss to those allied with the
Pacific cable. Barton rebutted this by stating that
The Pacific cable is not for a day, but, it is to be 
hoped, for all time, and it is surely the province of 
those responsible for the administration of a country not 
to limit their views to momentary advantages, but rather 
to look ahead and proceed in such a manner that their 
actions will be of permanent benefit ... There can be no 
doubt that in reducing the term of the agreement to a 
reasonable period the Commonwealth has obtained for the 
Pacific cable a very great advantage, which cannot fail 
to be of immense and increasing value.
Barton acted on the premise that the former agreement was
inviolable. Consequently, his resolve to deal with the issue in a 
just manner was unshakable, and the new agreement passed the
Commonwealth House of Representatives on 29 July 1903, without
.. , . 114division.
At a subsequent annual meeting of the British Empire League in
Canada, held on 19 May 1903, Sir Sandford Fleming expanded upon the
implications of the Eastern Extension Company's actions in
Australia. For him, the situation was far more than a question of
losses and profits. Instead, the crisis affected the great issue of
the "good faith and honour" of the component parts of Empire.115
Much as the misunderstanding is to be deplored, it is the 
cause of rejoicing to the old enemy of the Pacific cable.
112. Seddon to Barton, 11 May 1903, ibid, p.2.
113. Barton to Seddon, 1 June 1903, op. cit.
114. Barton to Seddon, 30 July 1903, ibid, p.12.
115. British Empire League in Canada, Enclosure in, Seddon to 
Barton, 29 June 1903, ibid, p.9.
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... As a result of long plotting, that Company has at
length achieved a double victory. They have not only 
succeeded in taking from the Pacific cable its fair share 
of telegraph earnings, but they have managed by their 
machinations to get the owners of that undertaking at
loggerheads.
Unless that impasse was handled in a friendly spirit of brotherhood
and co-operation, Fleming feared that the conflict could be the
"beginning of a family quarrel the outcome of which no one can 
117 . .foretell." The aim of the Pacific project was to bring
closer together the strands of Empire. But, in its infancy, the 
cable actually appeared to be a hinderance to that great end.
Fleming's appeal, for a return to co-operative dialogue between
the partner states involved in the Pacific cable, went unheeded.
News of the ratification of the new agreement by the lower house of
the Australian Commonwealth produced a further string of protests
118from Canada, New Zealand, and Queensland. Of the three
angered premiers, only Robert Philp of Queensland offered Barton any
alternative to his chosen course of action. Philp urged Barton to
delay any further discussion until the once-proposed special
conference had had an opportunity to assess the significance of the
Commonwealth legislation. Philp informed the lieutenant-governor,
on 17 August, of his state's intention to obstruct ratification of
119the agreement until a conference could be held.
116. Idem.
117. Idem.
118. See, Laurier to Barton, 19 August 1903; Seddon to Barton, 
18 August 1903; and Philp to Barton, 17 August 1903, 
Australia, Senate Paper, 1903, No.44, p.l.
119. Philp to Lieutenant-Governor, 17 August 1903, Premiers 
Papers, Pre. 46, Queensland State Archives.
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Philp's determination, and the disapproval of Canada and New
Zealand, moved a band of Commonwealth senators, led by W.G. Higgs of
Queensland, to withhold support for the Commonwealth government's
resolution. In a letter to Philp, of 3 September, Higgs stated that
"the federal government are acting in a most extraordinary and
120unstatesmanlike manner." He argued that clause 80 of the
Post and Telegraph Act prohibited the government from relinquishing
its authority to collect and distribute messages to the Eastern
121Extension Company. This was sufficient to prevent
ratification of the agreement by the senate. However, the Company
still opened an office in Melbourne, under the authority of the
lower house. Although no money was ever voted by the senate, the
Commonwealth provided a special line for the Company between Sydney 
122and Melbourne.
In late October of that year, the colonial office duly began
arranging the details of the desired conference. Because of the
transferrence of responsibility for the Pacific cable from the
colonies to the Commonwealth, the federal government was not
interested in continuing the discussion, as it deemed the new
agreement as the conclusion of the question. Consequently,
120. Higgs to Philp, 3 September 1903, ibid.
121. Speech in Favour of Pacific Cable, by W.G. Higgs (from 
the "Parliamentary Debates" 23 November 1905), ibid. The 
Act states that "the Postmaster-General shall have the 
exclusive privilege of erecting and maintaining telegraph 
lines and of transmitting telegrams ... and performing 
all the incidental services of receiving, collecting, or 
delivering such telegrams."
122. Idem.
123. Higgs to Philp, 3 September 1903, op, cit.
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matters were left in abeyance for two years until June 1905. At
that time the Pacific Cable Conference was finally convened at the
colonial office. The chairman of the meeting was the colonial
secretary, Alfred Lyttleton; and also in attendance were Lord
124Jersey, Sir William Mulock and, of course, Fleming.
Despite the good intentions of the conference, the issue of 
considering the effects of the Eastern Extension Company's 
manouevers had been left for too long for any practical result to 
come from the meetings. Lyttleton said as much in opening the
conference:
whatever may have been the original merits or demerits 
of the case, the matter now has been left untouched for 
so considerable a period that it would perhaps be the 
most businesslike way to look at these Agreements and 
the opening of offices in the light of accomplished 
facts.125
By admitting such defeat at the outset, the conference was destined 
to prove fruitless. Indeed, the only conclusion reached at the 
meeting was that the Commonwealth agreement be amended, expressly to
state that it remain in force until 31 October 1913, "and no
. 126 longer".
124. Proceedings, Pacific Cable Conference, Colonial Office
Proof, Miscellaneous, No.182, p.3. Telecom Archives,
Sydney.
125. Ibid, p.2.
126. Pari Paps., 1905, Vol. LXIV, Cd. 2663, p.4. In December 
1905, the Australian Senate amended the Commonwealth 
agreement to suit the recommendation of the conference. 
The Company was not prepared to accept the new condition 
and the agreement was terminated. As a result, on 3 
April, 1906, the Australian government withdrew the right 
of the Company to operate independently in Melbourne and 
the 'Adelaide agreement' remained in force. First Annual 
Report of the Postmaster-Generals Department. 1911, No. 
29, p.28.
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The conference was shown that, by allowing the Eastern
Extension Company to open offices and aggressively solicit business
in Melbourne, the Commonwealth had dramatically reduced the
financial prospects of the state-owned line. In 1903, out of a
total Victoria traffic of 489,318 words, the Pacific service secured
only 83,410, while the Eastern Extension Company received 
127405,908. The story was equally disturbing in New South
Wales. Of the total telegraph business the Pacific line transmitted
128128,327,words and the Eastern Company sent 367,065. Because
of the inequality of traffic, early estimates of revenue were proven
incorrect, even though Fleming's prediction in 1893 of the number of
words to be expected in 1903 were exact. Rather than a surplus, the
Pacific cable incurred a loss of £90,518, of which Australia was
129charged £30,514. The inability of the Pacific Cable
Conference to erradicate the circumstances created by the former 
monopoly meant that, although the cable was intended to be more than 
a commercial property, it would not be a paying concern for many 
years to come. The Eastern Extension Company continued to operate 
profitably in Australia. Although inconvenienced by the advent of 
state-ownership in submarine telegraphy, this first attempt, taking 
several decades to eventuate, ensured the future of private 
interests in world communications.
127. See Appendix C.
128. Idem.
129. See Appendix D.
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Conclusion
The Pacific cable was not laid without difficulty. If the story 
of that imperial telegraphic connection is complicated, the reasons 
for this complexity can be readily identified. Indeed, three major 
factors contributed to the history of the Pacific cable: the apathy
of the British authorities; colonial disunity; and determined
opposition from the Eastern Extension Company. The latter is
understandable in light of the vested interest of the 'infamous
monopoly'. The other two, although explicable, are less easily 
comprehended. Clearly the Pacific cable was a low priority to 
British Imperial statesmen, so much so that the admiralty felt 
little neglect when it discontinued the survey of the ocean floor, 
and failed to tell the interested colonial governments for over 
three years. During the early discussions about the Pacific cable, 
the Imperial government concluded that the scheme was a colonial 
matter, and offered no substantial benefit to the British tax payer.
Throughout the 1880's and early 1890's, the Imperial government 
continued its disjointed, piecemeal assemblage of an Empire with no 
definitive policies to comprehend its transformation. Instead, 
British officials responded to situations as they occurred, and in 
order of importance to Britain itself - rather than to the Empire in 
its totality. The "national interest" was not necessarily 
synonymous with colonial interests. When Canada, New Zealand and 
the Australian colonies put forward a policy for overseas 
communications, which they deemed in the interest of the Empire, 
successive Imperial governments declined to participate in this view.
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Indeed, Britain's initial reluctance to nurture the willingness 
of Canada and Australia to co-operate, in bringing together the 
loosely associated segments of Empire, tended to negate the 
significance of the Pacific scheme. As in the Scramble for Africa, 
the 'British Lion' was spurred to action largely by the threat of 
being excluded. Even Joseph Chamberlain only conceded to colonial 
demands for a committee in 1896, after being informed that the 
United States was seriously considering a Pacific cable of its own.
The early promoters of a Pacific cable were, in truth, ahead of 
their time. In the 1880's, concern over the challenges to British 
world supremacy increasingly came to dominate foreign and colonial 
policy. Chamberlain was the first modern British colonial secretary 
of state to recognise the potential of the settlement societies in 
maintaining Britain's commercial and imperial dominance. However, 
by the time the British Conservative government moved to comprehend 
this fact, the need for an alternative means of communications with 
Australia had passed. The Eastern Extension Company had reduced the 
tariff for ordinary messages to 3s., and established a second and 
'all-red' route to the antipodes, via the Cape, before the Pacific 
service was in operation. The long delay manipulated by the Eastern 
Extension Company, and tolerated by the Imperial government, meant 
that instead of becoming a second and cheaper means of 
communications, the Pacific service was a third and costly route. 
Moreover, on 12 December 1901 signals were received in Newfoundland 
from Britain without the use of a cable thus marking the beginning 
of wireless telegraphy and the decline in submarine cables.
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However, the Pacific cable did not have to return a profit to
justify its construction. The strategic importance of swift and
secure communications guaranteed the worth of a Pacific telegraph
service. Curiously, it was this concern for safe communications
that caused the Imperial authorities to procrastinate about the
Pacific cable plan. Indeed, P.M. Kennedy has argued significantly
that strategic considerations moved the British government to "turn
a blind eye to the privileges" of the Eastern and Eastern Extension
companies.1 The Eastern group, the proprietors of by far the
largest fleet of cable ships in the world, possessed the means for
disrupting the cable communications of an antagonist in the event of
war. As a result, the development of the associated companies was a
strategic concern of the Imperial government, and the two bodies had
2
agreed to a "confidential co-operation". Consequently, the
Pacific cable project, conflicting as it did with the smooth and 
profitable operation of the Eastern Extension Company, was in fact 
also a thorn in the paw of the British military establishment.
Also responsible for the anti-climax of the Pacific cable was 
Australian parochialism, a dimension of colonial nationalism. The 
Pacific telegraph provided an opportunity for the separate colonies 
to put aside regional differences and colonial rivalries, to advance 
the common good of Australia as a whole within the Empire. The
cable was of greater importance to the Australian colonies than any 
of the other parties. Yet, the various colonies were unable to
1. P.M. Kennedy "Imperial cable communications and strategy, 
1870-1914" English Historical Review. Vol.86, 1971, p.745.
2. Idem.
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disregard their own local self-interests. Consequently, although 
New South Wales was bound by honour to see the Pacific line to its 
conclusion, it did not feel bound to protect its future if this 
interfered with immediate economic gain. All the southern 
hemisphere settlement colonies, with the possible exception of New 
Zealand, were moved in the matter by the desire to secure cheaper 
communications and eliminate monopoly in the bargain. It can 
reasonably be concluded then that imperial unity was a battle cry, 
but not a primary factor in promoting the Pacific cable in Australia.
The instability of the Australian colonial legislatures before 
1894 contributed to the appearance of indifference toward the 
Pacific cable. Because of its interest in Australian telegraph 
business, the Eastern Extension Company reacted to each set of 
circumstances arising from the cable debate. The colonial 
governments, by comparison, were slow to respond to proposals for an 
alternative means of communication. As an independent body only 
marginally effected by public opinion, the Company answered its 
critics by condemning the practicality of a second cable service 
and, as a last resort, offered generous concessions to protect its 
monopoly. Conversely, to come to a common position, the separate 
colonies were forced to meet in conference to discuss numerous 
questions, ranging from means of ownership and financing, to routes 
and landing places. Between conferences, colonial governments were 
preoccupied with pressing local matters which took precedent over 
realising an imperial submarine cable. As a result, the Company was 
able to read colonial opinion, and respond as required, to prolong 
the discussion.
238
Canadian motives varied from government to government, and 
individual to individual. It has been argued by G.N. Savory that 
Sir Sandford Fleming was guided by the desire to increase traffic 
over the Canadian landline and, thus, through private gain. This 
may well have been true during the early years of discussion. 
However, Fleming's call in 1902 for the Canadian government to 
nationalise the landline would appear to contradict this argument. 
From 1887 until the completion of the Pacific cable, Fleming 
laboured incessantly to convince the governments concerned that the 
prosperity of the British Empire depended on cheap and secure 
communications. His idea for establishing a system of state 
controlled cables was, I would rather argue, fostered by a genuine 
desire to advance the cause of imperial unity.
The same can not be said for the Canadian government after 
1896. The Laurier ministry came to power at the height of imperial 
sentiment in Canada. As an astute politician, Laurier recognised 
the electoral significance of imperialism. His oratory at the 
jubilee conference in 1897 is ledgendary. However, he was not 
willing to commit his young government to the Pacific cable proposal 
at that time. For him the conference was a resounding success 
without concluding the Pacific cable debate.
When the Pacific telegraph service was finally established, few 
of the anticipated benefits were realised. The cost of overseas 
communications was lowered to an acceptable level, and an imperial 
cable network was initiated. However, because it was a financial 
liability to the colonies concerned, the Pacific cable acted as a 
deterrent to further joint ventures with the Imperial government.
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Despite the federation of Australia after 1901, it became 
increasingly difficult for the Imperial authorities to persuade the 
sister Dominions to assist in the financial responsibilities of the 
Empire. Throughout the first decade of the 20th century Imperial 
affairs were dominated by issues of defence. It was the desire of 
the British government to convince the colonies to take up their 
share of the burden in protecting the Empire. The reluctance of
colonial statesmen to participate in the British view could be 
attributed to the course and the outcome of the Imperial
communications debate; the end result of which was not at all what 
the colonies had envisaged - a strong and viable competitor in the 
field of submarine telegraphy. What they received was a mere shadow 
of the original noble and grandiose concept - unable to compete 
financially with the monopoly, and outdated almost as soon as it was 
completed.
The Pacific cable project offered an excellent symbol of the
"new imperialism" at work, in that it provided a tangible creation 
to place beside the rhetoric of imperialism and jingoism. It
appeared to be an example of the component parts of Empire, however 
far flung, working together to aid in the promotion and expansion of 
British ideals and industry, as well as local colonial interests. 
The cable debate also fostered a closer relationship between Canada
and Australia. The protracted discussions lead to a better
understanding of the divergent course of the two settlement 
societies within a rapidly changing British Empire.
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APPENDIX A
List of signatories to the Articles of Association of the 
Pacific Telegraph Company, Limited:-
The Earl of Milltown, Representative Peer of Ireland in the 
Parliament of Great Britain
Sir James P. Corry, Bart., M.P., Member for Armagh in the 
Parliament of Great Britain.
Sir Daniel Cooper, Bart., Vice-President of the Colonial and 
Indian Exhibition, 1886.
The Viscount Folkestone, M.P., Member for Middlesex in the 
Parliament of Great Britain, Comptroller of H.M. Household.
Hugh G. Reid, Esq., J.P., late M.P. for Aston, Warley Hall, 
near Birmingham.
Sir Alfred Slade, Bart., Receiver-General of H.M. Inland 
Revenue.
J. Henniker Heaton, Esq., M.P. for Canterbury in the Parliament 
of Great Britian.
E.M. Young, Esq., London, General Manager of the Australia 
Mortgage, Land, and Finance Company Limited.
Edward Pulliser, Esq., Inte Capt. 7th Hussars.
Randolph C. Want, Esq., Solicitor to the New South Wales 
Government, London.
Sir W.M. Clarke, Bart., Queen Street, Melbourne.
The Hon. P. Perkins, London, late Minister for Lands, 
Queensland.
Sir Samuel Wilson, K.C.M.G., M.P., Member for Portsmouth in the 
Parliament of Great Britain.
The Hon. Murray E.G. Finch-Hatton, M.P., Member for
Lincolnshire in the Parliament of Great Britain.
George Coote, Esq., F.S.I., Sweetham Hall, Sudbury.
Signed the duplicate Articles of Association:-
Sir Donald A. Smith, K.C.M.G., Director Hudson Bay and Canadian 
Pacific Railway, Montreal.
Sandford Fleming, Esq., C.M.G., Director Canadian Pacific 
Railway, and Hudson Bay Companies, Ottawa.
Source: Secretary of Pacific Cable Company to Gillies, 8
December 1886, Enclosure, Federal Council. 87.230.
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APPENDIX B
Route No.1
Commencing at Vancouver Island, the cable to extend to 
Fanning Island, thence to a suitable island in the Fiji group. From 
Fiji to Norfolk Island, and at that point the route will bifurcate 
to the northern part of New Zealand, and to a convenient point near 
the boundary between New South Wales and Queensland.
Knots
Vancouver Island to Fanning Island ................  3,232
Fanning Island to Fiji ............................  1,715
Fiji to Norfolk Island ............................  1,022
Norfolk Island to New Zealand.....................  415
Norfolk Island to Tweed Mouth, near boundary
New South Wales and Queensland ....................  761
Total 7,145
Route No.2
From Vancouver Island the cable to be laid to a small 
unoccupied island indicated on the charts as Necker Island, 
suituated about 240 miles westward from the most western island of 
the Hawaiian Group and about 400 nautical miles from Honolulu. From 
Necker Island the cable to extend to Fiji, and thence, as in route 
No.1, to New Zealand and Australia. On the section between Necker 
and Fiji possibly Howland Island or Baker Island may be available 
for a mid-station, but the exact position has not been ascertained.
Knots
Vancouver Island to Necker Island .................  2,431
Necker Island to Fiji .............................  2,546
Fiji to Norfolk Island ............................  1,022
Norfolk Island to New Zealand .....................  415
Norfolk to Tweed Mouth ............................  761
Total 7,175
Route No.3
As in Route No.2, the cable to extend from Vancouver Island 
to Necker Island, thence to Onoatoa or some one of the eastern 
islands of the Gilbert Group. From this station in the Gilbert 
Group two branches to extend, one to Queensland and the other to New 
Zealand. The Queensland branch to touch at San Christoval Isalnd, 
in the Solomon Group, and to terminate at Bowen, connecting at that 
point with the land-lines, easterly to Brisbane and Sydney, westerly 
to the Gulf of Carpentaria.
Vancouver Island to Necker Island .................  2,431
Necker Island to Onoatoa (in Gilbert Group) .......  1,917
Onoatoa to Fiji ...................................  980
Viti Levu to New Zealand ..........................  1,004
Onoatoa to San Christoval (Solomon Group) .........  953
San Christoval to Bowen, Queensland ...............  980
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Total 8,265
APPENDIX B (Cont'd)
Route No.4
As in Route Nos. 2 and 3, the cable to be laid from the 
northern terminal point to Necker Island. From Necker Island to 
extend in a direct course to Bowen, touching at Apamana, a central 
island in the Gilbert Group, and at San Christoval, of the Solomon 
Group.
Knots
Vancouver Island to Necker Island .................  2,431
Necker island to Apamana (Gilbert Group) ..........  1,865
Apamana to San Christoval (Solomon Group) .........  970
San Christoval to Bowen, Queensland ...............  980
Total 6,246
Route No.5
As in Route Nos. 2,3 and 4, the cable to run from Vancouver 
Island to Necker Island; from Necker Island to Fiji, thence direct 
to New Zealand.
Knots
Vancouver Island to Necker Island .................  2,431
Necker Island to Fiji .............................  2,546
Fiji to New Zealand ...............................  1,150
Total 6,127
Route No.6
From Vancouver Island the cable to extend to Honolulu? from 
Honolulu to Fiji, and from Fiji to follow Route No.l to New Zealand 
and Australia. On the section between Honolulu and Fiji one of the 
Phoenix Islands may possibly be found for a mid-station.
Knots
Vancouver Island to Honolulu ......................  2,280
Honolulu to Fiji ..................................  2,600
Fiji to Norfolk Island ............................  1,022
Norfolk Island to New Zealand .....................  415
Norfolk Island to Tweed Mouth .....................  761
Total 7,078
Route No.7
From Vancouver Island the cable to extend to Honolulu; from 
Honolulu to Onoatoa, of the Gilbert Group; from Onoatoa to San 
Christoval, of the Solomon Group; from San Christoval to Bowen.
Knots
Vancouver Island to Honolulu ......................  2,280
Honolulu to Onoatoa ...............................  2,080
Onoatoa to San Christoval .........................  953
San Christoval to Bowen...........................  980
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Total 6,293
APPENDIX B (Cont'd)
Route No.8
From Vancouver Island the cable to extend to Honolulu; from 
Honolulu to Fiji, possibly with a mid-station on this section if a 
suitable island be available. From Fiji the cable to run direct to
New Zealand.
Knots
Vancouver Island to Honolulu .......................  2,280
Honolulu to Fiji .................................... 2,600
Fiji to New Zealand ................................. 1,150
Total 6,030
The northern terminus of each route is on Vancouver Island. 
The cable will land at some suitable point to be determined, 
probably at Port San Juan, near the entrance of the Strait of San 
Juan, or at Barclay Sound.
Source: New Zealand Pari. Paps., 1894, Telegraph Cables (Further
Papers Relating to), 1-F.8. pp.2-3.
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